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War of 1812 scholarship has focused primarily on classic military studies of decisive 
battles. Likewise, scholarship on the experience of war essentially concentrates on how 
killing and combat effected the human psyche. This dissertation pursues a broader 
perspective. It examines the impact of the environment on the health of soldiers and 
emphasizes everyday conditions and environmental suffering. Veterans’ accounts typically 
elevate suffering in camp over combat. A substantive study of soldiers’ responses to daily 
environmental conditions demonstrates the importance of health management to the outcome 
of the War of 1812. Through case studies of health measures related to frontier conditions, 
the use of alcohol to manage morale, the role of rations and food insecurity on the 1814 
campaign, and close attention to two military units on either side of the conflict – the British 
104th Regiment of Foot and the U.S. 21st Infantry Regiment – this dissertation argues that 
daily environmental management was far more important than victories in battle.  
The environment may have been the most significant factor in the War of 1812, but that 
did not reduce the importance of human agency. An exploration of illness demonstrates that 
the best commanders took proactive steps to protect the health of their soldiers. The British 
 
 
Army used veteran units in intensive combat areas and placed unfit and inexperienced 
soldiers in less threatened locations, such as the Maritime provinces of British North 
America; moreover, it reduced the size of its forces when the environment could not sustain 
large armies. The Americans, on the other hand, promoted officers with the most experience 
in frontier warfare and allowed leaders to move freely between militia and regular units to 
gain experience. For both sides the management of provisions was central to troop morale, 
patriotism, and health. This included generous alcohol rations to mediate harsh climatic 
conditions and the horrors of combat. The 1814 campaign in Niagara demonstrates that 
success on the battlefield was secondary to and dependent upon an effective logistical system 
that provided enough calories for each soldier.
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INTRODUCTION 
Lying in bed alone, a young captain was too ill to troop the line. He was destined 
to lead armies in Mexico and Florida and become the President of the United States. 
However, as the commander of the small Fort Harrison on the Ohio frontier, Captain 
Zachary Taylor was outnumbered, most of his soldiers were ill, and he was completely 
cut off from reinforcements. To make matters worse, Taylor’s strongest soldiers 
remained well despite the fever raging in his company, but they had abandoned their post 
to seek survival on their own. The situation was hopeless; however, Taylor continued to 
lead.1 He encouraged his soldiers to fight, and he managed to hold Fort Harrison. His 
letter recounting the episode shifted from the first-person to the third-person narrative, 
and Taylor was surprised by his performance in a terrible situation.2 The military and 
political leader of the Shawnee Confederacy, Tecumseh, commanded the force opposing 
Taylor. Tecumseh surrounded Fort Harrison, and because of William Hull’s pledge of 
extermination it was likely that all the American soldiers would be killed if Fort Harrison 
capitulated.3 The hopelessness of brutal frontier warfare situations and a trend towards 
massacres between Americans and Native Americans pushed Captain Taylor to defend 
his fort with soldiers completely unfit for regular duty.4 Yet the Americans answered the 
call, overcame their ailments and injuries, and held off a much larger force. Fighting 
 
1 Zachary Taylor to William Harrison from Fort Harrison 16 September 1812, in John Brannan (Ed.). 
Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States, During the War with Great Britain 
in the Years 1812, 13, 14, & 15 : With Some Additional Letters and Documents Elucidating the History of 
That Period (Washington City: Printed by Way & Gideon, for the editor, 1823), 62. Short citation will be, 
Brannan (Ed.), Official Letters. 
2 Ibid.  
3 The Proclamation of William Hull to the Inhabitants of Canada from Sandwich, Upper Canada 12 July 
1812 in Brannan (Ed.) Official Letters, 31. 
4 Taylor to Harrison, in Brannan (Ed.) Official Letters, 62. 
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while ill or injured was one of the best demonstrations of personal honor and courage in 
part because of the harsh realities of frontier siege warfare. In many ways, soldiers longed 
for opportunities to respond in hopeless military encounters, and to overcome sickness 
and perform well in battle was the best way to demonstrate character in an Army that was 
still connected directly to a Revolutionary tradition of suffering and perseverance.  
Like Captain Zachary Taylor, American soldiers and commanders were not 
always sure why they survived, and how they succeeded or failed. Like Taylor’s shift 
from first- to third-person voice, War of 1812 soldiers often surprised themselves with 
their own actions, because the challenges themselves were surprising. It was often harder 
to survive the elements than face the enemy. Honorable victory proved the character of 
the soldiers on both sides, but battles won or lost mattered a lot less than securing lines of 
supply and communication and simply taking the actions necessary to keep soldiers in the 
ranks while fighting in the frontier borderlands region between the United States and 
British North America. While the environment – specifically its influence on sickness – 
was an important factor in the conflict, the actions of soldiers and commanders to 
influence their environment mattered more. Officers struggled to keep soldiers in the 
ranks, and when they gave soldiers the ability to prove their character by fighting while 
ill, injured, or inebriated, they were often rewarded with victories in seemingly hopeless 
situations. The War of 1812, regardless of the persistence of nationalistic portrayals and 
interpretations, was like all others: cruel and unromantic, and the methods used to gain 
victory were often unremarkable. Patriotism was fueled by extra alcohol rations, 
battlefield victories lost initiative because of poor national logistics policies, some of the 
best soldiers sat in garrison for most of the conflict, and New Englanders bore a 
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disproportionate share of a war that their states opposed. An unpopular war was fought in 
an extremely challenging environment, where success was often measured more by 
logistical policies than courage under fire. 
 The War of 1812 began with American failures caused largely by the challenges 
of environmental management. At the outset of the War of 1812, the British had fewer 
soldiers. However, the seat of war in Upper Canada allowed the British 41st Foot to fight 
both against the U.S. forces in Michigan and the invasion coming from New York. In the 
western campaign, the U.S. army commanded by William Hull had more frontier militia 
that could handle remote warfare and logistics as well as heavy cannon moved via Lake 
Erie. In New York, Stephen Van Rensselaer had to build a road to move artillery into the 
Niagara region. Because of differing capabilities in light infantry tactics and different 
environmental challenges, William Hull’s army began its invasion long before 
Rensselaer’s army could attack, and the small British 41st Regiment of Foot was able to 
fight in both key engagements during summer of 1812: the battles of Detroit and 
Queenston Heights. However, the two American losses illustrate one of the most 
important themes in the conflict. In Detroit, citing high numbers of soldiers on the sick 
list, the highly experienced Revolutionary War veteran William Hull surrendered without 
a fight.5 At Queenston Heights, Stephen Van Rensselaer, despite being a political general 
with little military experience, fought fiercely until he collapsed due to blood loss 
following being wounded in the assault. Hull’s soldiers strove to fight despite illness, but 
he surrendered, and he was tried and convicted of cowardice. Van Rensselaer also failed 
 
5 Letter from William Hull to William Eustice from Fort Malden 26 August 1812, in Brannan (Ed.) Official 
Letters, 48. 
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but fought on despite enfeebling wounds, and thus he preserved his honor.6 It may seem 
reasonable to understand Hull’s failure in Detroit based on his losses to illness, but it was 
unacceptable to his peers and subordinates because soldiers were expected to persevere, 
and officers were expected to adapt to the challenges of illness and environment. The 
British strategy exploited the region’s environment, and the battles of Detroit and 
Queenston Heights may have been the only major tactical victories that brought strategic 
gains in the entire conflict.  
 The initial failures of the American Army led to an assault by Tecumseh’s 
confederation and a British Army commanded by General Henry Procter. Militia officers 
like William Henry Harrison, Isaac Shelby, Green Clay, and Duncan McArthur became 
the leaders of the Army in Northern Ohio. Following the massacre at Raisin River, the 
Americans managed to hold out in sieges at small fortifications.7 The sieges were 
difficult but largely successful, and all the commanders had the same problems with high 
rates of sickness that William Hull had at Detroit, but they called for their garrisons to 
fight rather than surrender. The soldiers and officers weathered the British offensive in 
their garrisons until Oliver Hazard Perry’s naval victory gave the Americans control of 
Lake Erie.8 The 1813 campaign led by William Henry Harrison experienced some of the 
most difficult environmental challenges faced by an Army from Ohio to the Niagara 
 
6 Solomon Van Rensselaer, A Narrative of the Affair of Queenstown: In the War of 1812 (New York: 
Leavitt Crocker & Brewster, 1836), 25-26. 
7 For the American Soldier perspective on the Raisin River Massacre see William Atherton, Narrative of 
the Suffering & Defeat of the North-Western Army under General Winchester: Massacre of the Prisoners: 
Sixteen Months Imprisonment of the Writer and Others with the Indians and British (Frankfort, KY: Printed 
for the author by A.G. Hodges, 1842). 
8 No one understood the significant role that the control of Lake Erie played more so than William Henry 
Harrison. He related the control of the lakes to which Army required the most labor. The American 
concentration on siege warfare was significant, but this shifted quickly after Oliver Hazard Perry’s victory. 
See William Harrison to John Armstrong from Seneca Town, 4 August 1813, in Brannan (Ed.). Official 
Letters, 184. 
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region, and his emphasis on light infantry tactics created significant success. From the 
outset of the 1813 offensive, Harrison embraced a light infantry supply line that traded 
wagons for pack horses and employed local provisioning and naval support.9 Harrison 
pushed the allied forces of Tecumseh and Henry Procter back to Niagara through a 
constant pursuit until the Battle of the Thames.10 The militia officers also instituted 
hygienic policies that kept soldiers off the sick list longer and allowed Harrison’s army to 
go deeper into enemy territory.11 Although Harrison won few traditional battlefield 
victories, he accomplished the most strategically because the British and Tecumseh 
coalition never threatened Michigan and Northern Ohio in a meaningful way again. 
Henry Procter remained aggressive even after he lost the environmental advantages, he 
previously held when he controlled Lake Erie, and this loss forced his army into a long 
and miserable retreat that crippled most of his force. William Henry Harrison’s army 
faced the worst environmental challenges when it penetrated the Upper Canadian frontier 
border region just when extremely poor rainy weather made the roads impassable for 
supply wagons.12 Environmentally conscious light infantry tactics did not win any major 
 
9 The first reference to the use of pack horses in Harrison’s army was in December of 1812, William Hull’s 
army also used pack horses, because it was also capable at light infantry tactics. See Letter from Lieutenant 
Colonel John Campbell to Major General William Henry Harrison from Fort Greenbush 23 December 
1812, in Brannan (Ed.). Official Letters, 110-17. 
10 Letter from Major General William Henry Harrison to Secretary of War John Armstrong from 
Moraviantown, 5 October 1813, in Brannan (Ed.). Official Letters, 229. 
11 General Orders 19th Infantry Regiment 1 August 1813, 19th Infantry Regiment Order Book, Library of 
Congress. 
12 This region is currently one of the most fruitful environments in North America, and its ability to grow 
crops is impressive. During the War of 1812 the region was transitioning from first to second nature, but 
the armies destroyed crops at a high rate. The most significant factor in the perception of the region’s 
sparseness and parsimony, however, was its roads. The Niagara region was theoretically best supplied by 
water. However, the Royal Navy’s presence was limited in North America and the American Navy was a 
very modest organization. Although portions of the region were bountiful, poor roads impeded the 
movement of supplies for large armies. The other problem during the War of 1812 was the common and 
often brutal civil destruction. Campaigns during the French and Indian War were more successful, largely 
because Jeffrey Amherst used a counterinsurgency strategy that cultivated positive relationships with the 
local population. As a result, Amherst was able to move a much larger army through the same region.  
6 
 
battles for Harrison, but the states and territories he governed were no longer under threat 
of a British supported assault. 
 East of Niagara in 1813, the British continued to win victories, and seasoned 
regular American Army commanders fared much worse than Harrison’s invasion. The 
largest problem in the Niagara region was the regular officers placed in command, with 
Henry Dearborn and James Wilkinson commanding at the highest echelons. Both 
commanders relied most heavily upon regular regiments and regular tactics. Winfield 
Scott was an exception because he recognized a series of small but essential disasters that 
befell the American forces in the Niagara Region.13 A skirmish at Stoney Creek cost the 
Americans two captured generals, even if the Americans stopped the British attack. The 
complete loss of a detachment led by Colonel Boerstler led to Henry Dearborn’s return to 
Washington D.C., suffering from nervous exhaustion.14 Colonel Winfield Scott 
recognized the ability to support the efforts of William Henry Harrison. Scott wanted to 
complete the defeat of General Henry Procter’s 41st Regiment of Foot, but Wilkinson led 
in an “abortive” manner.15 Wilkinson not only withdrew Scott’s support of Harrison, but 
he also withdrew all regulars from Fort George on the Canadian side of the Niagara 
River. During the 1813 campaign in the Niagara region, America’s greatest victory was 
the destruction of a supply depot (and the unjustified burning of public property) at York. 
However, Wilkinson nullified his victory by withdrawing his forces from the frontier, 
leading to defeats at Crysler’s Farm, Chateauguay, and La Colle Mills. His abject failure 
 
13 Winfield Scott, Winfield, and Timothy D. Johnson (Ed.) Memoirs of Lieut.-General Winfield Scott. 
Voices of the Civil War (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2015), 51. Short citation will be, 
Memoirs of Winfield Scott.  
14 Memoirs of Winfield Scott, 50. 
15 Letter from Winfield Scott to James Wilkinson from Fort George 11 October 1813, in Memoirs of 
Winfield Scott, 54-55. The term abortive was in Scott’s commentary about the letter.  
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at La Colle Mills led to a court-martial and his relief from duty. Wilkinson’s focus on the 
campaign toward Montreal failed to stress how William Henry Harrison weakened the 
British in Upper Canada. Instead, Wilkinson focused on the capital at York and failed 
miserably. Wilkinson preferred to use regulars, and they suffered significantly from 
health problems, so much so that Wilkinson never felt he had adequate forces. 
Wilkinson’s army suffered far more significantly from “the rainy season” than Harrison’s 
army, and Winfield Scott bitterly clashed with Wilkinson because of the lack of emphasis 
on “la petite guerre.”16 Scott understood that fighting in North America required a 
combination of regular and indirect small wars tactics that emphasized ambushes and 
rapid raids on fortifications and supply lines. On the British side, Henry Proctor was in a 
much weaker position. The British no longer controlled Lake Erie, and Proctor’s 41st 
Foot was cut off from supplies. As General Harrison actively pursued Procter, and the 
widespread health afflictions caused by the frontier environment had a larger effect on 
weakened British forces in Upper Canada, Wilkinson’s “abortive” campaign meant that a 
better led American Army would face off against massive British reinforcements in 1814.  
 The military dynamic of the War of 1812 changed significantly in 1814. Gordon 
Drummond commanded the British Army in that year, and he combined local knowledge 
with classic British education and experience fighting the Napoleonic Wars in the 
Netherlands, Egypt, and Jamaica. His family settled in Quebec, so Drummond 
understood the environmental limitations of Canada better than any previous 
commander.17 The initial success of the aggressive strategy of Isaac Brock and Henry 
 
16 Memoirs of Winfield Scott, 56, 51. 
17 Kenneth Stickney, “DRUMMOND, Sir GORDON,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 8, 
University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed November 8, 2019, 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/drummond_gordon_8E.html.  
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Procter overstretched the British after the loss of Lake Erie. Drummond, unlike previous 
leaders, used the minimum forces necessary to control the Niagara region.18 His operation 
employed an economy of force distribution, not in the classic manner of focusing combat 
power elsewhere but rather to minimize logistical challenges. His leadership at Chippewa 
and Lundy’s Lane led to losses in the frontline fighting but succeeded in cutting off 
American supply lines with militia and Native American allies. Drummond traded the 
best battlefield tactics for the best long-term petite guerre strategy. After losses at 
Lundy’s Lane and Chippewa, he went on the offensive for the sieges at Plattsburgh and 
Fort Erie. All the battles fought in the summer of 1814 were American victories, but 
Drummond gained the most and took the offensive. With reinforcements from the end of 
the Peninsular War, Drummond had more troops than the Americans, but he instead 
limited the size of his Army to create a feasible supply system in an isolated frontier 
border region. The veterans of hard fighting in Europe were exceptional soldiers but the 
veterans also came with the injuries and diseases common in years of combat duty. 
Drummond chose a strategy that led to losses on the battlefield, but few leaders gained in 
victory what Drummond gained in defeat. 
 For the United States Army, 1814 was a watershed moment of reform in training 
and tactics. General Jacob Brown, with the help of officers like Winfield Scott and James 
Miller, focused on training with the Baron von Stueben’s drill manual. Brown’s army 
was the best led in the entire conflict, and it showed on the battlefield. Soldiers held up to 
the repeated British attacks at Lundy’s Lane, won a smaller battle at Chippewa, and stood 
 
18 A. M. J. Hyatt, “PROCTER, HENRY,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 6, University of 
Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed November 8, 2019, 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/procter_henry_6E.html.  
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firm in the sieges of Fort Erie and Plattsburgh. The officer performance was exemplary, 
with officers leading from the front. James Miller was the only unwounded senior officer 
in 1814, and he led three bayonet charges: one at Chippewa, one seizing a British battery 
at Lundy’s Lane, and one destroying the British powder magazine at Fort Erie. What 
Jacob Brown could not change was contracted logistics that operated outside the military 
chain of command.19 The British Army also managed logistics by contract, but Arthur 
Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, integrated a British Army officer to serve as 
commissary general. Gordon Drummond maintained a Commissary General as well, and 
he shaped his strategy around his Commissary General’s ability to provide adequate 
sustenance.20 Jacob Brown’s army won its battles but could not keep soldiers in the field 
after victories because of high rates of sickness caused by an inadequate supply system.  
 Overall, victory in battle rarely matched the impact of weather and the 
environment. Commanders who embraced more environmentally conscious tactics 
gained the most strategically, with or without victories on the battlefield. A petite guerre 
strategy preserved logistics but also got the most out of soldiers technically unfit for duty 
because of sickness. In the early war years, the British relied on the coalition led by 
Tecumseh for sound, light infantry tactics; William Hull surrendered a large army 
because of sickness; and another army lost most of its force building a road to transport 
artillery to the Niagara River. In the second year, the British environmental advantages in 
Upper Canada shifted to the Americans because of the Royal Navy defeat on Lake Erie. 
 
19 Contract logistics means paying a private company to provide supplies. Ideally, contract logistics gains 
efficiency and decreases cost; however, military commanders lose control of logistics. 
20 Lieutenant Colonel John Harvey, “District General Orders, Niagara Falls 12 October 1814,” in Ernest 
Cruikshank, Documents Relating to the Invasion of the Niagara Peninsula by the United States Army, 
Commanded by General Jacob Brown, in July and August 1814 (Toronto: Canadian House, 1968). 
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The worst environmental conditions in the conflict emerged in 1813, but William Henry 
Harrison’s use of a strategy that was not reliant on the poor roads of Upper Canada 
completely routed the British Regiment threatening Northern Ohio. In 1814 the American 
Army won every battle; however, Gordon Drummond’s emphasis on sending troops only 
if he could adequately supply them and his tactic of cutting Americans off from their 
supply lines during battle meant the British gained more than the Americans did on the 
battlefield. Policies that kept soldiers in the field mattered more than heroics and 
battlefield victories. 
 Another important component of this introductory summary addresses the 
composition of forces on both sides of the conflict. The British Army was rigid in many 
ways in terms of purchased commissions and an overemphasis on European line order 
tactics. However, the Napoleonic Wars made the British more flexible about 
commissioning by merit and more open to light infantry strategy. Somewhat 
paradoxically, the British Army was both rigid and flexible. The British were, at times, 
fixated on inefficient traditions and other times changed significantly based on the 
realities of the conflict in North America. The regiment was the most significant structure 
in the British Army. The British regiment was as much a family as it was a military unit, 
and all training, direct command, and correspondence happened there. This explains the 
mixture of adaptation and rigidness, because each regiment was unique, and all the 
commanders came out of that system. The British Army also embraced the use of militia 
in skirmishing, flanking duties, and other petite guerre tasks. Those militia soldiers also 
possessed local knowledge and could return home whenever they were sick or necessary 
for the harvest or local security. Their most useful allies throughout the conflict were 
11 
 
Indigenous peoples. There were no British victories without significant help from tribal 
allies. Tecumseh was so revered that he was offered a British Brigadier commission; he 
significantly influenced the British victory in Detroit and held off any American invasion 
from Northern Ohio while the Royal Navy controlled Lake Erie. At Chippewa and 
Lundy’s Lane, militia and Native American troops cut off United States supply lines. The 
British lost those battles but gained the most through using the militia and Native 
Americans as their best light infantry force.  
 The American Army was very different, with a unique hierarchy of forces. There 
were three types of forces in the United States. At the highest echelon was the regular 
armed forces, the second tier was temporary federal volunteer regiments, and state 
militias were at the bottom. While the hierarchy was a well-entrenched system, it is 
problematic to interpret the hierarchy deterministically. Like the British, each American 
regiment was very different, and typically regiments were drawn from the same region. 
Also, for officers, service in the militia on the frontier brought combat experience and 
rapid promotions. Successful leadership in combat often led to federal recognition of rank 
and allowed for a faster path to regular general officer commissions. All that was 
required for militia units to transition to volunteer regiments were new uniforms and 
equipment. The order books for forward-deployed federal regiments also listed new 
recruits coming directly out on the front line in the combat theatre, meaning that soldiers 
often transitioned between the different levels of ground service. The hierarchy with 
regular units and officer commissions at the top meant that service in the militia and 
volunteers could become a path to the highest echelons of command. As such, militia 
12 
 
officers with service in the frontier typical rose to the highest level of leadership because 
militia service was the best path to combat experience before the War of 1812.21  
 The final topic of this brief overview of the war, before a review of pertinent 
literature, focuses on vocabulary. The term “soldier” will be used universally regardless 
of the soldier’s role as regular, militia, or volunteer. Soldier is not technically a term for 
junior officers; however, when interpreted more generally, a soldier is someone who 
fights in a war. This dissertation seeks to understand the War of 1812 experientially, so 
viewing all soldiers as fighters regardless of their rank or status in the militia or regular 
forces is more sensitive to the experience of all soldiers in a harsh frontier climate. Those 
divisions will only be referred to when necessary because the environment did not 
distinguish the hierarchies embedded in the institutional cultures of the British and 
American armed forces. Both sides varied significantly with the roles of the militia and 
regular forces. For officers in the American army those roles were flexible, and most 
successful commanders gained experience in frontier militias before the war. Conversely, 
the barriers between British regular army units were more defined, and often forces that 
transitioned to British Regiments of Foot struggled to attain parity. Native Americans 
shared those features as soldiers or warriors, but that dynamic ignores their tribal identity. 
Thus, they will be referred to by tribe unless that is impossible to ascertain from the 
record. The War of 1812 was not just an operational conflict, it was also about the 
 
21 The exception to this rule would be the younger officers at the outset of the conflict. Josiah Snelling, 
Thomas Sidney Jesup, and Winfield Scott were the core group of highly successful regular Army officers, 
whose commissions came at the beginning of the War of 1812. Thus, while they contradicted the trend 
amongst senior officer they did so because the War of 1812 offered the same level of combat experience to 
them as frontier militia experience did in peace time. Memoirs of Winfield Scott; Thomas Sidney Jesup, 
Thomas Sidney Jesup Papers, Library of Congress. 
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experience of people, and “soldier” is the best term to encompass the wide variety of 
ways that people served in the conflict.   
Current scholarship in multiple fields of study has the potential to inform the 
historiographical interpretations of the War of 1812. The University of Maine’s approach 
to borderlands scholarship is ideal geographically for exploring the northern theatre of the 
War of 1812.22 The multidisciplinary emphasis of borderlands elucidates the conflict 
more significantly. Environmental history, the social science of violence, and the so-
called “new military history” have the potential to shift the focus of scholarship of the 
War of 1812 from a decisive battles approach toward an emphasis on daily management 
of soldiers. Canada is a region that is aptly described as “parsimonious,” so supplying 
armies was far more difficult and significant than winning battles.23 Likewise, North 
American warfare has been understood to be about brutal petite guerre, emphasizing 
unlimited but indirect means of defeating opponents, in contrast to how decisive battles 
decided conflicts in Europe. The social science of violence is moving away from theories 
that elevate combat and killing as the most difficult psychological challenge to embrace 
theories that emphasize moral injury and the constant strain of campaigns over combat. 
Three seemingly different approaches to the study of violence and environment illustrate 
that the day-to-day grind of warfare and campaigning was far more difficult and 
significant than when armies clashed openly. In fact, winning battles rarely gained 
enough advantages to overcome systemic day-to-day problems. Most importantly, 
 
22 The bulk of the armies served in the northern theater, and most of the fighting occurred there. For most of 
1812 and 1813 the other theaters experienced infrequent combat. However, popular memory of the war 
tends to focus on the burning of public buildings in Washington and the sensational victory of Andrew 
Jackson at New Orleans. 
23 Cole Harris, The Reluctant Land: Society, Space, and Environment in Canada before Confederation 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008). 
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soldiers have been elevating the challenges of daily military service over moments of 
crisis and battle since time immemorial, and the experience of war needs to inform both 
the “new” military historiography and the operational interpretations of the War of 1812. 
In a dissertation that seeks to create a shift in methodological approaches to the 
War of 1812, it will be important to first explore the innovative works in other 
disciplines. Specifically, David Livingstone Smith is fundamentally altering the way that 
scholars approach war and violence to focus on an evolutionary psychological 
perspective. His work challenges years of research that defines war and killing as 
inhuman and understands human beings as uniquely violent animals.24 As group-based 
animals, human beings rarely murder those that they believe are also humans. But 
barbarians or individuals that are considered less than human are far more likely to be 
brutalized and exterminated like animals.25 Human beings are capable of remarkable 
empathy to groups they identify with, while atrocity, systematic ethnic cleansing, and 
targeting of civilians often occur against groups that are not considered human beings. 
Native Americans were “savages,” Jews in the Second World War were considered 
insects worthy of industrialized death through an insecticide, and American soldiers 
justified Vietnamese suffering through the excessive use of napalm and defoliants due to 
their backward society. Alan Taylor’s argument that the War of 1812 was a “race war” in 
which the British utilized barbarian slaves and Native Americans against white frontier 
settlements is especially evocative of Smith’s approach to warfare.26 Likewise, John 
 
24 David Livingstone Smith, The Most Dangerous Animal: Human Nature and the Origins of War (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007). 
25 David Livingstone Smith, Less than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2011). 
26 Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies 
(New York: Random House, 2010), 137. 
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Grenier’s work on the unlimited and brutal targeting of noncombatant villages during the 
War of 1812 illustrates how useful Smith’s evolutionary approach is to the conflict. 
Dehumanization does, however, create much higher rates of psychological impairment.27  
It is also important to emphasize how brutality through dehumanization created 
high rates of mental illness before the twentieth century. The question of killing as an 
emotionally charged psychological event, and the general overemphasis on killing, 
combat, and battle ignore how significantly sustained detrimental stress is on an 
individual’s health.28 Robert Sapolsky’s work in biological neuroendocrinology has 
reoriented any substantive study of stress. As a neurochemical expert, Sapolsky has 
illustrated the effect that cortisol, rather than epinephrine (typically understood as 
adrenaline), has had on the human body. While epinephrine provides significant energy 
under duress, cortisol shuts down every system in the human body that is not 
immediately necessary for survival.29 The immune system, reproductive system, and 
digestion are all significantly affected by cortisol. Jonathan Shay has argued that 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is the continuation of survival response in a non-
survival environment.30 With the elevation of cortisol levels during stress, the long-term 
systems shut down become detrimental to the health of soldiers. Day-to-day stressful 
 
27 John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
28 The work of Dave Grossman is most responsible for the overemphasis on the act of killing but existed in 
the wake of problematic, and ethically compromised work of Philip Zimbardo. Additionally, Grossman 
relied on the much-criticized work of U.S. Military Historian S. L. A. Marshall, who is widely known to 
exaggerate the reluctance of killing by soldiers. See Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of 
Learning to Kill in War and Society (New York: Little Brown, 1995). See also Philip Zimbardo, The 
Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York: Random House, 2007). 
29 Robert Sapolsky, Why Don’t Zebras Get Ulcers (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1994). 
30 Jonathan Shay, Odysseus America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming (New York: 
Scribner, 2002). 
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situations are, therefore, far more damaging to human health than extreme moments like 
a battle. 
Additionally, Sapolsky described how low socio-economic status, specifically 
food insecurity, and the unpredictability of stressors are worse for the health of people 
than extreme events. Scholars rarely link hunger caused by challenging logistics on a 
frontier with the psychology of warfare, but it was probably the most significant 
psychological factor. Likewise, the War of 1812 was a series of small skirmishes that 
could occur in any place, which was more stressful than the small group of “decisive” 
engagements. Even the most innovative military histories of the experience of war, such 
as This Republic of Suffering by Drew Gilpin Faust, have been based upon the dated 
stress research of David Grossman.31 The broader literature will be strengthened by 
moving military histories on the experience of war away from the Grossman perspective 
that exaggerates the emphasis on combat and killing towards the Sapolsky 
neuroendocrine perspective that recognizes the deleterious effects of sustained stress.  
 Jonathan Shay is perhaps the most influential scholar on the experience of soldiers 
in warfare from antiquity until the present. His books coined the term “moral injury” that 
significantly altered the study of the experience of war. Shay differentiated the types of 
killing typical in battle from those done immorally. Atrocity, the targeting of civilians, 
and unconscientious leadership were more detrimental to soldier health than killing in 
morally justified military situations.32 Systematically, petite guerre in the early nineteenth 
 
31 Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2008). 
32 Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1994). 
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century was unlimited warfare that, by design, targeted civilians, discouraged tribal 
fighters via brutality, and, in general, destroyed all public property. William Hull’s call 
for a “War of Extermination,” the Raisin River Massacre, the burning of York, and the 
partial destruction of Washington D.C. represent a war characterized by moral injury. 
When Shay’s work on emotional trauma is understood alongside the general health 
decline caused by persistent stress identified by Sapolsky, it becomes clear that the brutal 
style of warfare on the North American frontier led to significantly high rates of 
sickness.33  
 Out of western militaries, the Canadian Armed Forces have perhaps the best grasp 
on the role that moral injury plays on observers of atrocity who do not personally act 
immorally. Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire’s struggle with significant PTSD 
occurred not because he committed atrocities. Instead, he suffered psychologically 
because the United Nations did not supply forces adequate to stop the Rwandan 
Genocide.34 In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries the Canadian Armed 
Forces have been employed almost universally in peacekeeping roles, yet they still have 
struggled extensively with conflict-related mental illness. American prisoners who 
directly observed brutality as prisoners produced far more emotional accounts than 
descriptions of battles. Likewise, when the American commanders like William Henry 
Harrison and Jacob Brown targeted grist mills, the resulting labor and hunger triggered 
 
33 Jonathan Shay defines PTSD in the veterans’ experience as the persistence of combat adaptations to non-
combat settings. It is important to understand both of his key theories of moral injury and the persistence of 
battlefield adaptation into civilian live, although his work on soldier experience, Achilles in Vietnam, will 
be used in this dissertation. See Jonathan Shay, Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of 
Homecoming (New York: Scribner, 2002). 
34 Roméo Dallaire with Jessica Humphreys, Waiting for First Light: My Ongoing Battle with PTSD 
(Toronto: Vintage, 2016). 
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significant emotional expressions from British and Canadian observers. Focusing on the 
day-to-day small war experiences of soldiers reveals how much more significant the 
unlimited approach to petite guerre tactics played on the minds and health of soldiers. 
Most soldiers observed what we now call moral injuries directly, but all soldiers feared 
brutality because it occurred without predictability.  
 In the 1980s, when the PTSD diagnosis became formally codified in the 
American Psychological Association’s Diagnostics and Statistics Manual Version Four, 
major weather events were also officially included as a catalyst for emotional disorder. 
Weather brought real sickness in the form of stagnating pools of water, which produced 
malaria-carrying insects.35 However, contemporary accounts in Africa reveal the 
psychological influence of weather, as it pertains to rain and malaria. In his book What is 
the What, Dave Eggers novelized the lived experience of an African refugee. Eggers 
described how rain led to physical and psychological burdens for Liberian refugees. In 
their emaciated state, the African refugees knew that rain brought dengue fever and, 
therefore, brought on depression and hopelessness about the possibility of survival. 
Again, unlike the mental predictability of a large battle, the weather was outside of each 
soldier’s control and often led to life-threatening illnesses.36 Sapolsky’s descriptions of 
recent shifts in stress research illustrate how soldier complaints about the weather were 
 
35 The work of Edwin Dexter was foundational to environmental psychology, and he is known as a 
foundational psychologist on the influence of weather on the human mind. See Edwin Grant Dexter, 
“Conduct and the Weather: An Inductive Study of the Mental Effects of Definite Meteorological 
Conditions” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1899), and “Drunkenness and the Weather,” Nature 61 
(1899): 365-67. 
36 Dave Eggers, What is the What (New York: First Vintage, 2006). 
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more significant psychologically than battle and killing because of the unpredictability 
and complete lack of control early nineteenth-century armies had over the weather.  
 Despite the recent, but not current, overemphasis on singularly stressful events, 
stress research was not born in the study of trauma; Hans Selye created the concept in the 
study of the common additional health problems that most patients contracted when 
admitted to hospitals. Selye recognized a clinical concept of stress by realizing that fear 
generated by a hospitalization created a condition he called general adaptation 
syndrome.37 Selye became the father of the idea of stress by first understanding 
nonviolent day-to-day stressors, yet single incidents of violence became the most 
represented source of emotional trauma. The elevation of singular battles in military 
history fundamentally masks the realities of stress research, and, more importantly, 
ignores soldier accounts that continually emphasize the challenges of camp life over 
large-scale violence.  
 While the work of David Grossman On Killing is trendy and has captured the 
broad imagination, it has also overemphasized the act of killing as the most challenging 
feature of warfare.38 However, the social science of stress and violence is far more 
oriented on the stress concept of persistent stress than singularly extreme events. Day-to-
day understanding of soldier experiences in warfare is an approach to the experience of 
war that is far more grounded in stress research then the typical decisive battles approach 
to the War of 1812. Daily management is the best approach to understanding the way that 
 
37 Lumsden, D. Paul, “Hans Selye.” In The Canadian Encyclopedia. Historica Canada. Article published 
December 13, 2007; Last Edited March 04, 2015. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/hans-
selye accessed 10 September 2019. 
38 Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. 
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human beings experienced the War of 1812 and how that shaped its outcome. 
Additionally, the “new military history” is shifting the field of military history away from 
campaigns and commanders into explorations of social and cultural factors, and this 
dissertation’s emphasis on stress research can also strengthen military historiography.39 
 Another significant but problematic theory that has influenced scholarship on the 
experience of warfare was the work of literary scholar Joseph Campbell. While 
Campbell’s analysis of the hero’s journey through currently accepted social science 
created a model for the work of Jonathan Shay and David Livingston Smith, Campbell’s 
psychoanalytical analysis of the “The Hero’s Journey” was built on problematic Freudian 
psychology.40 The uncritical elevation of Freudian psychoanalysis as the material neuro-
biological source of mythology relating to male warrior archetypes was far too grounded 
in high-level intellectual theory. It is not difficult to reify the ideas of Freud in seemingly 
convincing ways, but the analyses of heroes ignore the ground realities of common 
soldiers. The evidence for a prescriptive universal soldier experience is certainly 
available, but Campbell’s narrative ignores nuance. Likewise, the work inspired quite a 
bit of less competent Freudian psychoanalytical history that has led to the idea that 
psychological history is bad history that discourages work based on more sound social 
science. Contemporary research, specifically surrounding the theme of psychological 
resiliency, illustrates how people react to combat and trauma very differently.41 Moral 
injuries, relating to unethical war crimes and genocide, are far more predictive of post-
conflict psychological problems than a universal heroic journey. From a social 
 
39 Stephen Morillo, with Michael F. Pavkovic, What is Military History? (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 37. 
40 Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
41 Salvator R. Maddi, “On Hardiness and other Pathways to Resilience,” American Psychologist 60, no. 3 
(April 2005): 261-62. 
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perspective, Campbell’s analysis of heroes at the highest echelons of society is the 
biggest problem because mythological heroes ignore most human experience. Campbell’s 
influential work on heroes explores exceptional cases and ignores common experience. 
The spiritual talisman of elite heroes that create success in battle and post-conflict 
atonement is just as easily the result of class and racial privileges that are typically not 
available for the ordinary soldiers. Additionally, soldier is becoming a term that applies 
to more than male archetypes. The classic heroes approach ignores multiple gender 
categories. Still, Campbell’s biologically materialist argument about mythology has 
inspired the work of scholars using more sound social science.42 The work of Campbell 
set a model for the work of Jonathan Shay and David Livingston Smith, and science is 
always changing and developing new avenues for research. Campbell’s work on elite 
archetypes through the social science of his era opens the way for a dissertation that 
employs up-to-date trauma scholarship to inform our understanding of the daily 
experience of ordinary soldiers.  
 From a historiographical perspective, this dissertation seeks to unite the 
outstanding publications of award-winning early American scholars like Alan Taylor and 
Nicole Eustace with the work of “new military historians” such as John Grenier and 
David Preston. Taylor and Eustace’s books affect broader fields in early American 
scholarship, while new military historians are modernizing the technical military 
historical approach. However, these works usually do not correspond with one another 
 
42 Psychoanalytical research is not currently considered the soundest approach to the human mind, 
especially from a materialist perspective. Psychoanalysis was the most accepted science on the human brain 
during the writing of Joseph Campbell. Scientists may not accept Freudian analysis as a materialist 
approach to the human mind today, but it was the most accepted view for nearly a hundred years. Methods 
based on social science should require periodic updates as the science on the human mind develops. 
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and have made less impact on the operational understanding of warfare. For Grenier’s 
The First Way of War, the War of 1812 represented a conflict in which active officers 
discounted the contributions of rangers in the Northern theater.  Grenier’s subsequent 
work transitioned to leaders like Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harrison, who 
better-employed ranger tactics and the militia, but discounted the role of regulars who 
originally served in the militia. Grenier’s argument is useful because officers like James 
Miller, Jacob Brown, and Eleazer Ripley may have technically been federal officers, but 
they held commissions in the militia early in the war. Most successful officers held 
federal rank but had militia experience. Grenier changed the way that early American 
scholars understood warfare because he placed the principle of unlimited warfare, which 
targeted civilians, front and center in small-scale conflicts. Also, Grenier did not sanitize 
violence; he explored violence as something that produces racism rather than the notion 
that racism engenders brutality.43 
 Building on a strong foundation of work on Native American warfare, David 
Preston constructed an approach to the Battle of Monongahela in 1755 that explores the 
battle from an environmental perspective. British officers wasted most of their logistical 
resources because of the personal supplies of officers in the preservation of class division 
and a fixation on heavy infantry wagons. General Edward Braddock’s army’s loss at 
Monongahela occurred because of the mismanagement and harsh environment of North 
 
43 Grenier, The First Way of War. Light infantry and petite guerre are often used interchangeably in this 
dissertation. However, there are important distinctions between the terms. Light infantry tactics involved 
the deployment of soldiers in operations and battle. The tactics of petite guerre were similar, but they 
included destruction of the environment and attacks on the civilian population. As a result, petite guerre 
warfare was very personal and brutal. 
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America.44 Braddock’s Defeat highlighted how poor management of the environment and 
a reluctance to embrace light infantry petite guerre led to abject failures. A poor grasp of 
the environment drove sickness due to poor logistics, and light infantry tactics emerged 
as a force of foot soldiers more adept at using the environment to their advantage. When 
grappling with Preston’s study and the work of other environmental historians such as 
Elizabeth Fenn and J. R. McNeil, it is equally important to remember that the best 
implementers of petite guerre tactics were also adept at using disease ecology to their 
advantages.45 Winfield Scott, a veteran of the War of 1812, was celebrated as a military 
genius for his victory in Mexico because his strategy was based significantly on the 
disease ecology of yellow fever.46 He gained those insights on small wars as a junior 
commander in Upper Canada. Likewise, Jeffrey Amherst’s exploitation of smallpox 
blankets through decentralized authority and subordinate initiative coincided with his 
formidable skill in moving British armies on the isolated North American frontier.47 
Officers who were skilled in managing small wars tactics also excelled at manipulating 
the health of their soldiers and the opponents.  
 Nicole Eustace’s recent monographs on the Revolution and War of 1812 illustrate 
the role of emotion and national identity. Eustace explored patriotism through population 
 
44 David Preston, Braddock’s Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to the Revolution (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2015). Preston notes that during the Revolutionary War the quartermaster 
department housed some of the best officers in the Continental Army. George Washington learned to value 
logistics from General Edward Braddock, and he placed some of his most skilled officers in logistical roles 
Many of those officers were highly educated Europeans. Following the Revolution, however, the military 
often contracted civilians to supply the military. The new system was less effective, and as a result soldiers 
suffered from deficient supplies. 
45 Elizabeth Fenn, Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-82 (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2001), John Robert McNeill, Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
46 Fenn, Pox Americana, 291-92. 
47 Elizabeth Fenn, “Biological Warfare in the Eighteenth-Century North America: Beyond Jeffrey 
Amherst,” Journal of American History 86, no. 4 (March 2000): 1552-80. 
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expansion, manhood, civil society, and the destruction of Native Americans. Her 
observations on crucial themes related to elite ideas about patriotism are especially 
valuable.48 However, her attention to detail, such as the facial expressions of William 
Hull during his surrender as argued in his court-martial, are often too removed from the 
material realities. Brilliant revelations from an award-winning scholar do much to tell us 
what elites thought and less about how that translated to the actions of soldiers and junior 
officers. By exploring daily realities with an emphasis on the soldiers’ experience of the 
environment, this dissertation will investigate how patriotism happened in the stomachs 
of soldiers. Specifically, it investigates how the generous use of liquor increased combat 
morale and motivation and how low food rations taxed the minds and bodies of soldiers 
to such a degree that the purest love of country could not overcome. Patriotism was a 
powerful idea, but it could also be defined by a warm belly – full of liquor – on the 
Fourth of July. 
 Alan Taylor has changed the way scholars understand the war in fundamental 
ways, specifically by introducing an environmental argument in his broad monograph on 
the northern theatre of the War of 1812. His books also advance a tragic interpretation of 
the war that is far closer to the harsh realities experienced daily by soldiers.49 In an article 
exploring the problem that environmental historians have seldom embraced social 
history, Taylor claims that he is a social historian interested in the environment. By 
employing the borderlands approach emphasized at the University of Maine, with a 
 
48 Nicole Eustace, 1812: War and the Passions of Patriotism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2012). 
49 See Taylor, The Civil War of 1812. This book represented a stark criticism of any romantic 
understanding of the War of 1812. His emphasis on citizens with shifting loyalty, and the violent race war 
emphasized the tragic aspects of the conflict.  
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closer study of day-to-day environmental experiences, this dissertation will take an 
essential step in expanding Taylor’s work. Additionally, Taylor’s scholarship described 
the Royal Navy’s use of African American slaves as supplements to marine raids in 
Virginia. His book illustrates how the Southern Democratic-Republican strongholds that 
supported war politically employed most of their soldiers in defending against slave 
revolts.50 Because of the fear of slave revolts, the soldier who fought in the northern 
theater came from the states most opposed to the war, and therefore soldiers and junior 
officers were far more likely to speak honestly about the harsh realities of the war. 
Taylor’s approach will be strengthened significantly with a dissertation that uses day-to-
day specificity to support his shift away from celebratory interpretation. 
 The military history of the War of 1812, in many ways, exists in a separate realm 
from other scholarly breakthroughs. There has been a fair amount of keeping pace with 
military historical interpretations of organizational leadership and a shift toward 
campaign analyses. The incorporation of social history is well underway, and there are 
significant exceptions to the trend toward battle case studies. The best case is John 
Grodzinski’s history of the 104th Regiment of Foot.51 His work’s attention to one 
regiment illuminates the way that illness influenced the Maritime-recruited regiment, as 
well as its skill in employing the tactics of petite guerre. Grodzinski’s excellent account 
of the 104th is why building a dissertation on evidence from day-to-day records is so 
necessary for the field. Grodzinski’s attention to lower-level regimental sources is 
 
50 Alan Taylor, The Internal Enemy: Slavery and the War in Virginia, 1772-1832 (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2013). 
51 John Grodzinski, The 104th (New Brunswick) Regiment of Foot in the War of 1812 (Ottawa: Goose Lane 
Editions and the New Brunswick Military Heritage Project, 2014). 
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exceptional, but comprehensive work covering all the regimental order books is needed 
to understand the war from the bottom up. 
 The most troubling aspect of the War of 1812’s military histories relates to the 
analysis of brutality. At the highest forums of military history, there is still a well-
developed “he started it” debate about the burning of cities.52 Reciprocity was the 
problem in the War of 1812, so continuing the cycle of blame in contemporary scholarly 
publications without contextualizing the actions as morally questionable on both sides is 
extremely problematic. In a presentation on his experiences in Vietnam, Tim O’Brien 
described his frustration with the people in the village at My Lai. He described his desire 
to take out his frustrations out on the local villagers there: “We did not turn our machine 
guns on civilians.”53 Understanding the motivations of brutal reciprocity should not also 
 
52 This debate is largely regional with historians focusing on the Old Northwest defending the actions of the 
United States poised against Canadian nationalist historians. Alec Gilpin’s defense of the surrender of 
William Hull is central to the U.S. regional argument because he assumes a massacre would have occurred 
at Fort Detroit without a surrender. While that massacre may have occurred, indeed it was likely, his 
argument ignores evidence that Hull incited that massacre with his policy of killing any British officer 
serving with Native Americans. Gilpin’s student and Army Signal Corps historian Stephen Rauch has 
defended this argument. J. C. A. Staggs’s social history of officer courts-martial also justified the 
assumption of tribal brutality as a rationale for Hull’s actions. Donald Graves came to the defense of the 
Canadian peaceable kingdom myth, in bi-centennial Journal of Military History article. He argued that the 
burning of Washington only occurred as a response the U.S. burning of York. As an Army Reserve Officer 
Training Corps instructor teaching future military officers about the ethical application of violence, the 
author of this dissertation has stepped into this debate with a recent American Review of Canadian Studies 
article describing the problem of reciprocal violence. Both sides used the concept of reciprocity to justify 
atrocities and how this current scholarly debate uses the same logic that caused all the violence. See Alec 
Gilpin, The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2012); 
Stephen Rauch, “A Stain Upon the Nation? A Review of the Detroit Campaign of 1812 in United States 
Military History,” Michigan Historical Review 38, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 129-53; J. C. A. Stagg, “United 
States Army Officers in the War of 1812: A Statistical and Behavioral Portrait,” Journal Of Military 
History 76, no. 4 (October 2012): 1001-34; Donald Graves, “Why the White House Was Burned: An 
Investigation into the British Destruction of Public Buildings at Washington in August 1814,” Journal Of 
Military History 76, no. 4 (October 2012): 1095-127; and Joseph Miller, “Two Brownstowns: A Case 
Study on Moral Injury and Reciprocal Violence,” American Review of Canadian Studies 48, no. 2 (2018): 
138-51. 
53 Marilyn Wesley, “Truth and Fiction in Tim O'Brien’s ‘If I Die in a Combat Zone’ and ‘The Things They 
Carried,’” College Literature 29, no. 2 (2002): 1-18. The author was initially exposed to this speech 
listening to a Bryan Cranston reading of The Things They Carried by Audible Studios. The speech is 
additional content. Tim O’Brien, The Things they Carried. Narrated by Bryan Cranston (Newark, NJ: 
Audible INC, 2013).  
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justify. Any adequately parented toddler knows that one wrong does not justify 
retribution. Even if the Raisin River Massacre predated the burning of York, which in 
turn predated the burning of Washington, reciprocal brutality is still wrong. Today, 
infantry platoon leaders know that they will be incarcerated by acting based on such 
logic, and this kind of debate should not guide academic discourse.54 The reciprocity 
itself was the cause of most of the brutality, so historical observers must help disengage 
from the “who started it” debate. The concept of moral injury should not, as in many 
studies on the subject, be overgeneralized because most soldiers feel the hatred of war, 
understand the desire to lash out at prisoners or non-combatants, and suppress the 
appetite for reciprocity.55 O’Brien’s frustration above with the My Lai massacre 
becoming symbolic of the war resulted from his difficulty of overcoming the force of 
desire to lash out against the population. The whitewash of the brutality of the War of 
1812 as a form of retaliation is based on a flawed assumption that every veteran, soldier, 
or militiamen had no moral compass because of the savagery of warfare. Open prejudice 
of veterans as non-agents is unmistakable in fashionable society, and the irony of national 
 
54 The best example of this is the placement of the book Black Hearts on multiple U.S. military professional 
reading lists. The book is something that all ROTC faculty at the University of Maine are expected to read 
and it is taught to fourth-year cadets. The book explores the relationship between a toxic command climate 
and an atrocity carried out by a soldier struggling with mental illness. See Jim Frederick, Black Hearts: 
One Platoon’s Decent into Madness in Iraq’s Triangle of Death (New York: Random House, 2012). See 
“Commandant's Reading List - A Complete List.” USMC OFFICER. Accessed September 11, 2019. 
https://www.usmcofficer.com/marine-corps-knowledge/commandants-reading-list/.  See also “Suggested 
Readings: Library: CAPL.” CAPL News. Accessed September 11, 2019. 
https://capl.army.mil/library/suggested-readings.php.  
55 Karl Marlantes argues that moral injury more often creates an exaggerated morality. A Vietnam veteran, 
he used the example of how that as a platoon leader he excessively used painful weapons like napalm, but 
as a veteran he is opposed to the production of such weapons. However, were he to go back he knows that 
he would use the weapons again, because as leader it was his job to do whatever he could to keep his 
Marines alive. He recognized the contradiction between his post-war sense of ethics pertaining to weapons 
like napalm and the pragmatic sense use of whatever weapons needed to survive. See Karl Marlantes, What 
It Is Like to Go to War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2011). 
28 
 
myths of espousing peaceable republican virtue while condoning reciprocal violence 
strengthens the idea.  
 Most of the works on the conflict have been operational military histories or battle 
case studies. Donald Graves has made a career of works focused on highly nationalistic 
operational military histories. His books celebrate the pre-Confederation military service 
in ways that mirror significantly the American “Greatest Generation” approach to World 
War II. His work is substantial and accurate but is a part of a long tradition of bugles and 
trumpets battle narratives. It rejects new methodology and typically describes battles in 
detail with little sense of the impact and the fact the most battles did not generate much in 
the way of strategic importance.56 Graves still celebrates the glory of battlefield exploits, 
and that is unique in the era of modern military history. However, he excels at technical 
military history, uses extensive primary sources, and reaches a broad audience of readers. 
His approach to narration is valuable, and “New Military” histories typically only reach 
academic audiences. His approach to the readable battle narratives can be strengthened 
significantly with studies that use newer approaches.57 
 
56 A recently published book by Joseph Stoltz is an excellent example how the study of historical memory 
greatly strengthens the historiography of the War of 1812. In his book, A Bloodless Victory, Stoltz explored 
the way that interpretations of the Battle of New Orleans have changed over time. He argues that nationalist 
and Confederate processes of historical memory have made the realities of the battle more obscure. The 
battle was won largely because New Orleans had a large quantity of French Napoleonic War veterans who 
were skilled in artillery. However, that highly experienced group of recent immigrants have never fit into 
the American stories of Western and Southern masculinity. See Joseph Stoltz, A Bloodless Victory: The 
Battle of New Orleans in History and Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017). 
57 Donald Graves, Field of Glory: The Battle of Crysler's Farm, 1813 (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1999); 
Where Right and Glory Lead!: The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814 (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1997); And 
All Their Glory Past : Fort Erie, Plattsburgh and the Final Battles in the North, 1814 (Montreal: Robin 
Brass Studio, 2013); and In Peril on the Sea : The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle of the Atlantic 
(Toronto: Canadian Naval Memorial Trust by R. Brass Studio, 2003). 
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 The group of military officers studying the War of 1812 have produced far more 
rigorous work but have limitations based upon the process of historical studies and 
officer development. Military historians trained in officer service schools typically focus 
solely on the Military Decision-Making Process, and as such, concentrate strictly on 
operational management.58 The Military Decision-Making Process is a high order process 
trained through graduate-level coursework and executed primarily by professional 
officers. Scholars from this point of view often overlook problems of day-to-day 
management, junior officers, and soldiers. The analyses are above the company level, and 
this dissertation seeks to explore the war from the lowest levels possible. Scholarship 
focused on operational history is intellectual history, with more attention to big ideas than 
material realities.  
 
58 It is interesting that most of these authors work directly for the U.S. Government and their standard for 
publication is books written for officers above the rank of captain. Some officers play similar roles in the 
Canadian military. Most of the studies focus solely on operational command, to inform the work of 
operational leaders. Many of these authors have published “New Military History” texts in peer reviewed 
presses, but the volume of the professional writing is for officers studying in U.S. military graduate-level 
education service schools. See Richard Barbuto, Jonathan M. House, and Combat Studies Institute (U.S.), 
Forgotten Decisive Victories (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Army Press, 2017); Richard Barbuto, and Center 
of Military History, The Canadian Theater, 1813 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United 
States Army, 2013); Richard Barbuto, and Center of Military History, The Canadian Theater, 1814 
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2014); Richard Barbuto, Niagara, 
1814: America Invades Canada (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000); Donald Hickey, The War of 
1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Bicentennial ed. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012); Donald Hickey, 
Don't Give up the Ship!: Myths of the War of 1812 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006); and Donald 
Hickey, Glorious Victory: Andrew Jackson and the Battle of New Orleans (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2015). See also Wesley Turner, The Military in the Niagara Peninsula: Eighth Annual 
Niagara Peninsula History Conference (St. Catherines, ON: Vanwell, 1990); Wesley Turner, British 
Generals in the War of 1812: High Command in the Canadas (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1999); Wesley Turner, The War of 1812: The War That Both Sides Won (Toronto.: Dundurn Press, 2000); 
Donald Graves and John R. Grodzinski, Fighting for Canada: Seven Battles, 1758-1945 (Toronto: Robin 
Brass Studio, 2000); John R. Grodzinski, Defender of Canada: Sir George Prevost and the War of 1812 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013); Joseph Stoltz and Center of Military History, The Gulf 
Theater, 1813-1815 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2014); John 
Elting, Amateurs, to Arms!: A Military History of the War of 1812. Major Battles and Campaigns (Chapel 
Hill, NC: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1991); and Robert Quimby, The U.S. Army in the War of 1812: 
An Operational and Command Study (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997). 
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The exception to this rule would be Canadian military officers because the strong 
militia tradition in Canada is not antagonistic to the institutional culture of the Canadian 
military. There has also been a rich tradition of rigorous historians in the ranks of the 
Canadian Army. Colonel Ernest Cruikshank has been referred to as the master chronicler 
of the war because of his editorial creation of exhaustive documents collections. The field 
of study owes so much to Cruikshank regarding the available printed primary sources that 
are now searchable, but his scholarship was impressive as well.59 His work in 
counterinsurgency is still timely as he often celebrates leaders who shared tribal culture 
and treated Native Peoples like equals and allies.60 Cruikshank even made that case to 
American historians amid controversy relating to torture in the Philippines.  
C. P. Stacy is an even more towering figure in the field of Canadian History in 
general. As a veteran officer and historian, Stacy recognized the complexity and 
persistence of national myths. He acknowledged the role that loss of Lake Erie played in 
the failures of often-criticized Henry Procter. Stacy’s contemporary, Jay McKay 
Hitsman, likewise explored the mythology of the Canadian militia.61 In many ways, 
 
59 Ernest Cruikshank, Drummond’s Winter Campaign 1813  (Niagara Falls, ON: Lundy's Lane Historical 
Society , 1900); Ernest Cruikshank, The Battle of Fort George (Welland, ON: Tribune Print, 1904), Ernest 
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Cruikshank, Documents Relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit, 1812 (Ottawa: 
Govt. Print. Bureau, 1912); Ernest Cruikshank, Documents Relating to the Invasion of the Niagara 
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(Toronto: Canadian House, 1968); Ernest Cruikshank, Queenston Heights (Niagara Falls, ON: Lundy’s 
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Niagara Frontier in 1814 (Niagara Falls, ON: Lundy’s Lane Historical Society, 1896); and Ernest 
Cruikshank and William Hamilton Merritt, Campaigns of 1812-1814 Contemporary Narratives by Captain 
W.H. Merritt, Colonel William Claus, Lieut-Colonel Matthew Elliott and Captain John Norton (Niagara 
Falls, ON: Lundy’s Lane Historical Society, 1902).  
60 Ernest Cruikshank, “The Employment of Indians in the War of 1812,” in American Historical 
Association, (Washington: Government Publication Office, 1896). 
61 C. P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada; a Survey of Defence Policies and Strategic Conditions 
Past and Present (Toronto: Issued for the Canadian institute of international affairs by the Ryerson press, 
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scholars like Donald Graves are a regression toward more nationalistically romantic texts. 
With some exceptions, combat veterans like Stacy do not typically romanticize 
nationalism and conflict; the field would be strengthened significantly by writers with 
firsthand combat experience and without the bias toward high order military operations 
processes that are conventional in the writing of field grade officers. Cruikshank and 
Hitsman, as well as Stacy, were all scholars ahead of their time, and returning to their 
more critical view of nationalism based upon the practical realities of military service 
will re-center the field while simultaneously contextualizing the War of 1812 within a 
broader impulse toward “New Military History.” Like the works of veteran Canadian 
historians, this dissertation seeks to take a veteran’s perspective to understand the conflict 
better. Veterans’ viewpoints are too often dismissed by historians, even though personal 
experience would be celebrated in other fields of academic study. Scholars acknowledge 
literary authors like Tim O’Brien, Ernest Hemmingway, and Joseph Heller for their 
truthful accounts of war, yet military veterans are considered too personally invested for 
objective military history when they depart from classic operational history.62 The 
perspective of a veteran junior officer with an academic historical approach is useful to 
add depth to the more nationalistic and Military Decision Process grounded studies. 
Celebratory nationalistic accounts ignore the sheer unreality of conflict for soldiers, and 
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the manner in which nationalistic texts find the bright side is often dismissive of the 
unrelentingly terrible daily experiences of soldiers in the War of 1812. 
The last meaningful source of military history lies in the first-person accounts of 
soldiers and military commanders that link this dissertation to a broader dialogue about 
warfare. The first example is the campaign of William Slim in the China-Burma Theater 
in World War II. After an embarrassing defeat, Slim recognized that the overreliance on 
conventional tactics using standard roads was the key cause of Allied failure.63 A shift to 
irregular jungle warfare tactics coincided with discipline concerning the health of 
soldiers.64 In the first campaign, crowded roads hindered the logistics of Slim’s force, and 
one of the key additions to traffic was the movement of sick and wounded soldiers.65 
Slim faced the biggest problem with malaria; he recognized that these soldiers needed 
rest closer to the front line in order to limit deaths in long marches to hospitals and 
eliminate massive amounts of road traffic that hindered logistics. Slim also held battalion 
commanders responsible for the hygiene of their soldiers by firing any leader that had a 
rate of loss greater than five percent from malaria.66 Simple measures, like always 
wearing full uniform in searing heat, were measures best controlled by commanders, and 
lower rates of sickness improved combat effectiveness. 
 
63 William Joseph Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945 (New York: 
Cooper Square Press: Distributed by National Book Network, 2000). 
64 Slim’s strategy worked to keep all soldiers in forward areas, expected all support soldiers to behave like 
combatants, and made all soldiers comfortable in the jungle away from the roads and urban areas. Keeping 
soldiers fit and in forward areas was central to his strategy, including basic public health measures like 
what was available in the War of 1812. See Slim, Defeat into Victory, 142-43. 
65 Slim employed Malaria Forward Treatment Units (MFTUs) to eliminate crowded roads. See Slim, Defeat 
into Victory, 178. 
66 Ibid., 180. 
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The second experience is less about the management of sickness and more about 
the role of environment on strategy in petite guerre conflict. Basil Liddel Hart considered 
T. E. Lawrence to be among the greatest thinkers in military history.67 The campaign of 
T.E. Lawrence as an advisor of Arab Bedouins may seem extremely remote from the War 
of 1812, but his philosophy of irregular war is one of the most influential ideas for this 
dissertation. In a professional article titled “The Evolution of a Revolt,” Lawrence 
described his strategy in terms of mathematics.68 Lawrence described war with three 
elements: “one algebraical, one biological, a third psychological.”69 Lawrence understood 
war as an extension of metabolism, and he developed a strategy that purposefully gave 
his Turkish opponents more terrain then they could control. For Lawrence, planning 
natural limitations was based on the principle that was “biological, the breaking point, 
life, and death, or better, wear and tear.”70 His philosophy broke war down to the lowest 
level of energy management and production. Because Lawrence fought in a remote 
desert, he recognized that camels metabolized energy better than motorized vehicles. 
Thus he designed a strategy around efficiency. For Lawrence, the use of camels was 
frugal and based upon the Bedouin lifestyle. He explained, “We used the smallest force, 
in the quickest times, at the farthest place.”71 While sickness was not a key struggle for 
Lawrence, his strategy was the most characterized by an understanding of his 
environment. When he traded the traditional measure of military success, terrain gained, 
for a more feasible metabolic strategy, he represented a genius for warfare in frontier or 
 
67 Basil Liddell Hart, Colonel Lawrence, the Man Behind the Legend (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934). 
68 T. E. Lawrence, “The Evolution of a Revolt” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1990). 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS68452.  
69 Ibid., 7. 
70 Ibid., 8-9. 
71 Ibid., 15. 
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wilderness environments. The quote that best illustrates Lawrence’s understanding of the 
human environmental experience of war follows: “The invention of bully-beef has 
modified land-war more profoundly than the invention of gunpowder.”72 Lawrence’s 
embrace of the metabolic and biological realities of the human body grasped essential 
aspects of irregular war, and his strategy of frugality of effort informs any military 
environmental analysis. In Lawrence’s case, strategy focused on metabolism did not 
necessarily affect soldier health but was the most important path to victory, yet those two 
things are nested significantly. 
The campaigns of Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman are also useful to 
understand the theme of war and the environment in the United States. While War Upon 
the Land is a compelling environmental history of the American Civil War, it is also 
important to consider the philosophy that created Grant and Sherman’s targeting of the 
agro-ecological system of the Confederacy.73 Grant worked directly with War of 1812 
veterans during his service in Mexico; he believed that Winfield Scott was the finest 
specimen of manhood he had ever encountered.74 In contrast, he directly observed the 
informal frontier dress and strategy of Zachary Taylor.75 Taylor praised Grant for his 
sharing of hard labor during a harrowing river crossing, and Grant developed a highly 
rustic, environmentally pragmatic leadership style. Serving as the quartermaster of the 4th 
Infantry Regiment, Grant also worked directly with Thomas Sidney Jesup, whose reforms 
 
72 Ibid., 14. 
73 Lisa M. Brady, War Upon the Land: Military Strategy and the Transformation of Southern Landscapes 
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of the Quartermaster Corps came as a result of failures in the War of 1812.76 Sherman 
had served as a Lieutenant under the command of Zachary Taylor in the Second 
Seminole War.77 However, because Taylor’s predecessor Thomas Sidney Jesup 
developed a decentralized strategy, Sherman was responsible for his isolated outpost. 
Grant and Sherman’s early development in terms of frontier warfare, under the leadership 
of War of 1812 leaders, recognized and grappled  with the environmental challenges of 
warfare in North America. 
It is very important to understand that Grant and Sherman’s use of tactics to 
destroy the environment of the American South occurred in a significant progression. 
Grant and Sherman first fought conventionally in the western theatre of the Civil War. 
While the western campaign occurred in a less developed environment, the Union Army 
still employed conventional strategy at the outset. Grant won acclaim at Fort Donelson by 
defeating larger entrenched opponents through bold offensive and coordinated naval and 
ground artillery. The both served under Winfield Scott’s command, and after the War of 
1812 they saw military action in Mexico and the Seminole Wars in Florida. Sherman 
fought with the Army of the Potomac and viewed taking supplies from civilians as 
unprofessional brutality until the Valley Campaign of Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson.  
Sherman moved to the Western Army with Grant; they both changed their perspectives 
after the Battle of Shiloh.78 In that encounter they saw the resolve of Southerners and 
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78 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the 
Americans (New York: Knopf: Random House, 1991). 
36 
 
called for a peoples’ war that could not differentiate threats from military and civilian 
alike. Sherman described the transition toward a more “Indian” style of war. Both were 
employing what John Grenier called The First Way of War, only against white opponents. 
Grant and Sherman’s tactics did not exist in a vacuum, and they were developed and 
employed directly under War of 1812 officers with hard-earned experience. 
Another U.S. military leader who excelled at petite guerre and management of 
soldier health was the two-time Medal of Honor winner Major General Smedley Butler. 
During the neocolonial period, Butler fought in nearly every conflict where U.S. troops 
were engaged. Unlike many iconic military leaders, his nom de guerre, “Old Gimlet 
Eye,” referred to jaundice from his repeated bouts of malarial fever.79 His experience 
with warfare in tropical environments translated into managing a staging camp for U.S. 
soldiers during the First World War. Smedley Butler worked mightily to improve the 
health and fitness of his soldiers. First, he raided supply warehouses to eliminate the mud 
that was causing sickness in his camp.80 Butler also doubled rations and used patriotic 
music to improve morale. In fact, because of his increase in available food, Butler “ran 
one-million dollars over his ration allowance.”81 Butler was nearly punished for 
overspending. However, his commander advocated for him because the rate of sickness 
in the camp dropped dramatically. Butler was denied more direct combat experience in 
World War I because he indispensibly  improved the health and morale of U.S. soldiers 
who arrived at a staging camp in France. He received the Army Distinguished Service 
medal because his hygenic reforms significantly improved the health of soldiers 
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throughout the theatre. A lifetime of experience fighting in wilderness environments 
provided extensive experience on the hygenic requirements of soldiers and marines. 
Without a post-military career in socialist politics, Smedley Butler would rank in the 
forefront of celebrated American military heroes, but he achieved much more by keeping 
his Marines healthy than he did with combat heroics. 
Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, is perhaps the best example of a leader 
that managed sickness and logistics exceptionally during the Napoleonic Wars. Wellesley 
began his career in the remote frontier in India, where the isolated environment was 
challenging, but inexpensive labor mitigated those challenges.82 In Portugal and Spain, 
the British Army struggled significantly with contracted logistics provided by civilian 
merchants, and Wellesley made one of his most capable generals his Quartermaster 
General.83 In the Peninsular War, Wellesley was known widely for always winning in the 
 
82 One aspect of soldier health that is valuable in this dissertation was the use of India Pale Ale. The British 
Army associated the beer ration as superior to a whiskey ration because it provided the same morale 
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alcoholism, was central to both the management of morale and soldier health. See Mitch Steele, IPA: 
Brewing Techniques, Recipes and the Evolution of India Pale Ale (Boulder, CO: Brewers Association 
2012), 22-26. The paper that advances this concept is a medical history of British cultural imperialism by 
an Air War college student. See Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth Somsel, “Tropical Medicine as Cultural 
Imperialism,” (Unpublished Paper) Air War College, September 2017. 
83 There is an interesting progression in Wellesley’s dispatches from 1809-1810, where he describes higher 
rates of sickness due to poor provisioning then to battlefield success largely because of provisioning. In late 
September of 1810 Wellesley cited the success of his Commissariat and Quartermaster General in 
operations near Cadiz. “Accordingly, all operations have been carried on with ease; the soldiers have 
suffered no privations, have undergone no unnecessary fatigue, there has been no loss of stores, and the 
army is in high spirits).” Prior to this many of his soldiers suffered high rates of sickness attributed to poor 
rations. In late August 1809 his soldiers and officers were suffering from a lack of supplies: “The sickness 
of the army, from the same cause (previously describing the death of horses) has increased considerably; 
particularly among the officers, who have fared no better than the soldiers; and have had nothing but water 
to drink, and frequently nothing but meat without salt to eat, and seldom any bread…the whole lie out, and 
nothing can be got for them.” Wellesley did not accept the environmental realties fatalistically, he 
developed a capable Commissariat and place excellent officers in the Quartermaster corps. Wellesley was 
extremely capable in battle, but he was an even better logistician who outlasted the French in the Peninsula 
largely because he had a better supply system, which led to better soldier health and morale. See Arthur 
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defensive. Wellesley never outstretched his difficult supply lines, and local allies 
supported the British Army with the constant harassment of the French lines of 
communication and supply. Wellesley’s tactics relied on a core of well-drilled British 
regiments holding the line, with black-coated riflemen serving as skirmishers to limit the 
effectiveness of French assaults. Wellesley mastered the combination of skilled and 
professional formations assisted by units that excelled in petite guerre, and Butler 
matched his efficiency in battle with his capacity as a logistician that kept his troops 
healthy and well-fed.  
This dissertation employs five case studies that use American, Canadian, and 
British sources; two are narrative and three are oriented around topics. One chapter 
explores the British 104th Regiment of Foot, while a second concentrates on a company in 
the U.S. 21st Infantry Regiment. A third analyzes the public health innovations of the 
U.S. commanders who gained experience as frontier militia leaders before being elevated 
to generals in the federal army. Two case studies employ a theme-based transnational 
approach, the first focusing on the use of alcohol as medicine and the second focusing on 
logistics and malnutrition. While this dissertation explores sources from the entire 
conflict, most of the chapters focus on the campaign of 1814. Documentary records are 
more complete in 1814, the year with the largest volume of soldiers and fighting, and the 
period with numerous commanders who were skilled at managing the daily heath of their 
soldiers. American commanders before 1814 won few victories, and it is important to 
understand that even the limited success gained in 1814 would have been impossible 
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without the reform led by officers with high rates of experience fighting in the frontier. 
These case studies argue the methodological value of focusing on the daily management 
of health. This dissertation maintains that the largest challenge in the conflict was not 
battle; rather, it was managing the environment and the health of soldiers. There are cases 
where military units won battles but gained nothing because of the environmental 
challenges of the War of 1812. Additionally, there is a striking correlation between 
commanders who won on the battlefield and their efforts to halt sickness. Military 
leadership in battle is often privileged over the challenges of daily morale, rations, 
cleanliness, and compassion. Nonetheless, the unromantic elements of war remain the 
most important, just as they were during the War of 1812.  
From a more explicit methodological perspective, this dissertation employs a 
wider array of sources than typically found in the classic historiography of the War of 
1812. It combines the correspondence of officers – which is common in operational 
military history – with the diaries, courts-martial, and order books that are often used in 
social history. As a work within the wider theme of the “experience of war,” this 
dissertation is unique for its more explicit connection between soldier experience and 
operation and strategic outcomes. The merger of social and operational military historical 
approaches is sorely needed in the field of military history. The large volume of bottom-
up sources in this dissertation is not separate from questions of the broader results; 
situating the experience of soldiers within operational outcomes is pivotal in gaining a 
more holistic and comprehensive understanding of the War of 1812. Multi-disciplinary 
approaches to the social science of violence, environmental history, and “New Military 
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History” are combined with source work that employs the types of documents that are 
common in both operational and social military history.  
The first body chapter, “Managing the Sick List,” focuses solely on U.S. Army 
records relating to managing the health of soldiers. It explores how the most successful 
U.S. Army officers developed first as militia officers in frontier regions. A focus on 
military professionalism with clear delineation of militia and regular status overlooks the 
way that combat experience before the War of 1812 occurred in isolated frontier regions. 
With combat experience on the frontier, commanders developed skills in managing the 
heath of their soldiers. Leaders with frontier experience developed hygienic measures 
such as management of human and food waste, the removal of stagnant pools of water, 
and quarantine measures. “Filth trenches” rarely make history, but efforts to preserve the 
numbers of fit-for-duty soldiers were fundamental to the success of operations in the 
Canadian frontier. Officers like James Miller, William Henry Harrison, and Jacob Brown 
all began their careers as frontier militia officers, and there is a key correlation between 
officers who excelled at public health measures and those who succeeded on the 
battlefield. The relationship between frontier public health measures and successful petite 
guerre tactics was significant because leaders gained environmental knowledge through 
experience. An additional measure that was important to the success of commanders on 
both sides was the use and control of alcohol to manage morale.  
The next chapter, “The War for Calories,” explores the campaign of 1814 based 
upon an understanding of food and logistics. Armies that won battles could not gain 
strategic results because the environment in the Upper Canadian frontier made it 
impossible to provide sustenance for soldiers. The Americans in 1814 reformed their 
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army and won every major battle, but a contract logistics system with no accountability 
made it impossible to continue their invasion of Canada. The British Army, on the other 
hand, was at its largest size in 1814 with significant reinforcements following the British 
victory in the Peninsular Campaign. Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond accepted the 
weakness of his command on an isolated frontier, and he elected to minimize his forces 
on the frontier to create a realistic logistics plan. The British innovation on the frontier 
created strategic gains in tactical defeats, yet commanders abandoned their gains due to 
an institutional fixation on the purchase system in Crimea. Significantly, American 
officers from the 1814 campaign reformed the military’s logistics system; this led to 
more professionalization and facilitated the mass mobilization of the U.S. Civil War later 
in the century. 
“Liquor and Soldier Motivation,” the following chapter, focuses solely on the use 
of alcohol to manage the morale of soldiers. Alcohol was employed to control combat 
and sustain soldier motivation; indeed, it served as a measure of military professionalism. 
The typical half-pint daily ration of whiskey or rum was used to fortify the bodies of 
soldiers in a harsh environment and to maintain the sustained motivation needed to 
manage the drudgery of military campaigning. Before engagements, the ration was 
typically a pint of spirits for each soldier. Given that musket fire was inaccurate and 
much of the fighting in the War of 1812 was hand to hand, intoxication was not as 
inhibiting as it is in modern combat. While soldiers were supplied with enough alcohol to 
be constantly intoxicated, they were not allowed to share alcohol or purchase alcohol 
locally, because officers sought to control drunkenness. Importantly, alcohol was the 
medicine of morale but served as an important insulator from actual medical treatment. 
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The fact that military units were full of soldiers that were essentially functional alcoholics 
was problematic, but that was not as challenging as the prospect of troops being treated 
by physicians who only offered opioids and purgatives that did more harm than good. 
The War of 1812 did not have perfect solutions; rather, commanders and soldiers sought 
the least bad options. Alcohol represented an imperfect way to manage soldier morale 
that was better than any other alternatives. Lastly, the chapter explores the way that 
alcohol was used to solidify similarities of white soldiers on both sides but differences 
with Native American combatants. Native Americans consumed alcohol in much the 
same way that white soldiers did, but the ubiquitous fear of drunken Native Americans 
perpetuated racialized ideas regarding the animal nature of North American indigenous 
peoples. Alcohol also served as a supplement to calorie loss on a frontier that posed 
significant logistical challenges.  
Through a series of events and controversies, Captain Joseph Treat led the most 
well-documented U.S. infantry company in the War of 1812. Treat’s experiences are the 
subject of the next chapter that explores “War at the Company Level.” This unit provides 
the focus of the third chapter. What is most interesting in his records is how traditional 
combat leadership in battle was considered a reward for the daily suffering in camp. Treat 
fought in the 21st Infantry Regiment for most of the War of 1812, yet he was denied 
command of his company at the battles of Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane because of 
lackluster performance in picket duties. Treat suffered sickness and still joined his 
regiment but was denied service in his company’s most significant victories. Remarkably, 
Treat and his peer company commanders maintained the most thorough fit-for-duty 
rosters and ration records in the U.S. Army during the war. The records from the 21st 
43 
 
infantry connect the highest rates of illness to low rations of food and liquor, and petite 
guerre actions. 
The last body chapter, “Wasted Opportunities and the 104th Regiment of Foot,” is 
a case study of the only British Regiment of Foot recruited in North America during the 
War of 1812. This dissertation argues that British military leaders managed the health of 
soldiers better than their American counterparts in most instances. However, the 
relegation of the New Brunswick-raised 104th Regiment of Foot to garrison duties 
illustrates how the hierarchical structure of the British Army failed to utilize the fittest 
regiment for the environment of Upper Canada for most of the conflict. The 104th 
Regiment of Foot was raised from the New Brunswick Fencibles, and, as from its 
beginnings, it excelled at the light infantry tactics most applicable to the War of 1812. 
However, in its transition from Fencible to British Regiment of Foot, the 104th was filled 
with officers who could purchase commissions but who were too ill for active service. 
Minus one small detachment, the 104th remained in the Maritime provinces in garrison 
duties until 1814. When it was mobilized, the 104th excelled in the light infantry role of a 
flank company. In a war where a couple of small British regiments carried the balance of 
the fighting for two years, the 104th Regiment of Foot sat idle in garrison until 1814. In 
that year the British Army was at its zenith in North America, following Wellington’s 
victories in Spain and Portugal. The 104th Regiment of Foot was, therefore, a wasted 
opportunity and is best compared to “foreign” Swiss regiments. The Swiss-raised 
regiments were filled with Swiss German officers and with soldiers who hailed from 
many locations in Europe, primarily Spain and Portugal. The Canadian-raised regiment 
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may have been a British regiment in name, but its marginal provincial status kept it out of 
the fighting for most of the War of 1812.  
Human beings do not construct monuments to the daily grind like they do to 
heroes on battlefields. As the concluding chapter maintains, battle-focused approaches to 
combat and military history will never grasp the challenges that soldiers face each day. 
The relentless challenges of staying fed, clean and healthy, however, played significant 
roles on the outcomes of battles. A focus on the daily experience of soldiers is not just an 
exercise in social history; it is essential to understanding operational history as well. The 
best military commanders know that keeping soldiers fit-for-duty is the most significant 
aspect of leadership, yet the routine efforts to keep soldiers healthy go largely 
unremembered. The fact that combat and battlefield victories generate more compelling 
stories that reach wider audiences does not make campaigns and commanders’ tactics 
more significant to the results of operational history. Officers and soldiers who took 
charge of their health and morale performed better both in combat and in the daily effort 
required to stay fit-for-duty. The public health decisions of commanders were more far 
consequential than the noble efforts of medical professionals. Moreover, effective public 
health and logistical policies created the more lasting outcomes, independent of victories 
and losses in pitched battle. The unglamorous management of the harsh experiences that 
soldiers faced in the camp and on the march crucially shaped the War of 1812’s outcome. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MANAGING THE SICK LIST 
“This little army, worn down by fatigue, by sickness, by wounds and deaths”1 
 
It is first essential to identify what soldiers and commanders did to stay 
healthy and keep them on the fit-for-duty roster. While environmental sickness is 
undeniable, the actions of leaders mattered, and the best leaders gained experience 
with service in the frontier militia. Alan Taylor’s two recent books on the War of 
1812 were the first major accounts of the war that emphasize the role of the 
environment and sickness on the outcome of the conflict.2 Taylor unequivocally 
stated that he is a social historian with sensitivities to environmental history, so he has 
only begun a process of environmental interpretation of the War of 1812. Taylor’s 
books described how the climate of Upper Canada, specifically the narrow fighting 
season and high rates of malaria, prevented the U.S. Army’s ability to occupy Upper 
Canada. His approach, while not entirely environmentally determinate, ignores how 
the British implemented major institutional changes to absorb invalids, and how much 
easier it was for Canadian militiamen to convalesce at home. Also, Taylor’s valuable 
shift towards environmental attention did not fully grapple with how the most 
successful American commanders, such as Winfield Scott, Duncan McArthur, 
 
1 Letter from William Hull to Secretary of War William Eustace, Fort George, 26 August 1812, in John 
Brannan (Ed.). Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States, During the War 
with Great Britain in the Years 1812, 13, 14, & 15 : With Some Additional Letters and Documents 
Elucidating the History of That Period (Washington City: Printed by Way & Gideon, for the editor, 
1823), 48. 
2 Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian 
Allies (New York: Random House, 2010), and The Internal Enemy: Slavery and the War in Virginia, 
1772-1832 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013). 
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William Henry Harrison, and Jacob Brown, implemented hygienic policies that 
safeguarded the health of the men under their command. Sickness was central to the 
outcome of the war. However, individuals were often able to overcome their illness, 
and successful officers often managed illness with forward-thinking public health 
safeguards. Discipline and cleanliness were synonymous, and serviceable uniforms 
were fundamental to preventing disease-carrying mosquito bites.  
 From social scientific and conceptual historiographical perspectives, the 
adaptive frontier officers confirm the ideas of psychologist Salvatore Maddi and 
historian Kathryn Meier. Maddi’s work on “hardiness” has evolved into the concept 
of resilience;  “hardiness” and an individual’s sense of control of his health played a 
significant result in a positive health outcome.3 Likewise, Meier focuses on “self-
care” where soldiers took charge of their health through occasionally straggling to 
secure rest, better food, and hygienic bathing. Too often, historians interpret the 
experience of war by soldiers as solely pernicious, and soldiers lose agency. In the 
study of veterans’ experiences, Tim O’Brien has been outspoken about the problem 
of the “old and terrible lie” in which any effort to find a moral story in an individual’s 
struggle in war continually fed into romantic notions of combat.4 While romantic 
accounts can be uncritical and problematic, most soldiers overcome the harsh 
physical and psychological cost of conflict. The work of Maddi and Meier contradict 
O’Brien’s claim that true war stories never have a moral lesson because most veterans 
 
3 Kathryn Meier, Nature’s Civil War: Common Soldiers and the Environment in 1862 Virginia (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013); and Salvator Maddi. “On Hardiness and Other 
Pathways to Resilience.” American Psychologist 60, no. 3 (April 2005): 261-62. 
4 Tim O’Brien, The Things They Carried: A Work of Fiction (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 
2010), 76. 
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survive and adapt to their situations.5 The memoir of E. B. Sledge, With the Old 
Breed, concluded that he would not end his story with a romantic description of the 
beauty of the South Pacific. He noted instead that war was a waste of human beings, 
land, and society, yet democracy could not survive without a willingness for service 
in combat.6 Sledge’s perspective on the wastage and value of military service in a 
democracy offers valuable insight beyond World War II. The health situation in the 
War of 1812 was, in many ways, hopeless and largely influenced by forces outside 
the control of commanders. The commanders that chose to accept responsibility and 
exert control over health and the environment outperformed their peers, however, 
thereby confirming the work of Salvatore Maddi long before the development of 
professional psychology. 
 Through the exploration of three themes, it will become clear that the 
management of sick soldiers was central to success in the War of 1812. The three 
themes are so significantly intertwined that a chronological narrative will be the best 
approach to this chapter. The first theme that emerges is how soldiers linked honor to 
service while ill or injured. Officers gained accolades and reputation by serving 
despite wounds and illness. To date, scholars have linked honor to duels and poor 
professionalism in the American Army, but just as often honor encouraged officers to 
serve while injured or sick.7 The second theme emerges from regimental level 
 
5 Another exceptional historical approach to hardiness is found in the work of Earl Hess. He outlined 
the horrors of war for Civil War Soldiers, including injury, killing, and suicide, but he argued that the 
community of soldiers, built largely by fighting “shoulder to shoulder,” helped most soldiers overcome 
their wartime experiences. See Earl Hess, The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997). 
6 E. B. Sledge, With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa (New York: Presidio Press, 2010). 
7 This specifically refers to Alan Taylor who has moved the field forward in terms of social and 
environmental history, but he discounts the role of honor. In his account honor led only to dueling and 
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hygiene and health policies. Military histories to date have primarily ignored hygienic 
procedures, save for criticism of the lack of professionalism of the U.S. Army. The 
most overarching theme in the literature is the ways that frontier militia leaders were 
far better at managing and taking responsibility of the health of soldiers, and therefore 
the militia rather than the regular Army had the best public health policies.  
In most cases, scholars connect all professionalism to the reforms of regular 
officers like Winfield Scott. However, Scott was an outlier, and frontier militia 
officers more often advocated these policies after they received federal acceptance of 
their rank. Most generals in the War of 1812 gained a reputation in the militia and 
then were made regular officers later. The final sections explore how the culture of 
honor and privation merged with the Revolutionary tradition. The British system of 
logistics outpaced the fledgling U.S. system, and as such, prevented a significant 
number of desertions, as well as freeing up healthy soldiers for combat duties. 
Officers who excelled at managing sickness were also effective in managing morale 
because the combat motivation and health management were one-in-the-same. Honor 
has been used to criticize the U.S. Army, militia, and volunteers when it was a 
significant factor in transcending disabilities to fight. And this dynamic occurred on 
both sides of the conflict. In Salvadore Maddi’s language, hardiness is impressive but 
 
fractional disputes amongst officers. Likewise, J. C. A. Stagg recently discounted honor as positive 
attribute of 1812 era officership. Honor has therefore been often understood as a liability, yet it is 
difficult to find a modern professional military establishment that does not still prize honor. There are 
far more incidents of courage under extreme duress than there are accounts of dueling officers in the 
conflict. An important author on the issue of honor in the Early Republic is Joanne Freeman, largely 
because her work is a more nuanced understanding of dueling. In most cases dueling did not result in 
violence, and restored relationships in a way that both parties saved face. See Joanne Freeman, Affairs 
of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), and J. C. A. 
Stagg, “United States Army Officers in the War of 1812: A Statistical and Behavioral Portrait.” 
Journal of Military History 76, no. 4 (October 2012): 1001-34. 
49 
 
suffering for its own sake reflects poor leadership and strategy. Militia officers with 
forward-thinking health policies were the only American commanders to achieve 
success, so any study of health management calls to questions criticism of citizen 
soldiers. 
 General William Hull’s surrender of Fort Detroit ranks as one of the most 
embarrassing defeats in U.S. military history. Historians such as Stephen Rauch and 
Alec Gilpin have defended Hull because of high rates of illness inside his army.8 
Rauch and Gilpin support Hull’s justification of his surrender because “This little 
army, [was] worn down by fatigue, by sickness, by wounds and deaths.”9 However, 
this argument problematically views illness as a  static concept. They argued that 
soldiers were either sick or healthy, and that the sick could not serve in combat. 
Gilpin and Rauch’s arguments are significantly contradicted by what Hull’s officers 
and soldiers believed that about fighting while ill or injured in the most dramatic 
moment of Hull's court-martial, he questioned Brigadier General James Miller about 
his unit’s fitness. After a battle to restore Hull’s supply lines, a storm battered 
Miller’s regiment and most of his force became ill. When asked if, despite his 
sickness, he should have returned to Fort Detroit, Miller stated: “Neither myself nor 
men were in as good a situation as we [could have] been in; but we were able to 
proceed, and should have proceeded, if we were not ordered back.”10 The memoir of 
 
8 Stephen Rauch, “A Stain Upon the Nation? A Review of the Detroit Campaign of 1812 in United 
States Military History,” Michigan Historical Review 38, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 129-53; and Alec 
Gilpin, The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2012) 
9 Letter from William Hull to William Eustice from Fort Malden, 26 August 1812, in John Brannan 
(Ed.). Official Letters, 48. 
10 James G. Forbes, United States. Army. Court-martial (Hull: 1814), and Miscellaneous Pamphlet 
Collection (Library of Congress). Report of the Trial of Brig. General William Hull, Commanding the 
North-Western Army of the United States: By a Court Martial Held at Albany on Monday, 3d January, 
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an Ohio militiaman supported Miller’s testimony.  According to the author, “The 
wounded leaped at the idea that they would soon have an opportunity of avenging 
their wrongs, and besought the surgeons to report them fit for duty.”11 A key 
motivation for soldiers was the identity and status they gained through suffering and 
succeeding. The surrender denied the soldiers and men the honor of fighting while 
sick, and Hull denied them the opportunity to demonstrate their hardiness. Hull used 
sickness like a fixed concept and therefore overlooked incidents when sick soldiers 
fought off major attacks – especially inside of fortifications. 
 During Hull’s court-martial no one failed to recognize that many in the fort 
were sick, yet he was still publicly shamed and identified as a coward because of his 
surrender. Hull asked a direct question about cowardice and his surrender of Fort 
Detroit. With little hesitation, James Miller stated, “Yes! Such an immediate 
surrender I think was an indication of a want of courage.”12 No one disagreed with 
Hull, because testimony confirmed that ill soldiers filled Fort Detroit. However, his 
surrender was unjustified because ill soldiers often defended fortifications in the war. 
His daughter later observed the following:  
All outward disgrace seemed to have fallen upon his head, yet all were borne 
with cheerful equanimity. A soldier, he had been branded as a coward; a 
patriot, he was esteemed a traitor; loving the approbation of his fellow men, 
he was an object of universal censure; naturally fond of public life, and 
 
1814 and Succeeding Days (New York: Eastburn, Kirk, and Co., 1814), 117. Hereafter, Trial of Brig. 
Gen. Hull. 
11 Vercheres de Boucherville, Rene Thomas, James Foster, and Milo Milton Quaife, War on the 
Detroit; the Chronicles of Thomas Verchères De Boucherville and the Capitulation, by an Ohio 
Volunteer. The Lakeside Classics (Chicago: The Lakeside Press R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 1940), 
277. 
12 Forbes, Trial of Brig. Gen. Hull, 117. 
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ambitious of public usefulness, he was under a sentence of irrevocable 
ostracism.13 
 
James Miller became a lifelong invalid because of the ague, most likely malaria, 
which he contracted before Tippecanoe. He fought at Brownstown, Chippewa, 
Bridgewater, and Fort Erie. Miller was initially a New Hampshire militia officer, who 
excelled at managing health on the frontier. According to Adam Walker, “Every 
precaution possible by the humane and generous Col. Miller to preserve the health of 
the regiment; himself waded the river, as well as every officer; in many instances 
performing the duties of the common soldier.”14 His example, combined with 
generous rations of spirits, ensured high morale and combat effectiveness in the 4th 
Infantry Regiment.15 Miller, unlike Hull, recognized that morale and health were 
linked and there was no more competent officer under fire in the regular army.16 
 The defense of Fort Harrison from an assault by Native Americans could not 
have better represented the expectations made by soldiers and commanders. Zachary 
 
13 Maria Campbell, Revolutionary Services and Civil Life of General William Hull (New York: D. 
Appleton & Co., 1848), 297. 
14Adam Walker, A Journal of Two Campaigns of the Fourth Regiment of U. S. Infantry in the 
Michigan and Indiana Territories Under the Command of Col. John P. Boyd and Lt. Col. James 
Miller, During the Years 1811 & 12 (Keene, N.H.: Printed at the Sentinel press by the author, 1816), 
11. Hereafter, A Journal of Two Campaigns of the Fourth Regiment. 
15 Walker, A Journal of Two Campaigns of the Fourth Regiment, 11-12 
16 As a Major in the militia Lewis Bond was the only supporter of Hull’s argument about sickness. It is 
important to note that Bond’s bias was significantly impacted by his experiences. Bond was not a 
British prisoner until the aftermath of Detroit meant that American towns were burned, and his life was 
continually in jeopardy, and he went to Camp Malden in order to preserve his life from Native 
American raids (most likely Potawatomi). In captivity he updated his initial writing. After his 
miserable experiences Bond described how “the situation of his Army much reduced by casualties, the 
hospital’s filled with sick.” His account actively took hyperbolic liberties, specifically citing 
cannibalism, and it is tempered by the writing of leaders like Harrison, Miller, and Lewis Cass, all of 
whom cited tribal atrocities and sickness without claiming to be so woefully incapable of prevailing. 
See Lewis Bond Journal, Library of Congress, 13. 
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Taylor’s defense of an isolated and heavily outnumbered Fort Harrison, with a large 
party of non-combatants, was remarkably like Hull’s surrender at Detroit. Taylor 
claimed that “indeed there were not more than 10 or 15 men able to do a great deal, 
the others being sick, or convalescent, and to add to our misfortunes, two of the 
stoutest men in the fort, and that I had every confidence in, jumped the picket and left 
us.”17 Captain Zachary Taylor, who would later command a larger force in Mexico 
and become the President of the United States, stated that he did not feel capable of 
defending the fort. Before the siege Taylor was unable to post guard due to the 
“unhealthiness of the company,” nor was he able to see to his duties at night because 
he “had just recovered from a severe attack of the fever.”18 Native Americans pierced 
Taylor’s perimeter and set fire to a blockhouse. The camp was filled with the screams 
of the attackers and frightened civilians. Taylor’s “men were very slow in executing 
[his] orders,” because of “debility.”19 He managed to maintain his “presence of mind” 
and rally the weakened soldiers to use the damaged building as a temporary breast 
work.20 Taylor, with no initial hope of success, refused to surrender and allowed his 
volunteer soldiers to demonstrate their honor. In his words, “never did men act with 
more firmness or desperation.”21 The contemporary language regarding firmness or 
infirmity illustrates the individual differences between an individual’s recovery, in 
 
17 Zachary Taylor to William Harrison from Fort Harrison 16 September 1812, in Brannan (Ed.). 
Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States, 62. 
18 Zachary Taylor to William Harrison from Fort Harrison, 16 September 1812, 61. 
19 Zachary Taylor to William Harrison from Fort Harrison, 16 September 1812, 62. 
20 His writing style was interesting because the young Captain described events as if he was outside of 
himself and was in many ways surprised by his poise. The impossible nature of his fort’s defense 
created a surreal prose during a time when most accounts were romantic and formulaic accounts of 
battles. 
21 Zachary Taylor to William Harrison from Fort Harrison 16 September 1812, in Brannan (Ed.). 
Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States, 62. 
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remarkable similarity to current definitions of hardiness and resilience. The militia 
was a significant force on the frontier, and leaders understood that the will and honor 
of soldiers could be employed to counteract infirmity.  
 Colonel Solomon Rensselaer presided over the initial assault across the 
Niagara River at the Battle of Queenston Heights and, unlike Hull, he would fail in 
the right way. During the period before the battle Rensselaer, like many other 
soldiers, described the necessity of working while “suffering under the effects of a 
fever.”22 Major Morrison was one of the few officers willing to lead troops across the 
Niagara. However, Morrison “suddenly found himself taken too unwell for the 
duty.”23 Rensselaer continued to lead while wounded until he succumbed to blood 
loss. He described his experience as follows: “Finding myself very much crippled 
now, by a number of wounds, and by the loss of blood unable to proceed.”24 As a 
Federalist politician Rensselaer sense of honor was based largely in the political 
feuding criticized by Joanna Freeman, but honor was not just about duels.25 Honor 
caused problems, but it also pushed officers to fight when wounded and ill. And while 
Queenston was not a victory, Rensselaer preserved his reputation because he 
continued to serve while sick and injured. Failing the right way meant that officers 
fought until they could no longer stand, and even in defeat, officers knew that their 
honor would have to survive scrutiny. War itself is never ideal, so maximizing the 
 
22 Solomon Van Rensselaer, A Narrative of the Affair of Queenstown: In the War of 1812 (New York: 
Leavitt Crocker & Brewster, 1836), 29. Interestingly enough, Solomon remained in the regular forces 
because he was injured in a 1794 campaign with General James Wilkinson. He received a bullet 
through his lungs, yet he somehow recovered due to his “youth and strong constitution.”   
23 Van Rensselaer, A Narrative of the Affair of Queenstown, 29.  
24 Ibid., 25-26.  
25 Freeman, Affairs of Honor. 
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positive role of honor, within certain shortcomings, was necessary to inspire soldiers 
and officers to acts of courage despite their poor health.  
 William Henry Harrison grasped the relationship between the frontier and 
illness. Until the United States controlled Lake Erie, Harrison’s troops would suffer. 
But by retaining Northern Ohio garrisons, the Northwest Army would be able to 
exploit a U.S. naval victory. Harrison wrote: 
I hope that the period will soon arrive when we shall transfer the Labouring 
oar to the enemy, and oblige him to encounter some of the difficulties of 
labours and difficulties which we have undergone in waging a defensive 
warfare, and protecting our extensive frontier (sic).26 
 
The campaign in the Old Northwest was plagued with sickness, suffering, and 
fatigue. United States operations were limited in the winter but did not stop. Ohio 
Militia operating out of Fort Harrison went on an offensive to destroy the Prophet’s 
town and conducted several petite guerre style ambushes.27 Like at Detroit and 
Queenston the weather became a hindrance, rains created swollen rivers, and a brutal 
winter storm slowed their march. Despite leaving Fort Harrison with soldiers “all 
unfit for duty,” the offensive was successful. Samuel Hopkins praised his men who 
had covered over 100 miles “with a naked army of infantry aided only by about fifty 
rangers, and spies: all of this done in twenty days – no sigh, no murmur, no 
complaint.”28 The militia on the frontier often not only held its own with regulars; 
 
26 William Harrison to John Armstrong from Seneca Town, 4 August 1813, in Brannan (Ed.). Official 
Letters,184. 
27 The Prophet Tenskwatawa was the brother of Tecumseh, and religious leader for the Shawnee 
Confederation.  
28 Samuel Hopkins to Governor Isaac Shelby, From Wabash, Near the Mount of Pine-Creek, 27 
November 1812, in Brannan (Ed.). Official Letters, 97. 
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instead, it outperformed regulars principally by its ability to function while ill, 
without supplies, and exposed to terrible weather. Service on the American frontier 
gave officers like Harrison the right experiences to command in Upper Canada. 
 Soldiers at the lower echelons of command were also aware of the inadequate 
supply problems and their influence on health. Kentucky militiaman William 
Atherton’s Narrative of the Suffering & Defeat of the North-Western Army Under 
General Winchester grasped the problems of frontier supplies as well as leaders like 
Harrison. He consistently complained of being forced to eat unsalted meats because 
“the roads were almost impassable.”29 The great effort to bring supplies meant that 
soldiers were on reduced rations from September until December, and when the men 
could secure beef they were “entirely without salt, which has been much against the 
health of the men.”30 Atherton observed, ”Butchers got to a beef and kill it, when 
lying down and could not get out of the way. This kind of beef, and hickory roots, 
was our principal subsistence for a length of time.”31 Because of the lack of salt, the 
soldiers had to slaughter cows without being able to preserve the meat, and soldiers 
like Atherton believed that fresh meat was less healthy than salted meets. The danger 
of Native American assaults also exacerbated the lack of food supplies during the 
collecting of local foodstuff. Atherton observed that “Shortly after Our arrival at Fort 
Defiance, five of our men who had been gathering plums, were found scalped.”32 
After the salt supplies ran out, the soldiers could hunt and eat fresh meat, but the 
 
29 William Atherton, Narrative of the Suffering & Defeat of the North-Western Army under General 
Winchester: Massacre of the Prisoners: Sixteen Months Imprisonment of the Writer and Others with 
the Indians and British (Frankfort, KY: Printed for the author by A.G. Hodges, 1842), 18. 
30 Atherton, Narrative of the Suffering, 14. 
31 Ibid. 19. 
32 Ibid., 10. 
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squirrel population quickly diminished.33 By December the men were eating pork 
without salt, and Atherton noted that ”Many of the men were sick and that sickliness 
occasioned by being compelled to eat fresh pork without bread and salt, and from 
being exposed to cold and wet.”34 Poor roads led to low supplies, and when soldiers 
secured fresh meat, their health declined. Both sides influenced the health of their 
enemies through petite guerre tactics that cut off supplies, impaired communication, 
and made subsistence very dangerous. Nonetheless, Atherton’s account of suffering 
was something he discussed with pride because of its connection with the traditions 
of the Revolutionary Army. 
 What made Atherton especially interesting was that he, unlike many 
historians, did not blame his leadership. For Atherton, “It seemed that the very 
elements fought against us.”35 He was also proud to have suffered for his country. 
Forced to retreat because of low supplies from Camp Three to the camp on Raisin 
River, Winchester’s Army’s suffering exceeded Atherton’s power of description: “To 
give a detailed account of individual suffering during this march, from camp No. 3 to 
the Rapids, would swell this sketch beyond its intended limits.”36 Still, Atherton was 
proud of the sufferings he experienced in serving his country. He described how “the 
reader can form but little idea unless he had been on the spot, and seen and felt what 
we saw and felt.”37  
 
33 Ibid., 19. 
34 Ibid., 25. 
35 Ibid., 27. 
36 Ibid., 28. 
37 Ibid., 27. 
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Atherton’s suffering separated him from non-veterans while connecting his 
force to the Revolutionary Army. Even when provided the information, nonveterans 
would not comprehend the suffering: “Perhaps facts would be related which the 
present generation, who has but little knowledge of things only from report, would 
scarcely believe.”38 In the early portions of Atherton’s memoir, the enemy was a 
scarce actor, and his sufferings against nature was a badge of honor that he displayed 
by language that separated himself from his readers. It is no wonder that because he 
was a prisoner after the Raisin River Massacre his determination to continue while 
wounded saved him from the tomahawk. Atherton was wounded and marched by his 
captors “starving and sick, but he kept on as fast and as far as he could, and when he 
could go no farther he laid upon the ground and told them to kill him…but when they 
saw his resolution they became attached to him.”39 To still be on his feet, slogging 
through snow, after four months of eating unsalted meat, was an achievement that 
Atherton used to define his character because to overcome fatigue and illness was the 
best example of his virtue. His resolution was not only the best example of his 
character; it also saved his life. Soldiers could not control the weather, or whether 
they lived or died, but they could control their response to adverse conditions.  
 Alexander Smythe was a regular army commander who took over the Niagara 
region during the winter of 1812-13. Smythe favored regular units while recognizing 
that professional soldiers had more significant problems with illness. The summer 
campaign season meant that all active service occurred at a heightened risk of 
 
38 Ibid., 28. 
39 Ibid., 50-51. 
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malaria, while in the winter contagious illness proliferated in cramped winter 
quarters. While laboring outdoors in the summer weakened Rensselaer’s force in 
Niagara through mosquito-carried illness, Smyth’s soldiers succumbed to “measles 
and other diseases” because “they were now in tents, in the month of December.”40 
His orders were to invade Canada with 3,000 troops, but illness prevented an 
effective marshaling of forces. He was only able to assemble 1,500 troops, and his 
intelligence sources indicated that the British issued 2,314 rations to frontier troops.41 
Most significant to Smyth was the fact that he “saw that the number of regular troops 
was declining rapidly. I knew that on them chiefly I was to depend.”42 Some of the 
advantages of the militia were demographic rather than experiential. Typically, militia 
units were composed of soldiers drawn from the same region they fought in.43 
Therefore, the composition of militia units better prepared them for the environmental 
caused illnesses as well as infectious diseases from proximity in camps.44 Smyth 
noted that in both instances when he gathered forces for the ordered invasion that “the 
regular troops were men in bad health, who could not have stood one day’s march.”45 
Still, Smyth recorded that by the industry of officers that the sick men were willing 
 
40 Alexander Smyth to a Committee of Patriotic Citizens of the Western Counties of New York, from a 
camp near Buffalo, 3 December 1812, in Brannan (Ed.). Official Letters,103. 
41 Alexander Smyth to a Committee of Patriotic Citizens of the Western Counties of New York, from a 
camp near Buffalo, 3 December 1812, 104. 
42 Alexander Smyth to a Committee of Patriotic Citizens of the Western Counties of New York, from a 
camp near Buffalo, 3 December 1812, 103. 
43 Militia soldiers were also drawn from the same communities and would have already have a 
developed immune relationship helping with common communicable camp diseases.  
44 Also important was the role of friendship and lifelong connections on the health of militia soldiers. 
John Resch has argued that militia soldiers fared much better after the Revolution because their 
maintained their connections with their community. Having friends and family to care for militia on 
campaign was also a significant factor in their better performance regarding hardiness. See John Resch, 
Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War Veterans, Moral Sentiment, and Political Culture in the Early 
Republic (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999). 
45 Alexander Smyth to a Committee of Patriotic Citizens of the Western Counties of New York, from a 
camp near Buffalo, 3 December 1812, in Brannan (Ed.). Official Letters,103. 
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even if the officers ultimately decided that an invasion would be folly. Illness was the 
chief force that prevented a winter invasion of Canada, and one of Smythe’s chief 
problems was an unwillingness to rely on militia units that demography and 
experience on the frontier made healthier. The regular units recruited from diverse 
locations were far more susceptible to illness.46 
 At Fort Meigs in northern Ohio, the 19th Infantry Regiment was struggling 
with illness at the height of the summer of 1813. At the beginning of July, the post 
commander’s adjutant Captain Chums reported eight sick privates with no sick 
officers or leaders.47 As the season progressed, illness doubled. A list dated on 31 
July 1813 cited one Lieutenant, two Sergeants, one Corporal and twenty Privates on 
the sick list.48 General Green Clay commanded the post and was incapacitated, 
forcing subordinates to take charge. Like Zachary Taylor, Green Clay was a leader in 
the Kentucky Militia, and he was also Revolutionary War veteran. Clay was ill during 
a siege, but unlike Taylor, sickness incapacitated Clay. Clay recognized that 
subordinates would have to rise to the challenge, stating “the Genl (sic) feels that he 
will receive & support of the officers which his ill health may require.”49 The siege 
occurred on 11 July, and increased sickness represents both the duration of the 
inclement season as well as the influence that siege warfare had on an isolated 
garrison. Authors like John Grenier have claimed that The First Way of War evolved 
 
46 Letter from LTC John Campbell to William Harrison, from Fort Greenville, 25 December 1812, 
Official Letters, 117. 
47 General Orders 1 July 1813, 19th Infantry Regiment Order Book, Duncan McArthur Papers, Library 
of Congress. 
48 General Orders 31 July 1813, 19th Infantry Regiment Order Book, Duncan McArthur Papers, Library 
of Congress. 
49 General G. Clay, General Orders 11 July 1813, 19th Infantry Regiment Order Book, Duncan 
McArthur Papers, Library of Congress. 
60 
 
from experiences with Native Americans, but the War of 1812 illustrates the 
continuation of European siege warfare in much smaller scale battles at remote 
posts.50 Sieges almost always resulted in high rates of sickness.  
 Fort Meigs was in danger based on high rates of sickness and injuries, yet 
soldiers and officers still chose to fight. Clay, despite his illness, described surrender 
as a massacre and to fight as honorable. On 24 July, when sickness rates were 
increasing, Clay stated that “to fight is to conquer, to abandon posts is to suffer 
disgrace in the most shocking Massacre.”51 Although the British were in Malden, 
their control of the lakes meant that “a few hours of fair wind” could bring a British 
attacking force to Meigs.52 Despite significant cases of illness in the fort, including 
his own, Clay allowed his army to fight and offered them nothing but praise for their 
honor and firmness. Clay described his army as follows: 
The (G)eneral witnessed an animated zeal in all to discharge their duty if any 
testimony were wanted in favor of the soldier like feelings which 
persuaded…the wounded and the sick, both officers and men throwing aside 
their crutches, and advancing boats to post of danger the general cannot but 
express his grateful feelings and thanks to those officers.53 
 
When United States soldiers could cast off their infirmities, they rose to the challenge 
and at the siege of Meigs, like that of Fort Harrison, they fought capably while ill. 
American War of 1812 soldiers inherited the Revolutionary ideal of fighting in the 
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most austere conditions and under the duress of high rates of illness. The sieges at 
Fort Harrison and Meigs illustrate that illness did not eliminate sick soldiers from 
serving under fire.  
 The 19th Infantry Regiment’s Order Book continued to illustrate how 
commanders were taking charge of their soldiers’ health. The day after Green Clay 
praised his soldiers for enduring their illnesses to save Fort Meigs, 8 July, he issued 
an order that would help prevent disease. Clay commanded officers to inspect the 
cleanliness of the soldiers and the hospitals. The order stated that the “Cleanliness of 
the camp as the only possible way in which the health of the troops can be Restored 
and when Restored Porsaved Preserved.”54 The order also mandated that “officers 
will pay particular attention to the clothing of the men their mend cause them to wash 
their clothes and shave twice a week.”55 Before germ theory, U.S. commanders were 
calling for cleanliness, and clothing covering the whole body remained the most 
effective prevention of malaria until the latter half of the twentieth century. Hygienic 
measures were then and are now the best method to avoid illness. Soldiers and 
officers could not always control the factors that led to sickness, however, but the 
perception of control was extremely important. Importantly, hygienic measures 
occurred in tandem with orders for the serviceability of weapons.56 To frontier 
leaders, the health of soldiers was as important as functioning weapons. The 8 July 
order is exceptional because it called post commanders to “cause the stagnated water 
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in the ditches to be immediately drained.”57 While the 19th Infantry was a federal 
regiment the regional commanders consisted of Green Clay, Duncan McArthur, and 
William Henry Harrison; all were promoted as federal commanders after successes in 
leading Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana militia units. In the Old Northwest and Upper 
Canada, the fighting season was also the inclement season so clean uniforms, and 
filth sinks (trenches to store waste) were as crucial as functioning cannon. Filth sinks 
and hygiene policies rarely make it into military histories, but the storied battlefield 
commanders of the War of 1812 valued them as much as serviceable weapons. 
 The frontier militia leader William Henry Harrison also had a challenging job 
regarding the sick during his invasion of Upper Canada, following his federal 
appointment to Major General. In a letter dated 1 October 1813 the commander of the 
1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry complained: “the volunteers of my regiment who 
were sick – could not be attended to in the manner – which humanity in other 
circumstances would require.”58 He described how thirty-five soldiers from his and 
Colonel John Donaldson’s regiment of Kentucky Militia were ordered to Detroit, and 
“have been quartered in Genl  Hulls house.”59 Donaldson’s militia served with 
regulars, but the surgeon assigned to the regulars failed to treat ill militia soldiers. As 
such, he had to request Harrison’s orders for his soldiers to receive medical care. 
Donaldson’s regiment and the regulars at Detroit were in a position to protect lines of 
supply and communications. These soldiers were securing the same blockhouses and 
small fortifications, but the regular surgeon’s refusal to treat ill militia illustrated 
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some of the inherent tensions between citizen and professional soldiers. Even when 
two major theatre commanders, Brigadier Duncan McArthur and Major General 
William Harrison, began the war leading militia units, animosity still existed between 
regular and volunteer units over issues as inoffensive as caring for each other’s 
wounded. Much of the irregular fighting required mixed detachments, and rivalries 
had the potential to hinder overall health. It is also important to note that the denial of 
care to Donaldson’s militia regiment represents unprofessionalism amongst 
professional soldiers; unfortunately, much of the worst military professionalism came 
out of the regular Army. 
  Another fall 1813 account, in William Henry Harrison’s Papers, included one 
of the most concise but revealing documents about honor and infirmity duirng the 
war. A report made by Captain Samuel Hopkins of the 2nd Light Dragoons illustrated 
the willingness of regular Army officers to allow service from soldiers that today 
would be considered unfit for service. Hopkins described how, because of his 
ailments, he was not fit for a commission in the infantry, but he could serve in a 
mounted unit. At the time, his cavalry force was being shifted into an infantry 
brigade, which compelled Hopkins “to perform duties for which [he was] physically 
unfit.”60 The Army immediately granted Hopkins a Captain’s commission at the 
beginning of the war. However, Hopkins observed that “knowing my incompetency, 
from constitutional infirmity, to undergo the fatigues incident upon a long and 
arduous march I resolved not to accept it.”61 Hopkins may not have been fit enough 
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for the infantry, but he was still willing to serve in combat, and he was “delighted” to 
receive a commission in the cavalry.62 Serving on horseback was “a better situation,” 
and he was wisely ordered into recruiting duties when his cavalry unit transitioned to 
light infantry.63 It was often impossible for him to serve because his mounted unit 
regularly served as light infantry and Hopkins commanded the guard, fatigue 
(parties), and police duties of the camp.64 He was able to cross into Canada mounted, 
but the unit again diverted to un-mounted infantry following the capture of 
Sandwich.65 Hopkins became a liability in combat, so he requested to return to his 
duties as a recruiter. He wanted to serve in “some service where I can be more 
useful.”66 At the beginning of the war his “friends in Washington” believed that a 
constitutionally weak man, with character, could serve in the cavalry, later during the 
conflict his service remanded to outpost duties, and in the end, he desired to serve as a 
recruiter to be more useful.67 Hopkins received no battle honors, but it is clear that his 
unheralded service was helpful and that his character was respected. This illustrates 
that the Army was a place where the infirm could find an important role. Hopkins’s 
brief accounts reveal that successful officers and soldiers strived to maximize their 
service in the War of 1812, based on the realities of their health, and they expended a 
great deal of effort to prove their moral hardiness.  
 William Harrison’s leadership was amplified by the actions of lessor 
understood militia officers like Lewis Cass and Duncan McArthur. These frontier 
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Militia officers would win significant victories and secure esteemed reputations. 
Additionally, Isaac Shelby, a commander in his sixties and participating in his third 
war, demonstrated unbelievable endurance during extremely difficult marches. 
Shelby’s Kentucky militia would stand by his “zeal, and that of his men enabled them 
to keep up with the cavalry.”68 Later, at the Battle of Thames, “The venerable 
governor of Kentucky was posted, who, at the age of sixty-six, preserves all the rigor 
of youth, the ardent zeal, which distinguished him in the revolutionary war, and the 
undaunted bravery which manifested at King’s Mountain.”69 Shelby’s age and vigor 
add complexity to the surrender of William Hull at Detroit, as would Hull’s family’s 
portrayal of him in later life. Hull took solace in laboring on his farm, and veterans in 
the early republic often led vigorous lives well into old age. Shelby, who took no 
prisoners at the Battle of Kings Mountain, also represented the ruthlessness and vigor 
necessary to prevail on the United States southern frontier. The militia may not have 
always looked the part of regular soldiers, but militia drawn from the frontier could 
march and endure hardships at an equal or greater rate than the regular and volunteer 
regiments. 
 The mixed composition of Harrison’s army often made it hard for contingents 
of forces to maintain surgeons on the March. On the same day that Harrison praised 
Colonel John Miller, Commander of the 19th Infantry, Miller was afraid that his 
orders to move out of Detroit meant that he would not have a surgeon to care for “my 
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sick at the present.”70 At Fort Detroit, the artillery unit defending Detroit’s surgeon 
cared for Colonel Miller’s infantrymen. John Miller praised the surgeon’s mate 
Morrison because he was “very attentive to the sick.”71 However, Morrison was 
forced to offer his resignation because of an unspecified conflict with his supervising 
physician.72 John Miller still implored Harrison to allow him to retain Morrison, who 
he believed would be capable of his regiment’s fast-approaching march into Upper 
Canada. In a time when the medical profession was in its infancy, the value judgment 
of officers was more important than the recommendations of surgeons. A key aspect 
of emotional hardiness is accepting responsibility for health, and officers took as 
much or more responsibility for the health of their soldiers than the surgeons and 
surgeon’s mates. Constant marching and the necessity of securing outposts stretched 
the small numbers of medical professionals in the Northwestern Army to the point 
where John Miller wanted to retain capable surgeon’s mates, regardless of the 
recommendation of his supervising surgeon. Keeping men fit for the march was more 
critical than standard medical procedures; it was the responsibility of every field 
commander.  
 During Harrison’s 1813 invasion of Upper Canada, Duncan McArthur was 
left to defend Fort Detroit and Sandwich. Like the previous United States surrender of 
the fort, many of the soldiers left in garrison were soldiers unfit for the march into the 
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Niagara. He was given “700 effectives” to defend as well as all of the sick.73 Harrison 
would later describe how “Illness deprive(d) me of the talents of my adjutant general 
colonel Gaines, who was left at Sandwich.”74 Harrison’s victory at Thames and his 
capability led to a major shift in tribal loyalty. McArthur observed that the Ottawa, 
Potawatomi, Miami, and Kickapoo tribal leaders all agreed “to hold the same 
tomahawk with us.”75 
Most importantly, this illustrates how petite guerre tactics meant that ill 
soldiers were left in blockhouses to enable the impressive marches, like that of 
Shelby’s troops, as well as to serve as a supplemental force in a desperate siege. The 
infirm were not solely a liability, and the sick list was a dynamic changing document. 
Rested soldiers could enable a direct victory like the one at the Battle of Thames. 
Managing the sick list could also reduce the medical discharges that could occur 
without convalescence, or like Zachary Taylor’s victory at Fort Harrison, infirm 
soldiers could rise to the occasion during a defensive action. 
 Harrison’s previously described observations about labor and the naval 
victory of Perry occurred at the Battle of Lake Erie. Harrison left sick troops in rear 
fortifications that would have slowed their movement, but they also had ready access 
to their supplies without major physical effort. Harrison described the holding at Lake 
Erie as follows: “The baggage of the army was brought from Detroit in boats 
protected by three gun-boats.”76 The River Thames was on the mouth with tributary 
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streams, and the naval support could cover and supply the movement of Harrison’s 
troops inland.77 Harrison also listed the mills, which were powered by hydrology and 
had standing ponds; this illustrates how the hydrology of the Niagara was ideal for the 
malaria-carrying mosquitos. Harrison offered the following description of the 
battlefield: “From two to three hundred yards from the river a swamp extends 
parallel.”78 He also described local farms, which had animals that could serve as 
carriers, thus making the area a vector for the disease. In the passage of rivers and 
tributaries, Native Americans would cover the British retreat “to dispute our 
passage.”79 The Thames River was an ideal place for soldiers to succumb to illness, 
yet the seasoned militia soldiers from Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky were no strangers 
to fatiguing illness and participating in “ranging” patrols during the inclement 
seasons. They had to take hygienic measures into their own hands to minimize the 
negative influences of the environment. 
 Harrison’s subordinate, Duncan McArthur, received a federal commission as a 
Brigadier General after serving as Ohio Militia Colonel in William Hull’s failed 
invasion. He had some of the most insightful policies about the management of 
illness. The Regimental order book of the 19th Infantry regiment was preserved; it 
recorded McArthur’s policies about field sanitation and discipline. An order dated 1 
August 1813 called for “a sufficient number of sinks to be dug for the use of their 
troops out of the garrison, and at least one hundred and fifty yards from the picketings 
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the filth collected in the garrison must be emptied…at least once a day.”80 The 
August order principally regulated the cleanliness and health inside United States 
camps and fortifications. While the duty of emptying the filth was significant for 
health, it also served as a punishment. Soldiers who failed to care for their cleanliness 
were “made to the duty of camp colourman and employed in removing the filth for 
one week.”81 Soldiers who did not attend to their healthiness performed the duties as 
punishment. While cleanliness was again synonymous with discipline, it was also 
compatible with discipline with weapons and tactics. Frontier-schooled militia leaders 
best understood the unhealthiness of the border region between Northern Ohio and 
Upper Canada. Successful leaders were proactive and took great measures to 
safeguard the health of their soldiers.  
 Duncan McArthur not only called for the removal of trash and excrement, he 
also sought to eliminate all standing water and venereal threats to the soldiers under 
his command. McArthur also ordered the removal of standing water: “By the order of 
the commander in chief this will also cause the stagnated water in the ditches to be 
immediately drained.”82 This was issued long before stagnated water was associated 
with mosquito-carried illnesses. However, humoral theory believed that unhealthy 
vapor came from dead plant matter. The policy accidently eliminated mosquitos. 
Through trial and error, the frontier militia identified successful measures. The same 
order that removed stagnate water also mandated that unused cannons be returned and 
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cleaned, but hygiene came before clean and serviceable cannon. Cleaning duties in 
the camps have received little attention in military history, but in a war where 
sickness reined as the most significant source of casualties, those policies were 
central to success and most often developed by frontier militia officers that were 
elevated to regular Army general commissions.  
The final section of McArthur’s order focused on health, discipline, and the 
regulation of camp women. Without any significant descriptions of the rationale for 
such an order, McArthur mandated that “any married woman who has abandoned her 
husband and be found strolling about the camp or lodging in the tents of other men 
shall be drummed out of camp.”83 This punishment was typically the public shaming 
common in soldiers unfit for duty, and it was a rarity for a general to threaten civilian 
members of the camp, save for a few cases of espionage. McArthur’s emphasis on the 
health and cleanliness as well as sexual activities of soldiers’ wives illustrate how the 
19th Infantry Regiment was also initiating a measure to prevent venereal diseases. 
Women in the camps were linked to disease, rather than promiscuous soldiers, and 
the subtle language removing women and filth from the camp was an inexplicit but 
obvious measure to limit disease.84 
 While Harrison's army managed to achieve success north of Lake Erie without 
tents and the reports from Fort George were mostly positive, General James 
Wilkinson’s force was struggling. Persistent rain became a more significant 
 
83 General Orders 19th Infantry Regiment 1 August 1813, 19th Infantry Regiment Order Book, Library 
of Congress. 
84 Philippa Levine’s work on the British Army’s use management of prostitution is still the definitive 
military history on the military management of venereal disease. See Philippa Levine, Prostitution, 
Race, and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
71 
 
impediment. “The inexorable winds and rains continue to oppose and embarrass our 
movements,” Wilkinson noted, because his troops typically embarked from ships. 
Harrison, on the other hand, used ships in support while his men marched light and 
fast. The shores became quagmires, and British accounts reveal that the roads were 
just as bad. General William Slim, in his book Defeat Into Victory, explicitly linked 
over-reliance on the road to both poor asymmetric strategy and the elevation of health 
problems, because casualties exponentially increased traffic on limited roads.85 More 
significantly, Wilkinson’s struggles with the rainy weather did not only hinder 
movement and logistics; it also made it difficult to maintain his ranks of effective 
fighters. According to Wilkinson, “We have such a fluctuation of sick and well, 
between this place (Grenadier Island New York) and Sackett’s Harbor that it is 
impossible to say what force we shall move.”86 His soldiers likely suffered from a 
combination of malaria and communicable sicknesses driven by tight quarters, as well 
as pervasive seasickness among ground soldiers who were unaccustomed to sailing in 
rough weather. As the season was closing and Harrison was garrisoning Detroit, 
Wilkinson was not even sure if his subordinate Winfield Scott could “be up in 
season.”87 One force could operate off roads, and one could not, and Harrison’s 
emphasis on irregular petite guerre tactics also helped significantly in reducing rates 
of illness. Regulars might have been the best-trained troops, but they also relied on 
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roads more than the militia. The season forced Wilkinson into a fight where regulars 
were more likely to succumb to illness. 
 The army left soldiers behind to convalesce, but those soldiers ultimately 
returned to the ranks. In a 17 October 1813 letter, Colonel William P. Anderson 
described the value of leaving soldiers behind to recover. He stated that the seventy 
soldiers left at Put in Bay and the eighty-six left at Fort Meigs “are all now well and 
able to march.”88 The use of soldiers to defend rear positions had now increased the 
ranks of the 24th Infantry Regiment, and Anderson would request that more officers 
be allowed to recuperate at home, especially to protect their homes. Captains Gerry 
and Campbell, along with Lieutenant Allison, were all too sick to be effective, and 
the commander requested their return home. 
Moreover, if sent home they could prevent the enemy from being “able to 
Plunder their country” because they would be able to protect their property.89 Plunder 
is an overstatement of the common practice of armies subsisting on local crops. When 
sent home these soldiers would not be fit to march for “4 months to come” and thus 
they could perform more valuable service at home.90 Given the threats to their homes 
and families, they were “all too anxious to be dispatched the soonest practicable.”91 
Convalescing at home or in rear positions released logistical burdens of forward-
deployed units, as well as providing replacements. Moreover, sometimes soldiers 
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convalescing at home could protect their crops from opponents seeking subsistence, 
thereby denying supplies to the enemy. 
 Weather in Niagara was terrible during the fall of 1813 and compounded the 
narrow window that the seasonality of malaria fevers provided. Brigadier General 
John Armstrong described how difficult it was to move in Niagara. Stating that he 
should have already united his force with Wilkinson, he noted that “bad roads, worse 
weather and a considerable degree of illness, admonished me against receding further 
from a point where my engagements call me.”92 The same would be true of Isaac 
Shelby’s foot cavalry. The ever-virile sixty-six-year-old frontiersman and his soldiers 
could endure much, but the rain was intolerable. Shelby told his wife that “the 
weather is so rack and the roads so deep we cannot travel more than 20 miles a 
day.”93 Frontier leadership was superior in leading seasoning soldiers, but there were 
limits for even the best of troops. Shelby further told his wife “the Army owing to the 
(illegible word) hardiness all have undergone had become very sickly. They dying 
more or less, every (wary) day on the march. We have but hardly been supplied.”94 
While rain on the campaign is was always distressing for soldiers, the fall of 1813 
was unique with not “one clear day—for more than a month which has worn down 
the Army.”95 Bad weather meant fatigue and sickness and could pull the most 
seasoned formation out of the field. Shelby’s force succumbed long after the regulars 
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did because as frontier units they were far more accustomed to operating in inclement 
regions. The worst performing officers of the war, William Hull and James 
Winchester, both failed to adopt effective public health tactics. Conversely, officers 
from the frontier excelled. 
 Major General Wade Hampton’s 8 November 1813 letter to Wilkinson 
catalogues numerous environmental challenges and illnesses. Men had to carry 
supplies in the winter weather physically because horses could no longer support 
logistics. His subordinate Colonel, Henry Atkinson, was sent forth from the central 
supply depot and could “explain the reasons that would have rendered it impossible 
for me to have brought more than each man could have carried on his back.”96 
Hampton’s force would have been “throwing myself on your scanty means,” 
therefore “weakening you in your most vulnerable point.”97 Hampton noted that roads 
prevented “wheeled carriages during winters but by the employment of pack horses, 
if I am not overpowered, I hope to be able to keep you from starving.”98 Harrison’s 
force embraced light infantry packhorse logistics that did not require roads, but 
Wilkinson and Hampton were reactive to conditions rather than adaptive to 
predictable problems. East of Niagara in 1813 would not be a campaign where the 
Americans could subsist off of the countryside because Hampton “ascertained and 
witnessed the plan of the enemy to burn and destroy everything in our advance.”99 
Wilkinson’s men, cut off from supplies, were in a dire situation because Hampton’s 
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force at a supply depot was highly fatigued and demoralized. Hampton reported that 
“Besides the Rawness and sickliness they have endured fatigues equal to a winter 
campaign, in the late snows and bad weather, and are sadly dispirited and fallen 
off.”100 The environment, weather, and fatigue linked illness and poor morale into a 
condition as close to battle fatigue as it was to malarial fevers. The reliance on roads 
and traditional infantry tactics were Wilkinson and Hampton’s greatest problems. 
  Major General Jacob Brown’s report on the Battle of Bridgewater, more 
commonly known as the Battle of Lundy’s Lane, recorded the honor of serving while 
ill and injured. Brown, although recognized for his professionalization of the 
Northern Army, started his service in the War of 1812 as General in the Pennsylvania 
Militia. By the time of his promotion to a federal Major General, he had extensive 
experience on the Buffalo and Niagara frontier. It is problematic that his emphasis on 
discipline and subsequent career in the Army overshadow his rise to federal rank 
from his service in the militia. Citizen soldiers could be disciplined and well trained. 
Three figures merit mentioning. The first was Colonel James Miller, a man that 
would become a life-long invalid due to exposure to the Canadian frontier. Miller’s 
actions at Lundy’s Lane led to the capture of British cannon and immortalized him as 
a congressional Gold Medal winner. However, James Miller constantly struggled with 
an intermittent fever. He was called upon to seize the British battery, and his attack 
lost the support of the regiment assigned to “menace and amuse” the British 
infantry.101 According to Jacob Brown, “In the meantime, colonel Miller, without 
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regard to this occurrence, advanced steadily and gallantly to his object, and carried 
the height and the cannon.”102 Likewise, Captains Biddle and Ritchie were singled out 
for gallantry because they “were both wounded early in the action, but refused to quit 
the field.”103 Brown described how  Ritchie “declared he would never leave his piece; 
and true to his engagement, fell by its side, covered with wounds.”104 Immediately 
after describing the service of two wounded officers, Brown praised his Adjutant 
General, colonel Gardner for his “peculiar merit and distinction” for serving while 
sick.105 Gardner, “though ill, was on horseback, and did all in his power.”106 To serve 
while ill was synonymous with serving while injured, and honor and gallantry was 
self-possession regardless of an individual’s health. Miller provides perhaps the best 
example because his service, despite persistent illness, corresponded with his 
consistent heroism. Also, Miller’s lifelong convalescence illustrated his ability to 
overcome disabling illness during battle. 
 At the outset of the campaign of 1814, officers sought a campaign that would 
defend the character of the U.S. Army. Major General Brown said that “if we gained 
nothing else” in an invasion of Canada but “restore the tarnished military character of 
the country,” through the reform of the Northern Army.107 Thomas Sidney Jesup, 
Major of the 25th Infantry and chief of Army logistics during the Mexican American 
War, observed Brown’s emphasis on honor and character about the environment. 
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According to Jesup, Brown “added most emphatically ‘we go’ – ‘nothing but the 
elements shall stop us,’” because illness and the environment was the most 
challenging opponent on the Upper Canadian frontier.108 Jesup described how 
essential character and firmness were in combat at the Battle of Chippewa: “Relying 
on the firmness and excellent discipline of his troops, the Major determined to 
advance and try the effect of the Bayonet.”109 Jesup began to inject his character into 
the story but omitted his place in the battle by slashing through his initial text, to 
emphasize the courage of American soldiers: “The Major put himself in front and the 
charge made, but the enemy general did not wait and receive the bayonet.”110 
Character and firmness were the keys to success, even if a military victory was 
impossible because of Upper Canada’s environment.  
 While Jesup would become better known for his work as Quartermaster 
General, his service as the commander of an infantry regiment was significant. At the 
Battle of Bridgewater Jesup was incapacitated for a time, but he quickly returned to 
duty. In his description of the injury, he exhibited a significant shift to the third 
person, which is common in trauma writing: “Major Jesup soon after (Winfield Scott 
was wounded) Received a violent contusion on the great by a piece of shell, or 
perhaps the stock of a Musket, which brought him to the ground.”111 With courage 
and necessity, Jesup regained his consciousness and continued leading: “In a few 
moments however he rose and returned to his command, which had temporarily 
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109 Ibid., 5. 
110 Ibid. Jesup wrote and revised this passage and his editing is revealing. His message is also clearer 
with the omitted text.  
111 Ibid., 11. 
78 
 
devolved on Captain Murdock.” 112 The battle raged for hours with repeated British 
efforts to overtake the American position, and that took a toll on the injured Jesup. 
“The Major though suffering severely from his wound joined his (General Ripley's) 
line,” and after removing the wounded they retired to the camp at Chippewa.113 Jesup 
began the war as a Lieutenant, and by his actions while wounded at Bridgewater he 
gained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The Battle of Lundy’s Lane would not be the 
last time Jesup continued serving while injured. During siege warfare and battles 
following Bridgewater Jesup had two “horses shot under him” and received as many 
as three wounds.114 Jesup recorded his march from Buffalo to Fort Erie as follows: 
“Major Jesup was at this time suffering severely from his wounds: but the movement 
he was able to leave, he had volunteered for such duties as possess the physical 
capacity to perform.”115 He would be wounded again only to return to Fort Erie where 
he continued to fight and lead troops. Jesup described his efforts despite “having three 
wounds open and his right arm in a sling, and being in consequence unable to perform 
active duty yet believing his presence with his corps would have a good effect upon 
the service, he volunteered to join the Army at Fort Erie.”116 Jesup’s actions 
underpinned Jacob Brown’s observation that the campaign of 1814 was about 
regaining the honor of the U.S. Army, and his repeated efforts to return to duty 
despite wounds illustrate how individuals demonstrated their character by fighting in 
spite of injury or health problems.  
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 Brown’s emphasis on honorable performance and extensive drilling of his 
soldiers occurred in concert with measures ensuring good hygiene. In the company 
records of Charles Proctor’s unit, orders called for cleanliness and personal hygiene. 
Like the innovations of the forces in Harrison’s Army, Jacob Brown’s Northern Army 
adopted strict hygiene policies. The letters of general officers are available, but there 
are few records from general orders to junior officers. Charles Proctor’s company 
order book is rare because, in addition to the personnel tracking and muster records 
common in company-level documents, he also recorded lower-level orders. Proctor’s 
order book illustrates that from the very beginning of Jacob Brown’s command, he 
worked to preserve the health of his men. In a 23 January 1814 order Brown 
emphasized that “more attention to the health & comfort of the soldiers will be 
expected from many Gentlemen who have the honor of Caring. Our ranks must not be 
thinned in camp or Quarters the Gallant Soldiers must not perish ingloriously in filth 
& wretchedness.”117 Proctor’s book also recorded Winfield Scott’s calls for the 
reading and implementation of the drill book of Baron Von Steuben, and hygiene was 
an extension of soldierly discipline, even if cleaning of filth and policing the camp 
has never influenced the war’s historiography.118  
Following the campaign of 1814, Proctor recorded the most in-depth coverage 
of the scale of efforts taken to maintain order and cleanliness because those policies 
were particularly effective in the tight winter quarters. A platoon-sized force, which 
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was at the time comparable for to an entire company’s fit-for-duty roster, comprised 
of “A Sergeant, a Corpl & 20 Privates [who]will be detailed for the police.”119 While 
poor weather and other broader environmental factors were the cause of the high rates 
of sickness, officers in Brown’s Army were expected to preserve the health of their 
men via attention to cleanliness and discipline. Proctor's order book further recorded 
that “it will be the duty of their officers indefatigably to attend to the preservation & 
Cleanliness & order throughout the cantonment & its vicinity.”120 These hygienic 
regulations in the winter occurred in concert with uniform serviceability during the 
inclement season, and with a more general movement towards discipline. Excellent 
drill and tactics were worthless when illness claimed the lives of soldiers, and it is 
important to note that the campaign that brought U.S. victories at Chippewa, 
Bridgewater, and Fort Erie occurred simultaneously with an emphasis on better 
hygienic standards. Leaders who excelled on the battlefield also excelled at managing 
illness and valued both roles equally. 
 Major General Jacob Brown is well known for his reliance on Winfield Scott 
for discipline and tactics. However, Brown also entrusted Brigadier General Scott to 
care for the health of the soldiers on a challenging frontier. In a carefully crafted letter 
with several corrections in prose, Brown outlined his expectations on Scott: “The 
particular command up this Frontier devolves upon you, during my absence. 
Assumed it unnecessary, to give you detailed instructions, as well understand the 
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situation of the country, in which you are placed.”121 The situation of the country was 
what Brown articulated as the key challenge to his most trusted subordinate during 
his absence: “Without in which placed will & with will do every thing for that 
country, & for the health & honor of the forces placed under your command, that can 
reasonably be expected of an officer with the means you have in your power.”122 
Health and honor were preserved in unity because the frontier border region between 
the United States and British North America offered significant obstacles to the health 
of armies. However, the best commanders believed that they could influence the 
health of their men, and these officers typically gained experience with soldiers’ 
health by serving in frontier-based militias.  
 At the close of military operations in the war, Major General Brown resented 
that the efforts of his men to survive combat and the elements with honor received a 
lack of support and recognition. Brown reminded Secretary of War John Armstrong 
that the soldier’s life was characterized by of “privation, hardship, & danger,” yet the 
Northern Army’s sufferings were not acknowledged.123 The army was failing because 
they could not be adequately supplied. For Brown, “Honor & rewards must follow 
distinguished gallantry & good conduct, or the nation will command the military men 
she breeds, & her wealth & population will avail her but little, against a foe so well 
understands this subject.”124 Brown’s Army overcame both the enemy and the 
inclement climate of the Niagara frontier but suffered the most by the lack of support 
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from their countrymen. In a letter to the Governor of New York, Brown made it clear 
that his forces had overcome illness and danger only to suffer from a lack of supplies: 
“My gallant little Army has so far done its duty and been blest with the smiles of 
Providence; but unless it can receive efficient aid, there is cause to be alarmed for its 
ultimate safety.”125 The bitterness that his officers felt came from their ability to 
overcome illness, injury, and death on the battlefield, only to have their campaign 
limited by a lack of support. Jesup captured their frustration best with his criticism of 
the military’s logistics: “It is madness in the extreme to attempt to carry on war with 
such a system.”126 Brown was succeeding in an unwinnable campaign in an inclement 
region, yet without adequate support, his years of experiences on the frontier were for 
naught. 
Conclusion: A Problematic Revolutionary Heritage 
  
 A great deal of scholarship has cataloged the U.S. Army’s failings in the War 
of 1812, yet few historians recognize that the failures of 1812 were also the result of 
embedded mores that related to America's revolutionary experiences. These mores are 
still celebrated extensively regarding the American Revolution. Suffering privations 
and wearing the clothing off the backs of soldiers was embedded into the culture of 
the Army during the early national period. However, invading and occupying Canada 
was different than outlasting the British Army during the Revolution. The assumption 
that privations were the quintessential military experience during the war, rather than 
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a problem to overcome through logistical competence, limited the operational 
capacity of the American Army. Focus on a lack of professionalism, including a 
forced reliance on less disciplined militia, ignores the fact that frontier militia officers 
rose to the highest ranks in the regular army, primarily because they possessed greater 
talents regarding logistics and public health. In the backwoods of Upper Canada 
discipline learned on parade grounds was less valuable than frontier experience and 
petite guerre tactics. Frontier sufferings did not have to be significantly worse due to 
poor logistics. The War of 1812 was most often waged for the loyalty of 
borderlanders and late loyalists of questionable resolve, and preserving the health of 
soldiers was central to morale.  
 The Revolutionary comparison also existed in memoirs of private soldiers like 
William Atherton and Adam Walker. The theme of nakedness and hunger linked the 
lives of soldiers to their Revolutionary forefathers. When cut off from supplies at Fort 
Defiance, for example, William Atherton described the privations of the early 
national army on a rugged frontier: “We now saw nothing but hunger, and cold, and 
nakedness, staring us in the face.”127 Atherton poignantly described his sufferings: 
“Though many years have rolled by since the events transpired, the impression they 
made upon my mind is almost as fresh as ever.” His privations were not only 
traumatic – they also connected him explicitly to the sufferings of the Revolutionary 
Army.128 Adam Walker described the lack of provisions for five days following the 
wounded at the Battle of Tippecanoe: “The weather was freezing cold, and our 
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wounds which had been not been dressed for two days past, became stiff and 
extremely painful.”129 Descriptions of traumatic injuries, hunger, and exposure to the 
elements were both the cathartic processing of trauma in third-person writing, but 
also served as a badge of honor. Atherton’s determination saved his life, even in the 
face of unspeakable atrocities. He “was starving and sick (and shot in the shoulder), 
but he kept on as fast and as far as he could, and when he could go no farther he laid 
down upon the ground and told them to kill him…when they saw his resolution they 
became attached to him.” Remarkably, he survived.130 Atherton’s preface clearly 
states the objective of his narrative: “it is hoped that what has been said will be 
sufficient to give the youthful reader some idea of what that ‘Spartan band’ were 
called to endure. To the old Men of our country these things, perhaps will not be 
new.”131 The experiences of illness, privation, and wounds were badges of honor, 
even if they did not represent the most viable military strategies.  
 Isaac Shelby, who commanded a contingent of Kentucky backwoodsmen, was 
perhaps the best example of how privation and suffering linked War of 1812 soldiers 
to a cherished revolutionary experience. Early in an un-dated address to “Friends and 
fellow citizens,” Governor Shelby described how he and they were “schooled in the 
rough school of the revolution.”132 As an older man in Kentucky whose papers had 
several newspaper circulars cut out for anti-bilious remedies, service in the war 
seemed to aid Shelby’s health. In his description of the march to Ohio, he asked 
William Powell to tell his wife “let her know that I am quite hearty. – I never enjoyed 
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better health – and the arduous duties that incessantly press upon me, regain all my 
energies.”133 As a French and Indian War, Revolutionary War, and War of 1812 
veteran, he described a kind of happiness that came with suffering for one’s country: 
“I am in good health. The duties I have to perform requires my whole exertions I 
sometimes am greatly fatigued, nothing but the affection of serving my beloved could 
bear me up under the task I have to perform.”134 Hardiness and endurance was an 
acculturated aspect of serving on the frontier. As he noted, “The weather is so rack 
and the roads so deep we cannot travel more than 20 miles a day.”135 His men – 
suffering by exposure to adverse weather conditions and mosquito-carried illnesses – 
were still marching as hard and as far as horses. To suffer and endure were in keeping 
with the Revolutionary tradition, yet in an invasion, even Shelby’s hardy men 
succumbed to illness and weather.  
 Frontier-based militia leaders may have been the best officers regarding 
managing sickness, fatigue and behaving honorably under duress. However, the 
Revolutionary tradition of suffering and endurance predisposed the American Army 
to suffer far more than necessary in the context of a poor logistical system. Scholars 
to date study honor as a force that trumped professionalism when serving in the face 
of illness and a harsh environment was perhaps the best feature of the early national 
United States armed forces. This tendency to suffer privations with pride also sapped 
combat efficiency that could have been improved by systematic efforts for 
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professional logistics. In many ways, the War of 1812 is another case in a long story 
of an army carrying the lessons from a previous conflict into a less suitable stage. 
Outlasting an opponent by bearing hardship and adversity may have worked in the 
Revolution, but it was a flawed mentality to shape the invasion and occupation of an 
isolated frontier.  
 Sickness illustrates how the day-to-day slog of soldiering and fighting on an 
isolated frontier more resembled the harsh combat and ironies of twentieth-century 
warfare. A strong sense of honor and the quest to burnish their reputations meant that 
soldiers remembered the war differently. Men like William Henry Harrison, James 
Miller, Jacob Brown, and Winfield Scott all emerged as American heroes because of 
their battlefield exploits, yet their hygienic policies were as essential as courage under 
fire for battlefield success. Even the brash Indian fighter Andrew Jackson’s hygienic 
policies have been praised by the U.S. Army’s medical command’s official history as 
more forward-thinking than medical professionals such as Benjamin Rush.136 
Recovering the mundane consistency of preserving health and enduring illness better 
captures the nature of the War of 1812 than the battle and campaign case studies that 
have dominated historical memory. The digging of filth trenches and episodes of 
soldiers marching hard despite injury and illness need to be remembered. The young 
Captain Zachary Taylor, who would later become an American  president, defended a 
fort when he could barely perform his duties. That demonstrates an unromantic, 
uncelebrated, and ordinary sort of courage that is in many ways more remarkable than 
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studies of battles. One of the most significant changes in contemporary analyses of 
warfare, often shaped by the soldiers themselves, is the way in which war is defined 
by small moments of courage. These were often permeated by boredom and drudgery, 
and in many instances were perceived as worse than combat. A study of illness 
reveals that the War of 1812 was as monotonous and frustrating as any modern 
conflict; it illustrates that ordinary courage was defined by men marching in storms, 
suffering from fevers, and fighting while ill or injured for honor and survival. The 
next chapter continues an approach to survival through the supply of calories and 
logistics. It focuses on the 1814 campaigns, during which Jacob Brown’s reforms of 
the U.S. Army were unsuccessful because of poor logistics and the British traded 
combat power for a feasible supply system. British commanders gained more in 
battlefield losses because they limited the size of their army, and therefore they could 
supply more calories to their soldiers. They lost the battles but won the war for 
calories. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE WAR FOR CALORIES 
“It is madness in the extreme to attempt to carry on war with such a system”1 
 
 The previous chapter emphasized the entire War of 1812 from the 
perspectives of American commanders, with a heavier concentration on the first two 
years. This chapter will focus on the last year of the conflict: 1814. It was a year of 
significant transition in the war, and oddly enough it is year most remembered for the 
burning of Washington. While “The Star-Spangled Banner” emphasizes American 
spirit in the face of losses incurred during the British offensive in the Chesapeake, in 
the Upper Canada the U.S. Northern Army won every major engagement. The 
principal confrontations started with a minor engagement at the Chippewa and a 
major battle at Lundy’s Lane. Both were fought in the summer, near the falls at 
Niagara, and both were U.S. victories. However, the Americans were unable to press 
the advantage of their victories with a firm presence in Upper Canada. After Lundy’s 
Lane the Americans defended their gains in the British siege of Fort Erie, and the 
siege at Plattsburgh occurred in the fall of 1814. The Americans were able to defeat 
the British in battle during the summer and hold them off in the fall. The British had 
the advantage in troops, but the reinforcements came from combat weary Napoleonic 
War veterans who struggled in the rough frontier border region. This chapter seeks to 
answer why the American victories ultimately gained very little in the final year of  
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Figure 1 Used with the permission of the West Point History Department 
https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-
images/academics/academic_departments/history/War%20of%201812/OperationsNi
agara.gif 
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the conflict; it concludes that they won the battles but lost the war for calories, and 
thus gained little from their victories. 
After the Niagara Campaign of 1814, victories at Bridgewater, Chippewa, and 
Fort Erie strengthened the poor reputation of the U.S. Army. Following the War of 
1812, American commanders remained embittered by the lack of support they 
received during their only successful invasion of Canada. The title quote from 
Thomas Sidney Jesup, an officer who was a junior Lieutenant at the beginning of the 
war, but who would go on to lead a regiment at Bridgewater (Lundy’s Lane), 
represented the Northern Army’s chief concern. The quote cited the madness of 
having control of provisions in the hands of private contractors: “Either the 
contractors should be dismissed, or they should be made amenable to military 
tribunals.”2 The American regular Army redeemed itself regarding tactical 
competence and courage under fire, but it suffered after its victories. The 
commanding officer of the Northern Army, Major General Jacob Brown, and the 
force’s most decorated officer, Brigadier General James Miller, exchanged letters that 
described the neglected Army for years. While they highlighted deficiencies 
regarding material support, they also lamented the country’s lack of awareness of the 
American Army’s victory at Bridgewater – the British claimed victory at Lundy’s 
Lane after sleeping on the field.3 The U.S. forces drove the British from the field and 
covered their officers in the glory they all romantically sought. However, provisions, 
wounded and ill soldiers, and a lack of naval support forced them to pull back to Fort 
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3 James Miller Papers, Library of Congress; Jon Latimer, Niagara 1814: The Final Invasion (New 
York: Osprey Pub., 2009) 59. 
91 
 
Erie. The Army suffered more deaths from lack of support and illness than it did 
under fire. The only force in the northern theatre that brought glory and honor to the 
U.S. deprived those courageous soldiers of their lives and their health, and the 
commanding officers expressed bitterness about their lack of support. 
While the Americans saw only their problems, Lieutenant-General Gordon 
Drummond also struggled in 1814. Following Wellington’s victories in Spain, the 
British Army finally had a large corps of regular British Regiments of Foot; yet 
Drummond could not supply his growing force on the Upper Canadian frontier. 
Although Drummond had the forces necessary to gain the upper hand, he could not 
provide provisions enough to maintain his force’s health: “Although I should have 
wished it, I am apprehensive I shall not have it in my power to forward any further 
reinforcements to the Right Division.”4 Drummond  had enough troops to defeat the 
Americans on the Upper Canadian frontier. However,  he could not feed them, “for 
the inability of the Commissariat to supply Provisions.”5 Furthermore, Drummond 
“dread[ed] their failing in due supplies to those already ordered there.”6 However, 
while Americans felt betrayed by their people because of smuggling, the British 
failed to make moral judgments, and instead grasped the way that the environment 
limited armies on such a remote frontier. While Lisa Brady’s groundbreaking work 
on the American Civil War recognized how generals Ulysses Grant and William 
Sherman targeted the agro-ecological system of the south, British generals in the War 
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of 1812 already knew the inherent weaknesses of commanding armies in such remote 
environs.7 
Americans finally achieved tactical victories in pitched battles, but the British 
employed petit guerre light infantry tactics against the U.S. Army to separate the 
Americans from their supplies and disrupt their communications. In a letter from 
Major General Phineas Riall to Drummond, Riall described how winning the unsung 
small fight to hinder supply lines secured victory for the British by separating the 
Americans from their sustenance: “I propose tomorrow to take up a more advanced 
Position at the 12 Mile Creek, for the purpose of favoring some Parties of Militia & 
Indians.”8 The British used local fighters, who were masters of irregular tactics, to 
harass the supplies and communications of their opponents. The force of militia and 
Native American allies separated the U.S. Army from its supplies by being “pushed 
forward with a view to gain information of the enemys (sic) movements & prevent his 
receiving supplies from the country.”9 General Riall’s discussion of denying the 
American army subsistence from the countryside recognized that the crops grown in 
the summer of 1814 would aid the American advance into Upper Canada. The British 
finally had a larger force of regular regiments than the Americans. But recognizing 
that the region was too hard to supply, they cleverly reduced the size of their force 
and instead allowed the Americans to be the aggressors while they targeted their 
supply lines. In short, the British lost the battles but won the campaign by winning the 
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small fights. They hindered American supply lines and thereby forced U.S. 
withdrawals after victories in battle. 
 Major General Jacob Brown used moving language to describe how sickness 
deprived his army of the gains they earned through blood and honor. Describing his 
force’s rehabilitation of the American army’s reputation, he stated; “They had often 
bled and triumphed, and he believed that they would prefer to die in the blaze of their 
glory than live dishonored by captivity or defeat.”10 Despite his victories at Chippewa 
and Bridgewater, as well as a later triumph at Fort Erie, his army still faded away 
because of illness in such a harsh and isolated climate. He noted: 
As the daily casualties were thinning the ranks, and the constant fatigues and 
exposure inflicting those that escape the fire of the enemy, the commanding 
General determined without loss of time to make one great effort to save the 
suffering remains of a force, that appeared to be neglected by a country for 
which it had devoted itself.11 
 
Brown could not understand how his men, who had proved their honor on the field of 
battle, could be lost to illness from a lack of adequate logistical support. In fact, the 
angst regarding the contradiction between the Northern Army’s performance in the 
field and their lack of enough support, and the subsequent higher losses to illness, 
were believed to occur as the result of a conspiracy.  Brown stated the following in 
his narrative: “It should not be concealed that it appeared at this period to the army of 
Niagara and its commander that, there was a conspiracy planned for its destruction, 
and that this opinion, however, uninformed, tended to render it more desperate.”12 
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of the Niagara Campaign. 
11 Brown, A Narrative of the Niagara Campaign, 62. 
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With such poor support for their honorable service, many of the men who were not 
sick deserted, and the battlefield gains were lost to illness and a stressful 
environment. Brown’s language represented the moral perspective of U.S. Army 
officers who failed to grasp how they could influence their environment and exploit 
the supply weaknesses of their enemy. While the British had to rely on local allies to 
perform petite guerre tactics, the Americans used North American soldiers as 
regulars. They excelled on the battlefield but were not effective at isolating their 
opponents from their supply lines. 
 A great irony of the campaign on the Niagara in 1814 was that of the officer 
who, uninjured and in outstanding health, nevertheless became a lifelong invalid. 
James Miller described his almost miraculous lack of wounds during the duration of 
the war. His letter from Fort Erie after earning his fourth Congressional Gold Medal 
for destroying the British siege batteries states, “I escaped again unhurt.”13 Miller’s 
lack of injuries was no small matter – during the campaign very few officers to 
escaped either ill health or injury. He observed, “I can say that every Major save one, 
every Lt. Col, every Colonel who was here when I came and has remained here, has 
been killed or wounded, and I am now the only general officer, out of seven that has 
escaped.”14 But Miller’s service in a poorly supplied Army was ultimately more 
detrimental to his health. Survival and being unwounded was often more harmful to 
health; James Miller was unhurt, yet he became a permanent invalid after the war was 
over. Coping with a paucity of supplies and exposure to enemy attacks from all 
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directions meant that Miller was consistently exposed to stress, camp illness, and 
seasonal fevers. In 1814, Miller led bayonet charges at Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane. 
He also destroyed the power magazine at the siege of Fort Erie, yet the British use of 
petite guerre likely was more detrimental to his health than any wounds than he might 
have received in combat. The American army would win the Battle of Lundy’s Lane, 
by bold action seizing British guns, then repeatedly holding off charges by British 
Regulars. However, they had to give up the classic military tactic of holding the field 
of battle because militia and Native Americans cut off their food supplies.  
 
The Battle of Lundy’s Lane 
 Major Sidney Jesup described his service despite wounds received at 
Bridgewater (Lundy’s Lane) and the Siege of Fort Erie. Jesup penned his unpublished 
memoir during his subsequent convalescence. During the battle, Jesup was knocked 
out after receiving “a violent contusion” from an unknown source.15 Jesup was hit “by 
a piece of shell, or perhaps the stock of a Musket, which brought him to the 
ground.”16  Left on the ground for dead, Jesup revived and continued to repulse 
British assaults on the American position, an action that brought a promotion to 
Lieutenant Colonel.17 He remained in a sick bed until his regiment moved to secure 
Fort Erie. In September, despite his wounds, Jesup moved to Fort Erie to motivate his 
soldiers. Using the third-person voice, he stated that “Major Jesup was at this time 
suffering severely from his wounds: but the movement he was able to leave, he had 
 
15 Thomas Sidney Jesup, Memoir of the Campaign on the Niagara Spring 1814, Thomas Sidney Jesup 
Papers, Library of Congress, 11. Hereafter Jesup, Memoir of the Campaign on the Niagara. 
16 Jesup, Memoir of the Campaign on the Niagara, 11. 
17 Jesup, Memoir of the Campaign on the Niagara, 11. Find his promotion in Brown's papers. 
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volunteered for such duties as possess the physical capacity to perform.”18 The loss of 
officers and men was already so severe that a wounded officer was frequently used to 
preside over a sieged garrison. But it would only get worse. Jessup was wounded 
again in the siege, but he returned because of the soldiers’ moral and high rates of 
sickness. He stated that “Major Jesup having three wounds open and his right arm in a 
sling, and being in consequence unable to perform active duty yet believing his 
presence with his corps would have a good effect upon the service, he volunteered to 
join the Army at Fort Erie.”19 Jesup was unable to perform his duties; nonetheless, he 
became a symbol of resilience by coping with increasingly unmotivated and ill 
soldiers. The character of the Americans often resulted in battlefield victories, but this 
dynamic could not overcome the environmental challenges.  
 
18 Jesup, Memoir of the Campaign on the Niagara, 15. 
19 Jesup, Memoir of the Campaign on the Niagara, 15. 
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Figure 2 Used with permission of the West Point History Department 
https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-
images/academics/academic_departments/history/War%20of%201812/LundysLaneB
attle.gif 
  
While the American Army emphasized virtue, the British Army emphasized 
tactics and structural changes. Major General Riall recognized the non-linear aspect 
of the war and adjusted his operational approach appropriately. He noted: “If I 
advance from this I leave the Country in my rear perfectly exposed to the enemys 
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(sic) advance from Queenston”20 The British again sacrificed the pitched battle to win 
the small war, light infantry fight of controlling supply lines and provisioning their 
force. Riall would later secure a decisive battle at Lundy’s Lane, but he recognized 
the most dangerous of possible actions would be the enemy disrupting his lines of 
supply and communications. The 1814 campaign was a war for calories, one in which 
the U.S. won battles because the British had to check their aggressiveness and limit 
their forces to maintain supply lines. While American initiative created tactical 
battlefield victories, those victories achieved very little to shape decisive and 
meaningful strategic gains because of the difficulty of supplying troops that operated 
in the captured territory.  
 Lieutenant General Drummond reduced his force significantly preceding the 
Battle of Lundy’s Lane, and that reduction was fundamental to him achieving a better 
result in defeat than the Americans gained in victory. Drummond was forced to order 
all the camp women out of his forward locations. Such action significantly increased 
illnesses – women served as nurses, but they also mended uniforms, and damaged 
uniforms meant exposed skin, which in turn led to mosquito bites.21  
 More directly associated with combat power, Drummond also had to release 
militiamen to secure the harvest. Drummond praised the militia as follows: “I have 
the honor to transmit the enclosed Representation relative to the necessity of the 
Sedentary Militia being permitted to return home to save their produce from being 
 
20 Letter from Riall to Drummond from 12 Mile Creek, 20 July 1814 in, Wood, Select British 
Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 139-40. 
21 Letter from Drummond to Prevost from York 23 July 1814 in Wood, Select British Documents, Vol 
III, Part 1, 142. 
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totally lost to the country.”22 His release of the militia to their homes just days before 
the Battle of Lundy’s Lane could have been disastrous. However, they secured their 
crops and rushed to the fight. According to Drummond, “The zeal, loyalty, and 
bravery with which the Militia of this part of the Province have come forward to 
cooperate with his Majesty’s Troops in the expulsion of the Enemy, and their 
conspicuous gallantry, in this, and in the Action of the 5th Instant (the Battle of 
Chippewa), claim my warmest thanks.”23 The British technically lost in regard to 
tactical victory but won the light infantry long game of cutting off their enemy’s 
supply lines with a militia that gladly returned to the fight after being released to their 
homes. The Americans gained a moral victory, yet they were forced to withdraw.  
 Major General Brown was helpless. It took him some time to return to duty 
after Bridgewater, and he was absent while his army slowly disintegrated due to a 
lack of support. Brown had to seek a pass from the hospital because its proximity to 
the front made it impossible for him to exercise. He stated: “Having been almost 
recovered from my wounds, and being considerably unwell, and somewhat reduced 
by confinement, and the want of exercise.”24 Personal inactivity and the suffering of 
his force weighed heavily on Brown, who observed: “My gallant little Army has so 
far done its duty and been blest with the smiles of Providence; but unless it can 
receive efficient aid, there is cause to be alarmed for its ultimate safety.”25 Jesup 
made clear Brown’s intentions. Major General Brown said that “if we gained nothing 
 
22 Drummond to Prevost York 24 July 1814 in Wood, Select British Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 143. 
23 Letter from Drummond to Prevost from Lundy’s Lane 27 July 1814, in Wood, Select British 
Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 150. 
24 Letter from Major General Jacob Brown John Armstrong from Big-Tree Genesee River 19 August 
1814, Jacob Brown Papers, 153. 
25 Letter from Jacob Brown to Governor Daniel Tompkins from Canandaigua 21 August 1814, Jacob 
Brown Papers, 157.  
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else” in an invasion of Canada, then Brown’s army “restore(d) the tarnished military 
character of the country. “26 The soldiers and officers were acting honorably, but the 
force was already succumbing to the environment when British reinforcements 
arrived. Brown described British reinforcements: “I can but be very anxious for the 
ultimate fate of this Army…the (British) Reinforcements arriving from Europe will I 
fear give them the means” to destroy his force that “left by that country to Struggle 
alone within sight and within hearing.”27  Brown’s command won all their battles but 
could not keep the soldiers and officers from the sickness that usurped their honorable 
conduct under fire. The fighting in Upper Canada during 1814 was a campaign of 
passion versus system. And while passion carried the field, system prevailed in all the 
longer-term objectives. 
Food supplies and weather, in addition to British reinforcements, prevented 
the Americans from moving on Montreal. Secretary Armstrong recognized that the 
chief obstacle towards defeating the British in their center was provision. Armstrong 
stated, “I believe too, that if you are not in condition to eat your way to Montreal 
directly, the better policy for us will be to carry the war westward.”28 The U.S. 
Army’s official history  still criticizes American officers for not capturing Montreal 
because they lacked an understanding of the parsimonious frontier that made 
supplying armies extremely difficult.29 
  
 
26 Jesup, Memoir of the Campaign on the Niagara, 2. 
27 Letter from Major General Jacob Brown John Armstrong from Big-Tree Genesee River 19 August 
1814, Jacob Brown Papers, 154. 
28 Armstrong to Brown from Washington DC 16 August 1814, Jacob Brown Papers, 160. 
29 Richard Steward ed., and Center of Military History American Military History: The United States 
Army and the Forging of a Nation 1775-1917 Vol. 1, (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 
United States Army, 2005). https://history.army.mil/books/AMH-V1/index.htm 
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To make the difficult environment worse, the weather deteriorated 
dramatically in the fall of 1814. This prevented naval support from the U.S. Navy, 
and it provided the environment for the spread of illness in the ranks on both sides of 
the conflict. Brown wrote the Secretary of War, “As Genl Gaines informed me that 
the Commodore was confined to his bed with a fever, and as he did not know when 
the fleet would sail.”30 Chauncey’s fever never made it onto the recent bicentennial 
banners on Wellington Street in Ottawa, but it saved the British at the same time that 
Brown’s force won their most significant victory at Bridgewater. Nor has the light 
infantry “side” battle that cut U.S. soldiers from their supply lines been adequately 
recognized. This loss of naval support and constant harassment of their rear meant 
that Major General Brown had to focus on the western frontier. As Brown observed, 
“I have thought it proper to change my position, with a view to other objects.”31 
However, severe weather at Fort Erie provided the Americans an opportunity for 
victory. British strategy exploited the weather, while Americans basically believed 
virtue could overcome any obstacle. After Lundy’s Lane, the British laid siege to the 
American Northern army at Fort Erie, but the tactical reforms of Jacob Brown 
continued to result in U.S. victories. The British lost the petite guerre raids that 
preceded the siege, but the streamline army of Gordon Drummond maintained his 
strategic advantages. 
 
 
 
 
30 Brown to Armstrong from Chippewa 25 July 1814, Jacob Brown Papers, 116. 
31 Brown to Armstrong from Chippewa 25 July 1814, Jacob Brown Papers, 116. 
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Fort Erie  
 The British Army’s attempt to retake Fort Erie faltered despite its best efforts 
to destroy American sources of supply. American tactical acumen gained more in this 
campaign than at Lundy’s Lane, but mainly because their supply lines were more 
secure. Drummond first tried to destroy depots at Black Rock and Buffalo. Low 
calories could have trumped patriotism if the U.S. lost its supply depots. According to 
Drummond, “had this Service been Effected as I sanguinely expected the Enemy’s 
Force shut up in Fort Erie would have compelled by want to Provisions, either to 
come out and fight the Division under my Command or have surrendered to it.”32 The 
British attempted to separate the U.S. fort from its source of nutrition, but could not 
succeed in their siege after losing the light infantry fight. Drummond better 
recognized the weaknesses in his force as a result of exposure to a harsh environment.   
Like General Brown’s force, General Drummond’s army was struggling more 
with illness than battlefield losses. Drummond stated that his force “has a very 
formidable appearance on Paper.”33 While the British went on the offensive in the 
1814 campaign, they struggled to keep soldiers fit for duty. They managed the high 
incidence of illness by shifting their regiments from combat to garrison duties. As 
Drummond described the heath of his regulars, “I regret however to be obliged to 
observe that the inefficient State & composition of many of the Regiments are such as 
to detract greatly from the confidence which their numbers might otherwise 
 
32 Letter from Drummond to Prevost from the Camp near Fort Erie 4 August 1814 in Wood, Select 
British Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 168. 
33 Letter from Drummond to Prevost from the Camp near Fort Erie 4 August 1814 in Wood, Select 
British Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 169. 
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inspire.”34 Combat experience in the harsh frontier environment produced veterans, 
but also significantly diminished the health of his force.  
The British excelled at shifting troops to keep regiments with high rates of 
sickness in garrison roles. Drummond described his relocation of forces: “It is my 
intention to write what I have leisure more fully on this Subject & also as soon as 
circumstances will permit to send down to Kingston Several Corps at present on this 
Frontier & which are wholly unfit for Service in the Field.”35 The early American 
republic maintained many regiments in the South on garrison duty to defend against 
potential attacks and slave uprisings. Southern regiments could have traded their 
garrison roles with American regiments with extensive combat duty. The British 
Army shifted its troops around and utilized Veterans’ Battalions that were composed 
primarily of invalids. The fact that long-serving regiments struggled to maintain their 
force fit for duty meant that Drummond’s high rates of reinforcements from the 
Peninsular War were not necessarily an increase in his combat power.36 He could not 
relocate the forces fast enough to influence the outcome at Fort Erie.   
 As stated previously, the weather was limiting the health of American units so 
significantly that officers like Jesup had to serve while injured. The British, in 
bivouac and far from their supply lines, suffered more. Izard noted that “We have 
received but five shots or shells from the Enemy within then (sic) last two days. Many 
 
34 Letter from Drummond to Prevost from the Camp near Fort Erie 4 August 1814 in Wood, Select 
British Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 169-70. 
35 Letter from Drummond to Prevost from the Camp near Fort Erie 4 August 1814 in Wood, Select 
British Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 170. 
36 The Peninsular War was the fighting that occurred in Spain and Portugal between the British and 
France during the Napoleonic Wars. While the Battle of Waterloo occurred afterwards it did so after 
Napoleon escaped captivity. Many British regiments shifted towards America after the fighting in 
Spain. While the invasion of the Chesapeake and Louisiana benefitted from this shift, significant 
reinforcements were sent to the Upper Canadian frontier.  
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deserters come in, who state that they expect that the enemys (sic) supply is 
exhausted, but they expect to be supplied within a short time.”37 However, the supply 
problems only worsened. Izard indicated that “The Weather with us has been very 
tempestuous & rainy, for some days. Knowing that the Enemy were without tents, or 
covering of any kind to shield them from the wet & learning from the Deserters that 
came in, that they suffered much.”38 Despite a long siege that wounded most of the 
officers, and the illnesses that ran rampant in the miserable weather, the U.S. 
Northern Army regarded the poor weather as an opportunity. Izard employed petite 
guerre harassing raids to “trouble their camp.”39 Izard’s objective was to worsen the 
morale caused by low supplies and poor weather, and he measured his success by an 
increase in the rate of British deserters. Izard celebrated his harassing attacks as 
follows: “We effected our object, kept the enemy up all night, killed & wounded 
several of them, & obtained twenty deserters.”40 These deserters pushed for further 
offensive actions.  
The foul weather cut both ways, but most often hurt the bivouacking soldiers 
on the offensive more than sheltered soldiers engaged in defending fortifications. 
Izard’s harassing attack produced deserters that encouraged him to order more 
aggressive action.41 The weather was not something the young U.S. Army could 
control, but it was something that commanders could and often did exploit. At first 
the American force delayed the attack due to “The extreme badness of the weather.”42 
 
37 Major General George Izard to Major General Brown from Fort Erie 11 September 1814, Jacob 
Brown Papers, 182. 
38 Izard to Brown from Fort Erie 14 September 1814, Jacob Brown Papers, 183-84. 
39 Izard to Brown from Fort Erie 14 September 1814, Jacob Brown Papers, 183-4. 
40 Izard to Brown from Fort Erie 14 September 1814, Jacob Brown Papers, 183-4. 
41 Izard to Brown from Fort Erie 14 September 1814, Jacob Brown Papers, 183-4. 
42 Izard to Brown from Sackets Harbor 14 September 1814, Jacob Brown Papers, 199. 
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The endeavor to destroy the batteries would be one of the most impressive actions of 
the campaign, with Miller yet again remaining the uninjured hero of another 
battlefield. The high casualties among officers meant that it took time for the 
recovering Brown to realize that Miller had still led the principal action, as well as to 
appreciate the significance of the victory.43 Miller’s force led the siege, and “they did 
not lose less than a thousand men.” 44 However, this was a bloody battle that cost 
them the life of General Davis and disabled General Porter, who was “Highly 
wounded in the hand.”45 The weather and environment that limited the American 
advance to Niagara – rather than north to Lake Champlain on the Richelieu River – 
were also devastating to the newly reinforced British army.   
Even the victory at Fort Erie would have been impossible without the 
reinforcement of General Izard’s contingent that had previously focused on Lower 
Canada. On 10 September 1814, Brown described how his force had become smaller. 
Brown observed that “My total effective force does not much exceed two thousand 
men; perhaps I may be able to fight, in position, twenty-five hundred.”46 A quarter of 
his force at Fort Erie was made up of invalids who could only secure the fortress, but 
Brown used every available soldier. Both armies were much more formidable on 
paper, and the Americans had the advantage of defense of garrison, where their 
spirited approach could push soldiers to endure solitary engagements. When General 
 
43 Brown to Secretary of War James Monroe from Fort Erie 1 December 1814, Jacob Brown Papers, 
214. 
44 Brown to Izard from Fort Erie 23 September 1814, Jacob Brown Papers, 200. 
45 Brown to Governor Tomkins from Fort Erie 20 September 1814, Jacob Brown Papers, 203. 
46 Brown to Izard from Fort Erie 10 September 1814, George Izard, Official Correspondence with the 
Department of War, Relative to the Military Operations of the American Army under the Command of 
Major General Izard, on the Northern Frontier of the United States in the Years 1814 and 1815 
(Philadelphia: Published by Thomas Dobson, at the Stone House, no. 41 South Second Street. William 
Fry, printer, 1816), 86. Hereafter Izard Correspondence. 
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Brown ordered the attack on the enemy, Jesup led the garrison. Jesup’s command 
consisted of “with the 25th about one hundred and fifty strong, and the artillery and 
invalids,” whose orders were, “to protect the fort and camp, and cover the retreat of 
the army should it be repulsed.”47 General Brown’s force in Niagara had won honors 
and high accolades because they maximized the use of ill soldiers, but this still could 
only keep a fraction of soldiers in the ranks.  
  Brown’s force could win battles, but they could not secure consistent supplies 
of provisions. Thomas Sidney Jesup provided the best account of this lack of support. 
A subsequent review of company order books proves that high incidents of illness 
correlated with periods of low rations. The officers complained about a system of 
logistics in a war where disease, brought on by fatigue and malnutrition, took more 
soldiers out of the field than the enemy, yet that system was entirely outside the 
authority and chain of command of military officers. Jesup knew this system well 
before his command of a regiment in Niagara; he had previously spent his own 
money to secure clothing for recently acquired prisoners of General Henry Proctor 
because they were “literally naked.”48 When Jesup acted principally as a 
quartermaster as he awaited his release back to the line via a prisoner exchange, he 
would do anything in his power to support soldiers. However, the victors of 
Chippewa and Bridgewater did not receive adequate provisions. For Jesup, a lack of 
provisions made it impossible for the Northern Army to remain on the offensive after 
their victories. Jesup stated that “It is madness in the extreme to attempt to carry on 
 
47 Thomas Sidney Jesup, Memoir of the Campaign on the Niagara, 15.  
48 Letter from Major Thomas Sidney Jesup to Major James L. Swearringer from Cincinnati 20 May 
1813, Thomas Sidney Jesup Papers, 150. 
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war with such a system. either the contractors should be dismissed, or they should be 
made amenable to military tribunals.”49 This condemnation recognized how Brown’s 
army remained supreme on the battlefield while being crippled by contract 
logisticians who were under no formal military authority. Jesup wanted to engage 
every logistical contractor from the “humblest Bullock driver or salesmen” to “the 
agent who accompanies the army,” and in general to subject every camp follower 
from “the whole tribe from the principal, wheresoever (sic) he may reside” to military 
legal authority.50 Still, Jesup was a man of honor who, while seeing the future in 
bleak terms due to a lack of support, would return to duty despite injuries. Jesup 
wrote that “Our little band still holds out at Fort Erie: I shall join them tomorrow, 
though my right arm is still in a sling.”51 
The command of General Izard experienced fewer battles and is far more 
informative to the nature of a conflict whose isolated frontier was more formidable 
than the enemy. Izard’s campaign must be taken more seriously because it challenges 
a significant theme within command and control military historiography. Historians 
from Wesley Turner to Richard V. Barbuto have argued that the United States should 
have focused on capturing the Canadian capital at Montreal.52 The object of Brown’s 
campaign was to destroy forts in the rear of such a campaign and then to support 
 
49 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Sidney Jesup to an Unnamed Lieutenant colonel in Ohio 
from Buffalo, Thomas Sidney Jesup Papers, 220. 
50 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Sidney Jesup to an Unnamed Lieutenant colonel in Ohio 
from Buffalo, Thomas Sidney Jesup Papers, 220. 
51 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Sidney Jesup to an Unnamed Lieutenant colonel in Ohio 
from Buffalo, Thomas Sidney Jesup Papers, 2. 
52 Barbuto is the only champion of the Quebec City Argument, but any cursory exploration of Arnold's 
failed campaign illustrates how the logistically incapable US Army would not have succeeded in the 
only wilderness more formidable than Upper and Lower Canada. The Canadian Theater, 1814. 
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2014), 56. 
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Izard’s effort to achieve those results. However, it was not logistically feasible. John 
Armstrong and Izard recognized the impossibility of carrying a successful campaign 
along the Champlain River. Armstrong observed that “on the project of taking post on 
the St. Lawrence, there is a great drawback, from the difficulty we shall find in 
subsisting, and if occasion should arise, in supporting it.”53 The U.S. Army’s chief 
desire was to capture Montreal; however, the environment was forcing them to 
consolidate their gains on the Niagara peninsula. Secretary of War John Armstrong 
bluntly wrote the following to General Izard: “It is very distinctly my opinion, that it 
has become good policy on our part, to carry the war as far to the westward as 
possible, particularly while we have an ascendency on the lakes.”54 Victories could be 
won, but the parsimonious frontier meant that they could not be held, and Americans 
were struggling to use the light infantry tactic of targeting enemy supply lines that the 
British employed. The American army would cling to moral pronouncements 
regarding the cause of their logistical woes, while the British were better at 
recognizing how frontier isolation influenced the outcome.  
General Drummond recognized he could not always gain long-term results 
because of environmental restrictions. Major General Brown’s victory at Fort Erie 
ultimately required an evacuation – because of the weather, not because of the light 
infantry targeting his lines of supply and communications. Drummond noted the 
“precipitation with which it has been marked, such as Provisions left on the ground, 
some Camp Equipage burnt (for which I consider they had not carriage).”55 This 
 
53 Armstrong to Izard from Washington 12 August 1814, Izard Correspondence, 70. 
54 Armstrong to Izard from Washington 12 August 1814, Izard Correspondence, 70. 
55 Letter from Drummond to Prevost from Niagara 18 October 1814, in Wood, Select British 
Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 219. 
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retreat became a significant source of British supplies by capturing a ship that 
“contained fresh meat, Bread, and Spirits for at least a Brigade—.”56 The abject 
retreat after victory occurred because of muddy roads rather than a British attack. 
Drummond recognized the environmental cause of the American withdrawal, and 
Brown’s “feeling the difficulties of his situation, and the impossibility of the even the 
Common Wagon of the country much less Guns through such Roads.”57 The 
Americans could not supply a fort in Upper Canada once the roads became muddy 
and wagons could no longer use the roads. In addition to recognizing environmental 
restrictions, Drummond also connected low supplies of food to high rates of illness in 
his most isolated fortifications. 
 The same muddy roads made it impossible to supply positions west of 
Niagara, and whole regiments were taken out solely by illness following low supplies. 
Today, non-battle losses are still higher than combat losses, but soldiers have far 
lower rates of loss to sickness. Modern medicine received far too much credit because 
it is widely known that contemporary combat arms soldiers avoid medical care; 
therefore, it is most likely that today’s American soldier rarely succumbs to illness 
simply because they are well fed. Regiments became less effective the farther they 
were from their supply lines. Drummond stated that “There is so much disease in the 
103d and that Corps is in every other respect so useless and inefficient.”58 The frontier 
was a more significant challenge for General Drummond, and regiments in the wrong 
 
56 Letter from Drummond to Prevost from Niagara 18 October 1814, in Wood, Select British 
Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 220. 
57 Letter from Drummond to Prevost From Niagara 20 October 1814, in Wood, Select British 
Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 222. 
58 Letter from Drummond to Prevost From Niagara 23 October 1814, in Wood, Select British 
Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 228. 
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location became sickly because of roads that were “Impassible” for logistics.59 The 
loss of the 103rd Regiment of Foot had little to do with enemy action; they simply 
occupied an outpost that was too difficult to provision adequately in a parsimonious 
place. However, while the British struggled to supply their troops and suffered similar 
privations, all the Americans could observe were the supplies provided to the British 
by their countrymen.60 
  To make matters worse for the Americans, New England was the chief 
supplier of provisions to the British Army in Lower Canada. The Northern Army’s 
muster rolls illustrate that although New England opposed the war, its private soldiers 
were almost exclusively from New England. Smuggling supplies from New England 
to the British Army was a particularly onerous betrayal.61 Jacob Brown and Jesup’s 
 
59 Letter from Drummond to Prevost From Niagara 23 October 1814, in Wood, Select British 
Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 228. 
60 This is a unique claim of this dissertation; however, the careful regimentally oriented work of John 
Grodzinski verifies the logistical struggles of the British to supply line infantry units. Additionally 
Alan Taylor points to General Izard as a source of the problem in stating that “smuggling doubly 
dammed the American war effort,” in The Civil War of 1812, but his work on the Internal Enemy later 
identified that most U.S. troops in the northern campaign were from New England where smuggling 
was prevalent. See John Grodzinski, The 104th (New Brunswick) Regiment of Foot in the War of 1812 
(Fredericton, New Brunswick: Goose Lane Editions, 2014); Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: 
American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies (New York: Random House, 
2010), 277; and The Internal Enemy: Slavery and the War in Virginia, 1772-1832 (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2013). 
61 Most of the company order books preserved for the northern campaign list soldiers from New 
England. The American Southern states typically fought with Andrew Jackson’s force but also had to 
maintain troops at home to prevent potential slave uprising. Also, there are few company-level records, 
and among the short serving and less politically connected junior officers, it is possible that New 
Englanders were merely more literate. For example, the Order book of Captain Byrd C. Williams has 
the least information found in company records. Only a clothing record included information on death 
and discharges. The shared record book for Captains John McRae and John Standard’s company also 
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should not discount the performance of New Englanders. Specifically, the town of Hillsborough, New 
Hampshire was home to so many of the war’s top performing officers. The following account from a 
letter from Benjamin Price to Major John McNeil illustrates the contradictions between campaign 
principally fought by New Englanders and mainly opposed politically by New Englanders: “You were 
fortunate in having the command of the 11th Regt. – Captn. Crooked has dutifully upheld himself & 
also the brave Col. Miller – you are all from the county of Hillsborough.” See Byrd C. Williams, 
Company order book for the Company of Captain Byrd C. Williams, Record Group 98, Records of the 
United States Army commands, 1784-1821, Records of units, Infantry, 1789-1815 20th Infantry 
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accounts level indirect criticisms, but Izard’s proximity to the Saint Lawrence River 
where most smuggling occurred allowed him to describe the Northern army’s 
betrayal. Izard maintained that “From the St. Lawrence to the ocean an open 
disregard prevails for the laws prohibiting intercourse with the enemy.”62 He 
described the specifics of U.S. supplies that helped the British: “The road to St. Regis 
is covered with droves of cattle, and the river with rafts, destined for the enemy.”63 
Worse, the American revenue officers were aware but did nothing to prevent the 
smuggling.64 Neither the Americans nor the British could subsist on the frontier 
without significant logistical support, and according to American officers, smugglers 
were outperforming the fledgling U.S. logistical system. Izard maintained that “Were 
it not for these supplies, the British forces in Canada would soon be suffering from 
famine, or their government be subjected to enormous expense for their 
maintenance.”65 Izard was first to occupy troops with harassing the British supply 
lines as well as cordoning off American smuggling routes, though without success. 
Every resource mattered, and the British were significantly hindered by the length of 
their supply lines. Smuggling was thus not a benign activity; it was fundamental to 
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the outcome of the conflict. The New England smugglers made it possible for the 
British to survive on a frontier that the American Northern Army was forced to 
abandon.66 
  Izard and Brown were both tasked with leading forces left in ruins by the 
failures of General Wilkinson. From the beginning of the campaign, the problems 
were almost solely due to providing provisions. Brown had more success turning 
green troops into skilled fighters, but he had Winfield Scott, Thomas Jesup, James 
Miller, and several other regimental commanders who drilled their troops intensely.67 
The Quartermaster Department was the most significant problem in the force, and 
while Brown secured battlefield honors, Izard was unable to overcome his logistical 
issues well enough to even field a fighting force – save for the small action at Sandy 
Creek – until his reinforcement of Fort Erie. Izard’s supply problems are significant 
because at first the plan centered on capturing Montreal, even though it was 
impossible to supply his force adequately at French Mills. 
 After Wilkinson’s relief, the Northern Army stationed at French Mills 
threatened Montreal, but the 1813 campaign had been a failure terminating at 
Chrysler’s Farm, and the army was too large to supply on the frontier. When Izard 
 
66 Joshua M. Smith has written extensively on the relationship between borderlands and smuggling; 
however, smuggling strengthened the concept of the border for soldiers fighting. Witnessing 
smuggling and having an inability to prevent cross border smuggling created understandable anger. In 
the future more work needs to be done on how the 1814 experience shaped the post war life of veterans 
and how this shaped New England. Dr. Micah Pawling has worked on the post war life of Captain 
Joseph Treat, and future collaboration will add depth to the understand of the way that smuggling both 
challenged and affirmed understanding of the border between British North America and the United 
States. See Joshua M. Smith, Borderland Smuggling: Patriots, Loyalists, and Illicit Trade in the 
Northeast, 1783-1820 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2006); Micah Pawling, ed., Wabanaki 
Homeland and the New State of Maine: The 1820 Journal and Plans of Survey of Joseph Treat 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007). 
67 Jon Latimer, Niagara 1814: The Final Invasion (New York: Osprey Pub., 2009) 18-19. 
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took command, he immediately communicated to the Secretary of War that he was 
“greatly disappointed, both in their number and quality” of his troops.68 First, he 
maintained that he had improperly trained regular troops. Izard wrote that “With very 
few exceptions (and those confined to companies) they are deficient in all the 
requisites of regular soldiers.”69 Brown had excellent operational commanders, but 
Izard did not. Even worse, most of his troops were ill due to poor supplies. Izard 
described the dire situation: “Their clothing and equipment are in a wretched state, – 
their proficiency in field manoeuvres, and even the rudiments of exercise, is 
lamentably small, – and an undue proportion of them are on the sick list.”70 The most 
damaging issue was that in addition to the loss of ill-trained soldiers, his veterans 
were the largest group of indisposed troops. He described his raw recruits as follows: 
“Of those who appear under arms, a very great number are unfit to take the field, in 
consequence of indispositions contracted in the last movement to the Lacole.”71 
Izzard immediately recognized the alarming dearth of supplies and the lack of 
discipline among his troops. Even the most well-trained forces would have struggled 
mightily without supplies and with most of their ranks indisposed by illness. While 
Izard did not connect this lack of morale and combat readiness to illness and low 
supplies, the correlation occurred too frequently for that relationship to be 
insignificant.   
 
68 Izard to Armstrong from Northern Army Headquarters Plattsburgh New York, 7 May 1814, Izard 
correspondence, 2. 
69 Izard to Armstrong from Northern Army Headquarters Plattsburgh New York, 7 May 1814, Izard 
correspondence, 2. 
70 Izard to Armstrong from Northern Army Headquarters Plattsburgh New York, 7 May 1814, Izard 
correspondence, 2. 
71 Izard to Armstrong from Northern Army Headquarters Plattsburgh New York, 7 May 1814, Izard 
correspondence, 2. 
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 In two subsequent letters, he recognized the nature of the petit guerre conflict, 
as well as how the poor health policies of Wilkinson had denied him of his best 
troops. In a 9 May 1814 letter to Secretary Armstrong, he observed how poor supplies 
of pay and clothing were limiting both his Dragoon Cavalry and Riflemen, two 
detachments essential to effective small war tactics. The riflemen were without pay 
and “several desertions have taken place from these two corps since my arrival” while 
“the dragoons are without clothing; their arms, with scarcely an exception, unfit for 
use.”72 Poor supplies sapped him of superior forces for rapid harassment and 
fortifying his lines of communications, precisely when the British were implementing 
measures to secure their own. Armstrong maintained after the British victory, 
partially won by the excellent light Canadian Voltigeurs, that “he will be compelled 
to hazard a battle in defence of his communications.”73 However, the difficult 
operations would have to be spearheaded by new recruits, because poor health policy 
and low supplies had eliminated a large portion of the seasoned regulars. The 
Secretary of War replied that “It is matter of serious regret that, in our oldest corps, an 
attention to police and a knowledge of duty are yet very deficient.”74 Izard would 
have to do more than Wilkinson without his veterans, because most of them remained 
on the sick list after the Battle of Lacolle Mills.  
 A series of letters from General Izard and John Armstrong dated 8 May is 
extremely telling. Armstrong emphatically repeated his concerns about troops lacking 
proper clothing. Armstrong pointed out that “The report you make of the troops is 
 
72 Izard to Armstrong from Plattsburgh 9 May 1814, Izard Correspondence, 4. 
73 Armstrong to Izard from DC 28 April 1814, Izard Correspondence, 5. 
74 Armstrong to Izard from DC 28 April 1814, Izard Correspondence, 6. 
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painful…Of clothing, there has been the most detestable abuses.”75 To make matters 
worse, Izard’s troops had been exposed to a disease that George Washington’s 
Continentals took pains to eliminate a generation earlier, and British leaders in the 
Seven Years War were known to manipulate. Izard reported that “The senior hospital 
surgeon reported to me yesterday, that a case of small pox has occurred in the 
cantonment.”76 There was no hiding the disdain that Izard felt about a complete lack 
of preparedness for a disease with a well-known cure. Izard described the efforts to 
stop the spread: “Every precaution is taking to prevent infection – and there not being 
any kine (sic) pox matter in this part of the country, an express has been sent to 
Albany for the purpose of procuring some. It is unfortunate that this was not done by 
the proper department some weeks ago.”77 The Army’s logistics system struggled to 
provide the supplies to stop the diseases of previous wars, and the bodies of America 
soldiers suffered. It is not surprising that many soldiers faced courts-martial for 
desertion to seek care at home, or how the lack of adequate medical supplies, clothes, 
and food made Izard’s force inactive for most of 1814.78   
While the Americans felt betrayed by their people, the British viewed their 
problems as driven by the harsh environment. Although Upper Canada was a distant 
campaign of the Napoleonic Wars, this was still the Army of Wellington, and as such 
it exploited the light infantry tactics that excelled at management of isolated frontier 
 
75 Armstrong to Izard from DC  18 May 1814, Izard Correspondence, 20. 
76 Izard to Armstrong from Plattsburgh 1 June 1814, Izard Correspondence, 22.  
77 Izard to Armstrong from Plattsburgh 1 June 1814, Izard Correspondence, 22  
78 Court Martial of James Gaff, Case File A-3; Court Martial of John Rabdy, Case File A-11; Court 
Martial Of William Sage, Case File A-17; Court Martial of Markus Remmee, Case File A-17; Court 
Martial of Nathan Stone, Case File A-17; Court Martial of Richard Gould, Case File A-17; Court 
Martial of Nathaniel Eaton, Case File A-17; Court Martial of William Wickings, Case File 17; Court 
Martial of William Bach: Case File A-17; Court Martial James Hyatt, Case File A17; Court Martial 
Proceedings, National Archives and Records Administration Washington DC. 
116 
 
supply lines. Light infantry is often understood in terms of the soldier’s load, but it 
emerged as a force that excelled at foraging and being supplied solely by pack horses. 
The frontier militia on both sides of the conflict were the forces that excelled the most 
at light infantry tactics, and while they rarely received laurels, such tactics often had 
the most impact on the outcome. The early American army’s institutional culture, 
however, emphasized character and patriotism. And while that did much to inspire 
soldiers during battle, it achieved fewer results in sustained motivation during long-
term privation. The American philosophy on nature was based on morality, and in 
crisis, soldiers could endure much. Yet over time that motivation diminished. The 
British approached nature more pragmatically and were thus able to achieve much 
with fewer direct military engagements. The practical, light infantry-based 
operational strategy was able to achieve more through a sustained system than the 
Americans could achieve through impressive performance in combat. 
The 1814 campaign should also illustrate how military tactics are a 
representation of practical natural philosophy that is often divergent among elite 
intellectuals, best outlined in the work of William Cronon.79 Likewise, ideas like 
natural philosophy or moral patriotism were met with real-world circumstances. 
Nationalism in American units helped to win battles, but the system that embraced 
environmental realities nullified their gains. The environment, like most of the 
geographical and environmental histories of Canada, was “parsimonious,” and that 
meant that smaller lighter forces were the best troops for long-term gains. The critical 
action at Lundy’s Lane was won on the field, yet the campaign was abandoned 
 
79 William Cronon “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature.” 
Environmental History 1, no. 1 (1996): 7-28. 
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because militia cut the Americans off from their supply lines. The British also had the 
wisdom to release their militia to their homes in order to simplify supply challenges, 
only to have those militiamen return when needed most. Drummond accepted a 
smaller force that he could supply rather than fully employing his large contingent of 
reinforcements. The Americans achieved what they sought to do at the outset of the 
campaign: increase the reputation of the American Army through courage in battle. 
However, the U.S. Army’s inability to gain lasting advantage from their victories, and 
the simultaneous attack on Washington D.C., led to little collective understanding of 
their achievements. The British commanders are often seen in history as conventional 
thinkers who overemphasized heavy infantry in pitched battles, but during the 
summer of 1814 they more readily embraced a light infantry approach, The 
Americans, on the other hand, focused on carrying fields of action.   
 Ironically, the British Army of the free-thinking Duke of Wellington returned 
to a system with ill-trained aristocratic officers with enough wealth to purchase their 
commissions and learned very little from the conflict.80 The adaptive light infantry of 
the War of 1812 and of the Peninsular War would primarily be abandoned for parade 
soldiers and inexperienced officers. In America, conversely, a veteran of the 1814 
campaign, Winfield Scott, would reform the army officer’s corps and make West 
Point into a first-class merit-based institution.81 The less well-studied father of 
American army logistics, Thomas Sidney Jesup, leveraged his frustrations during the 
 
80 The best example of this is a book on the charge of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War. The 
legacy of Wellington is that his success further justified the British system of purchased commissions. 
See Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954). 
81 Samuel Watson has written the definitive series on early U.S. Army officer development, and the 
second book in the series catalogues this period of Winfield Scott’s reform. See Peacekeepers and 
Conquerors: The Army Officer Corps on the American Frontier, 1821-1846 (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2013). 
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1814 campaign into his development of a capable logistical system. The American 
Army would later dominate a much more significant Mexican force, mainly because 
of the experience that officers such as Scott and Jesup gained in Upper Canada. On 
the opposing side, however, the British victory would lead to the famous charge of 
the light brigade in 1854 during the Crimean War. Jesup’s environmental lessons 
were transferred to the generals that excelled in the U.S. Civil War. The next chapter 
explores the role of liquor on combat motivation. Soldiers needed alcohol to fortify 
them for both combat and the experience of harsh nature. Morale in the War of 1812 
was about ideas, but it was also about what filled the stomachs of soldiers. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LIQUOR AND SOLDIER MOTIVATION 
“But fighting is not the part of a soldier’s life”1 
 
Exceptional scholarly works by early American historians on the War of 1812 
have recently emerged. As previously discussed, Nicole Eustace and Alan Taylor’s 
books have covered the issues of patriotism and soldier motivation as well as military 
professionalism.2 Nicole Eustace’s intellectual approach to the history of emotion and 
patriotism does much to capture what elite print cultural sources believed about 
patriotism.3 Nationalism dominates the Canadian interpretation morale during  the 
War of 1812, both in the work of scholars like Donald Graves who glorify British 
victories.4  Also Canadian nationalism complicates interpretation because the defense 
of the border was fundamental to creating a Canadian nation-state. The defense of 
Canada from a larger American Army in the War of 1812 has, from the inception of 
the Canadian national Confederation, has been central to Canadian patriotic identity.5 
 
1 Isaac Roach, “Journal of Major Isaac Roach 1812-1824” (CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series = 
CIHM/ICMH Collection De Microfiches. S.L.: S.N., 1893), Microform, 22. 
2 Alan Taylor, The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia 1772-1832 (New York: W. W. Norton 
and Company, 2014); The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & 
Indian Allies (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010); “Unnatural Inequalities: Social and Environmental 
Histories.” Environmental History Vol 1(1996): 6-19. 
3 Nicole Eustace, 1812: War and the Passions of Patriotism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2012). 
4 Donald E. Graves, Where Right and Glory Lead!: The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814. (Toronto: Robin 
Brass, 1997), Field of Glory: The Battle of Crysler's Farm 1813. (Toronto: R. Brass Studio, 1999).  
5 Many of the War of 1812’s first-hand accounts from the perspectives of British Officers who settled 
in Canada and Canadian Militia were key aspects of the movement towards Confederation. The writing 
of William Merritt and John Richardson are the best examples. John Richardson, and Alexander Clark 
Casselman, Richardson's War of 1812; with Notes and a Life of the Author (Toronto: Historical 
publishing co., 1902), and William Hamilton Merritt, William Claus, Matthew Elliott, John Norton, E. 
A. Cruikshank, and Niagara Historical Society, Campaigns of 1812-14: Contemporary Narratives by 
Captain W.H. Merritt, Colonel William Claus, Lieut.-Colonel Matthew Elliott, and Captain John 
Norton (Niagara, Ont.: Niagara Historical Society, 1902).  
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Canadian technical military historians from the time of C. P. Stacey repeatedly 
reemphasize the challenge of defending the border between American and Canada 
and the competence of British and Canadian military leaders.6 This heroic memory of 
the defense rarely recognizes a key feature of that defense. Much of Canada was an 
extremely inhospitable place in environmental terms, even if parsimony has been a 
central theme in the historical-geographical studies of the country.7 In reality, soldiers 
on both sides required stiff drinks to cope with the emotional challenges presented by 
the frontier border region of Upper Canada. A close study of the whiskey ration 
during the War of 1812 will illustrate that patriotism may have influenced the minds 
of elites, but it also occurred in the stomachs of soldiers, whose officers often 
excelled at inspiring their soldiers through raised rations. Liquor was not always a 
source of poor professionalism because the use of alcohol encouraged patriotism and 
soldier motivation.  
An examination of the use of alcohol helps to merge the historiography of the 
War of 1812 with John Keegan's paradigm-shifting The Face of Battle, as well as to 
 
6 Ernest Cruikshank,  The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 25th July, 1814: A Historical Study (Welland, Ont.: 
Printed at the Tribune Office, 1893), John Grodzinski, Defender of Canada: Sir George Prevost and 
the War of 1812 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013), J. Mackay Hitsman, Safeguarding 
Canada, 1763-1871 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), C. P. Stacey,  The Military 
Problems of Canada; a Survey of Defence Policies and Strategic Conditions Past and Present 
(Toronto,: Issued for the Canadian institute of international affairs by the Ryerson press, 1940), 
Wesley B. Turner, British Generals in the War of 1812: High Command in the Canadas (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999),  The Astonishing General: The Life and Legacy of Sir Isaac 
Brock (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2011). 
7 For classic Staples theory see, Harold A. Innis, and Daniel Drache, Staples, Markets, and Cultural 
Change: Selected Essays, Harold A. Innis (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), Innis, 
The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1954),  The Fur Trade in Canada; an Introduction to Canadian Economic History (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1956).  For an analysis of parsimony see, Cole Harris, The Reluctant 
Land: Society, Space, and Environment in Canada before Confederation (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2008). 
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add nuance to the arguments of Taylor and Eustace.8 John Keegan’s work challenged 
the idea of understanding warfare purely logically by exploring the emotional 
experiences of soldiers and the fog of war. Fatigue was the chief complaint of soldiers 
fighting in the War of 1812, and increased liquor rations were the best remedy. Rather 
than Keegan’s emphasis on alcohol consumption before battles, something unique 
was happening in North America where alcohol served as protection from nature and 
fatigue. Proper alcohol use was not a form of drunkenness; instead it was a remedy. 
The use of a depressant to treat fatigue offers many insights into the soldiers’ 
experience of war in the Early Republic and casts light on psychological conditions 
like shell shock, Battle Fatigue, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Additionally, by 
recognizing the environmental struggle and adaptation of the British Army and 
Canadian Militia, the War of 1812 can be better connected to a Canadian national 
identity based upon overcoming a harsh, parsimonious environment.9 Most 
importantly, examining the use of whiskey elucidates the experience of morale and 
patriotism among ordinary soldiers. 
 John Lynn best describes service motivation in terms of three key themes:  
motivation to join the military, sustained motivation, and combat motivation.10 White 
and Native American alcohol use was one tool to manage both sustained and combat 
motivation. Sustained motivation applies to the difficulties of managing camp life, as 
well as marching and exposure to the elements. Combat motivation pertains to 
 
8 John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme (London: Barrie & 
Jenkins, 1988). 
9 Harris, The Reluctant Land.  
10 John Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary 
France, 1791-94 (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1984). 
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discipline under fire, including the horrors of battle. Native American use of alcohol 
to manage motivation was used rhetorically to dehumanize them.11 The daily liquor 
ration for whites was thought to be helpful to improve their health. However, Native 
American alcohol use was considered detrimental to their health. White soldiers 
typically received a pint of liquor before a battle to manage their morale, yet for white 
observers, Native Americans were not capable of handling their animal lust when 
drinking alcohol during a battle.12 Officers were only criticized for alcohol use if it 
affected their performance, while the white soldier drunken escapades were 
considered “frolics.”13 Alcohol was considered a tool managed by whites, but 
something that unleashed the purported animal tendencies in Native Americans.14 The 
brutality of the conflict would, therefore, be profoundly shaped by the use of alcohol. 
While historians often criticize U.S. Army officers for unprofessionalism, their use of 
the liquor ration often showed their capability of managing sustained motivation. 
 The best War of 1812 example of a leader with exceptional performance who 
motivated soldiers with alcohol was James Miller. Miller, who rose from the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel to Brigadier General and received four Congressional Gold 
Medals for heroism, also excelled at managing the morale and inspiring patriotism in 
 
11 David Livingstone Smith, Less than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, Exterminate Others (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2011). 
12 Letter from LTC William Hamilton Merritt, Journal of Events Principally on the Detroit and Niagara 
Frontiers During the War of 1812, CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series = CIHM/ICMH Collection De 
Microfiches (St. Catharines, C.W. Ont.: Historical Society, B.N.A., 1863), Microform, 21.Edward 
Dewar to Colonel Henry Proctor from Amherstberg in E. A. Cruikshank, ed., Documents Relating to 
the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit, 1812 (Publications of the Canadian Archives. 
Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1913), 174. 
13 Court-Martial of Private William Harris, Detroit, 13 October 1813, in Regimental order book of the 
19th Regiment of Infantry, Library of Congress, The Court Martial of Private William Brown. Court 
Martial Records, United States National Archives, Washington, D.C., I-16, 9, The Court Martial of 
Thomas. Perkins. Court Martial Records, United States National Archives, Washington, D.C., A27, 27. 
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his soldiers.15 For the soldiers of the Fourth Infantry Regiment, merely arriving at the 
battlefields of Northern Ohio, Michigan Territory, and Upper Canada represented the 
most significant challenge. Serving as a private, Adam Walker described ascending 
the Wabash River. “We daily obliged (sic) to wade the river, and haul the boats after 
us over the rapids,” he noted, and the force was quickly stricken with “the fever, and 
ague.”16 The morale could have dropped significantly if not for “the humane and 
generous Col. Miller” who “in many instances perform(ed) the duties of the common 
soldier.”17 Walker praised the inspirational leader’s example, but also illustrated how 
central whiskey was to the maintenance of troop morale. He wrote that the soldiers of 
the Fourth Infantry Regiment gained “an evening’s respite” through “an extra glass of 
whiskey, bestowed by the liberality of our commander.” After the generous ration, 
Walker described how alcohol helped improve the regiment’s sustained motivation: 
“the unmost harmony and good humor prevailed—no contention—no murmuring—
all cheerfully performed their duty.”18 While the frontier environment may cripple a 
unit through sickness, whiskey served as a method to maintain the spirits of soldiers. 
Miller was also generous after battles. His detachment received 2,000 rations 
following a battle at the village of Maguaga (the United States called this the Battle of 
Brownstown), and he returned to Fort Detroit with 896 rations of whiskey.19 This 
 
15 Cal Ledbetter, “General James Miller: Hawthorne’s Hero in Arkansas.” The Arkansas Historical 
Quarterly 47, no.2 (1988): 99–105, and Lonnie J. White, “James Miller: Arkansas’ First Territorial 
Governor.” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly 19, no.1 (1960): 12–20. 
16 Adam Walker, A Journal of Two Campaigns of the Fourth Regiment of U.S. Infantry, in the 
Michigan and Indiana Territories, Under the Command of Col. John P. Boyd, and Lt. Col. James 
Miller, During the Years of 1811 & 12 (Keene, NH: 1816), 11. 
17 Walker, A Journal, 11. 
18 Walker, A Journal, 12. 
19 James Grant Forbes. Report of the Trial of Brig. General William Hull (Washington: U.S. Army, 
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supplement was necessary after a battle and a storm that debilitated and “fatigued” his 
soldiers.20 Miller understood the role of alcohol for both the sustained and combat 
motivation of his soldiers. 
 British officers also recognized the need for liquor rations on the frontier. In a 
brigade order that limited liquor rations for soldiers placed in barracks during the 
winter, the order also called for distributing rum to active soldiers. In an adjutant 
order, Edward Baynes described the need for alcohol in frontier posts. Soldiers 
“occupying Frontier Piquets(sic), and such detachments as may occupy posts of 
Observation, and Stations not affording the Comfort and accommodation of Regular 
Barracks, or be employed in the charge of Convoy of Stores, who are to continue 
to receive Rum.”21 Even efforts to limit drunkenness had to incorporate the value of 
liquor rations for active frontier service. The King’s Regiment, 2nd Battalion 8th 
Regiment of Foot, justified the loss of two elite grenadiers to desertion, by noting an 
increased alcohol ration to raise morale. Phineas Riall described their sickness 
because of the hardships with the frontier environment. Riall connected sickness to 
place and environment in a March 1814 letter to Gordon Drummond: “The Men are 
Sick of the Place, tired & disgusted with the constant labor to which they see no end 
& have got sulky and dissatisfied.”22 Because of their presence “in that cursed fort” at 
Niagara, the soldiers “receive a Ration of Spirits which the others do not,” yet 
desertions and high illness rates were still problems. Both sides of the conflict sought 
 
20 Forbes, Report on the Trial of Hull, 117. 
21 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Baynes, “Adjutant General’s Orders,” Montreal 27 November 1813, in 
William Wood, Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812, Vol II (Toronto: Champlain 
Historical Society, 1920), 461. 
22 Letter from Major General Phineas Riall to Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond, from Niagara 15 
March 1814, in Wood, Select British Documents, Vol III, Part 1, 98. 
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to sustain morale and fortify the constitutions of soldiers using distilled spirits; at the 
same time, they tried to limit intoxication. While the King’s 8th Regiment struggled 
despite receiving a liquor ration, other accounts demonstrate increased combat 
effectiveness attributed to a well-timed liquor ration.  
 In another account, the lack of whiskey corresponded with high rates of 
illness. Thomas G. Ridout described many incapacitated soldiers at Saint David’s, 
Near Montreal, in October 1813. The force in garrison guard duties at Saint David’s 
was “ruined by petty affairs.”23 In an August 1813 letter to a family member, Ridout 
described a rise of illness due to low alcohol rations: “The Army have been these two 
days out of whiskey. There is great deal of ague among the men.”24 Low coat supplies 
were a problem but not an immediate one in August, but the most pressing supply 
issue was the lack of liquor. In John Lynn’s classification, alcohol was a vital aspect 
of maintaining both sustained and combat motivation. Double rations of alcohol were 
typically issued in combat, but Ridout’s letter indicates how daily rations managed 
the health and sustained the motivation of soldiers for all daily duties.25  
 In 1814 the rum ration was again employed to manage the sustained 
motivations of soldiers isolated in the frontier environment. Returning to the subject 
of the King’s Regiment’s struggles, Major General Gordon Drummond made it very 
clear that it was the result of environmental challenges. Storms kept Drummond away 
 
23 Letter from Thomas G. Ridout to Thomas Ridout from St. David’s, 30 August 1813, in Earnest A. 
Cruikshank, ed. The Documentary History of the Campaign Upon the Niagara Frontier in the Year 
1813, Part 3 (Welland: Tribune Office, 1905), 87. Short citation: Cruikshank, Campaign upon the 
Niagara 1813. 
24 Cruikshank, Campaign upon the Niagara 1813, 87. 
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126 
 
from forward positions, via the Royal Navy transport, so the 8th Regiment suffered 
severely because of “excessively severe” weather. The lack of good weather removed 
eliminated supplies and led to sickness. Gordon Drummond forwarded the 
recommendation of the regimental surgeon, to remove the King’s Regiment, to 
George Prevost: “I am sorry to report to Your Excellency, that sickness is prevalent in 
the King’s regiment, principally ague and dysentery; and the Senior Medical Officer 
of the Regiment recommends their immediate removal from Niagara.”26 In addition to 
the King’s Regiment, sickness also incapacitated the 103rd Regiment of Foot. In 1814 
Drummond stated that “There is so much disease in the 103rd, and that corps is in 
every other respect useless and inefficient, and there is so much occasion of 
an efficient Regiment in the neighborhood of Burlington.”27 However, in 1814, the 
naturally poor weather also hindered the American advance.  Drummond may have 
struggled on the frontier, but he understood that the environment hindered the U.S. 
Army as well. In a letter to George Prevost, Drummond stated that  “The Weather 
being uncommonly Severe, and not being in possession of any information relative to 
the situation of the Enemy’s Main Body…It is evident that he has abandoned all ideas 
of offensive operations against this frontier.”28 Alcohol was the mechanism to 
manage sustained motivation, but the environment overwhelmed the ability of both 
forces to keep soldiers in the field. However, in 1814 Drummond and the British 
 
26 From major General Gordon Drummond to Major General George Prevost from York, 13 March 
1814, in William Charles Henry Wood, ed. Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812 Vol 
III, Part 1 (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1926) 96. 
27 Drummond to Prevost, from Niagara, 23 October 1814, in Wood, Select British Documents, 228. 
28 Drummond to Prevost, from Niagara, 23 October 1814, in Wood, Select British Documents, 227. 
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Army seemed to grasp these challenges better than their opponents in the American 
Army.  
 Spirits on the American frontier helped soldiers endure the environment at a 
time when nature was considered dangerous, rather than restorative.29 Generous 
whiskey rations often made a difference in the outcome of battles and coincided with 
John Lynn’s definition of combat motivation. When leaving an untenable 
fortification, Major G. D. Young had to attack an enemy position via a night march. 
Recognizing the need to fortify his soldier for the evening march, Young “ordered the 
men to be furnished with two days rations of provisions with double rations of 
whiskey.”30 Twentieth-century ideals of sober military professionalism may dismiss 
such rations before a major operation. However, Young’s force achieved great 
success. Young described the effective night maneuver in a brief narrative of the 
“Affair at Saint Regis” as follows: “At 11 at night, we marched with the utmost 
silence, that we might give little alarm as possible.”31 A double ration of whiskey was 
a full pint a day, but a silent night movement could not have demonstrated more 
poise. Young described how “we entered the place without even being heard by the 
Indians’ dogs.”32 For the British, the only difference was the favoring of rum over 
frontier whiskey, save for when they had captured American stores. On the march to 
Queenston Heights, Private Byfield Shadrach nonchalantly described the issue of 
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rum: “A noggin of rum was given to each man. We then move on for the field of 
action.”33 In a time when nature and frontiers were frightening, alcohol could serve as 
an essential source of liquid courage. Moreover, drinking alcohol rather than pursing 
sobriety facilitated poise. When circumstances prevented the distribution of whiskey, 
commanders could justify their losses on the field of battle honorably. 
 After the British defeat at the Battle of Lake Erie, Captain Robert Heriot’s 
Court-Martial revealed a low rate of spirits in his force, as well as the value of the 
liquor ration during a battle on the remote frontier lake. Lieutenant Thomas Clark 
revealed that Captain Barclay’s flagship went without liquor for two weeks before the 
battle. At Barclay’s Court Martial Clark testified that “We might have had a Weeks at 
half Allowance of Provisions but not of Spirits they were preserved for the Action, 
and all consumed that day, we had none served out for several days before.”34 Even 
after the judicious retention of liquor for combat, the lack of a provision of spirits 
before the action contributed to the outcome. Barclay lost the battle but fought 
bravely and used alcohol the right way to preserve morale. After a defeat on a 
movement from Fort George to Beaver Dams, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Boerstler 
justified his failure because an attack on his supply wagons separated his men from 
their whiskey. His soldiers “had marched eleven miles that morning without 
refreshment; they had fought three hours, the weather very warm, and consequently 
the troops were much exhausted.”35 He described mounting casualties by “skulking” 
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Native Americans, yet the capture of whiskey was their most significant loss.36 
Boerstler’s narrative described his willingness to fight, but not against intoxicated 
Native Americans. As he noted, “The commanding officer thought of ordering them a 
ration of whiskey, but some Indians getting in our rear and commencing a fire there 
was not time.”37 With high casualties and low morale, Boerstler was forced to 
surrender his force. Boerstler led a small detachment, but his defeat coincided with 
other losses and led to the resignation of Henry Dearborn and transition to the inept 
commander Major James Wilkinson. Without alcohol, it was challenging to maintain 
combat motivation over the long battle at Beaver Dams. The loss of Boerstler’s force 
was a part of a series of actions in 1813 that led to a near nervous breakdown of 
Major General Henry Dearborn and was one of many unsuccessful battles in the 
Niagara region.38  
 The Battle of Lundy’s Lane, near Niagara Falls, was the most significant 
American victory in the northern theater of the War of 1812. Yet it went mostly 
uncelebrated. The American forces returned to their camp, rather than retaining the 
field of battle, so both sides claimed victory. The U.S. Army maintained their 
positions and captured the British guns, in the face of repeated charges from the 
British Army, which had been strengthened by veteran regiment arriving in North 
America from the Peninsular Campaign against Napoleon. The attacks were so severe 
that James Miller and Eleazer Ripley were the only general officers still standing. 
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Afterward, General Ripley was subject to a Court of Inquiry. The court represented a 
formal challenge to his reputation because he ordered his army to withdraw to their 
camp. General Ripley had to retire his force because they had fought all day without 
anything to drink. Ripley described the need to leave the field for sustenance: “An 
interval not to exceed three-quarters of an hour, ensued; during which, all was 
darkness and silence; scarce interrupted by a breath of air. The men had neither water 
nor whiskey to refresh themselves, after the fatigue they endured."39 While it is not 
wise to dismiss dehydration, the whiskey ration was more consistently employed to 
prevent fatigued soldiers from breakdown during and after combat. Again, the British 
use of Native Americans with the addition of light infantry-style militiamen stopped 
the issue of a whiskey ration at a critical moment in the outcome of the battle. All 
sides understood the value of the whiskey ration, but the British commanders’ use of 
petite guerre tactics gave them a significant military advantage because they 
consistently separated the Americans from their liquor.  
Colonel Henry Leavenworth took command of his regiment after the injury of 
Winfield Scott At Lundy’s Lane. Leavenworth described how issuing rations were 
outside of Ripley’s control: “To refresh the men on the field would be hazardous in 
the extreme, and we were liable to be flanked on our left, and cut off from our camp 
at Chippewa.”40 While holding a field was no longer necessary to claim victory, the 
U.S. Army’s landmark victory in Niagara was tarnished by a movement back to camp 
to refresh soldiers. While these soldiers received meals, water, and whiskey in camp, 
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drinking alcohol was most commonly linked to combat motivation. Holding the field 
would not have been useful if the Army’s morale collapsed. 
The connection between the lack of whiskey and poor performance on the 
battlefield is significant. However, some of the most compelling accounts of whiskey 
and the War of 1812 were the moments when sharing spirits transcended the conflict 
and created friendship amongst opponents. Soldiers from differing sides periodically 
commiserated with one another through the medium of shared spirits. When Byfield 
Shadrach came across a barefoot and frostbitten American soldier, he elected to 
provide “some rum” and a pair of shoes. The unnamed prisoner “said he did not 
expect to be so treated, if he was taken prisoner, and wept.”41 Rum served a medium 
to help the U.S. soldier recover from his mistreatment by other British troops and 
exposure to the elements because both sides contended with the same harsh 
environment. During the British raid at Black Rock, in Buffalo New York, alcohol 
rapidly transitioned from a tense standoff into drinks amongst friends. U.S. Private 
James Sloan later wrote that “being unwell I stayed at Dr. Hawley’s tavern all night,” 
and his interaction with British soldiers was initially very tense.42 Sloan noted that 
“Sergeant Kelly now spoke to me in kinder tone and asked for liquor. I presented him 
with a demi-john of excellent cherry bounce.”43 The mixture of fruit and liquor not 
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only eased the tensions, but it also served as a mental break for men that typically 
tried to kill one another. It was also a drink that required a fusion of fruit with liquor 
and spices and would have created a far more familiar representation of home and 
family. Sloan described the generous sharing of alcohol as follows: “After filling their 
canteens and taking a few hearty swigs, in which I joined them, we were now on the 
best of terms, and it was agreed I should remain and go to bed again as the most 
secure place.”44 When Kelly died of minor wounds on a march from Amherstburg, 
Sloan memorialized his new friend: “His wound done bad on the road, and poor 
Kelley was laid in the dust.”45 Cherry bounce or rum could also serve as a kind offer 
from one opponent to another, in a war where both capitals of Washington and York 
were destroyed in anger. Compassionately sharing liquor reveals how soldiers on both 
sides suffered in much the same ways and were willing to see similarities in their 
opponents. It shows that the management of sustained combat motivation through 
alcohol transcended the sides of the conflict; however, later analyses will illustrate 
how this compassion did not transcend race. 
 Perhaps the best lens to understand how British and U.S. commanders defined 
the professional use of alcohol to combat a brutal wilderness were instances of misuse 
of alcohol. Most accounts describe the abuse of alcohol by Native Americans and 
serve as accounts illustrating difference and otherness. These descriptions are less 
valuable as historical observation of lived experiences, and more as the definition of 
what fell out of the realm of proper use of alcohol. This next section will first 
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describe the few documented instances of alcohol abuse by white soldiers, then 
catalog how the definition of tribal drinking enhanced the sense of otherness in a 
progressively brutal conflict. The accounts of improper alcohol use did not advocate 
for abstinence, or even what today would be considered sobriety. Alcohol was a tool 
for the management of health and morale, but the same drinking was considered 
misuse when Native Americans were concerned. 
 The abuse of alcohol was described as childish only when attributed to white 
soldiers. Frolics were punishable but in ways harmless events that received 
punishment without the high moral judgment reserved for others. Private William 
Harris was charged and convicted for “Rioting” for striking a fellow soldier and 
breaking “the window of a citizen.”46 Private William Brown was guilty of desertion 
because during a frolic, but faced lenient punishment because “he is very fond of 
liquor which is his only flaw.”47 Instead of being punished for desertion, Brown was 
convicted for Absence Without Leave (AWOL), because he was a great soldier when 
not intoxicated. Thomas Perkins was a more significant case that was dealt with as a 
hilarious drunken escapade because of his combat record. Perkins went “crazy” and 
drank too much following combat service as a gunboat commander on Lake Erie. 
When asked “whether Perkins is man apt to frolic?” Reuben Merrill answered as 
follows: “He drinks a great deal and appears kind of crazy.” Perkins had twice 
sounded an alarm in Burlington which resulted in the “seducing two soldiers of the 
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U.S. Army from their duties.”48 The serious charge of inducing soldiers to mutiny 
could have cost him his life, yet Perkins was not executed because of his independent 
combat action and tendency towards drunken frivolity. Typically, a soldier who was 
absent without leave and induced other soldiers to desert could be executed. 
However, the court only denied Perkins access to alcohol by placing him on hard 
labor without his whiskey ration because it concluded his actions were frivolous.  
Soldiers abusing alcohol were described in playful terminology, while white authors 
described Native Americans like animals. 
 The British likewise dealt with disciplinary problems related to drunkenness 
as a result of frivolity and mischief. In an 1812 district order Major Thomas Evans 
restricted soldier’s recreation to eliminate drunken frolics. In his general orders, 
Evans referred to  “the disorderly and intoxicated state of the soldiers of the line 
during the five last days, he is under the necessity of ordering that except servants no 
soldier shall, until further orders, be permitted to leave his quarters.”49 Soldiers were 
not expected to regulate their behavior when intoxicated as long as they caused no 
problems. Soldiers could not purchase spirits from locals, in addition to the generous 
ration, “so long as the enemy may think proper to threaten the safety of the 
frontier.”50 Soldiers were expected to drink when commanders allowed the alcohol, 
but citizens were not permitted to provide additional spirits. Evans further described 
the prohibition on soldiers acquiring there own alcohol: “The Major-General has 
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thought proper to forbid persons on the line of defense between Niagara and Fort Erie 
from selling Spirits except by license and under such restrictions as may be conducive 
to the good of His Majesty’s service.”51 Officers punished soldiers for purchasing the 
alcohol; soldiers were expected to drink when provided the means of more spirits 
through double rations. When a drunken militiaman, listed as Private Chambray, beat 
up an invalid, he was criticized but unpunished because the officer of the guard was 
expected to prevent drunk soldiers from rioting. The standard ration was more than 
four drinks, as defined by the typical alcohol concentration of one beer, and a double 
ration was eight and a half drinks. Adjutant General Edward Baynes offered a 
problematic account of drunkenness. Which was “less worthy credit, on the part 
of Cambray, because it is proved, that he was much in Liquor and the Man with 
whom he fought, is a Wounded Invalid, deprived of the use of one of his Arms.”52 
Soldiers were expected to have drunken escapades, and since Cambray was on a post, 
he was criticized and not punished. However, similar behavior by officers was 
deemed unbecoming, and excessive drinking by Native Americans was synonymous 
with animal behavior.  
 Officers drank improperly when observers described their use of alcohol as 
free or excessive. Alcohol was a tool that was both necessary and could be overused. 
During the invasion of Lower Canada led by Major General James Wilkinson, 
contemporaries criticized General Wade Hampton because excessive alcohol use 
limited his ability. His subordinate, Colonel Robert Purdy, criticized Hampton's 
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performance: “As a reference to the orders issued by him will show, mark very 
strongly the capriciousness of his conduct and the total want of steadiness in his 
intentions.”53 Hampton gained his position through previous high performance, yet in 
1813 alcohol significantly influenced his performance. Colonel Purdy observed that 
“Such has been the General’s conduct on some occasions that I have, in common with 
other officers, been induced to believe that he was under the influence of a too free 
use of spirituous liquors.”54 General Hampton’s poor performance was directly 
related not to normal alcohol use, but the excessive use of spirits. A gill was a half a 
pint and was the daily ration, so it would not take much more to lead to poor 
decisions. Due to different roles, rations useful to manage soldier motivations could 
significantly affect officers’ decision making.  
 The divergence of officer and soldier expectations on alcohol use was present 
in the writing of British Major Thomas Evans. At the Battle of Queenston Heights, 
Evans resorted to freeing soldiers arrested for behavior caused by drunkenness 
because of the “imminence and magnitude of the danger.”55 Still, Evans was 
reluctant, but the circumstances of an American invasion meant that soldiers needed 
to be free from alcohol-related crimes based upon combat necessity. In an October 
1812 letter, Evans described his leniency due to combat necessity: “I hesitated not 
assuming the responsibility of liberating all the 49th prisoners, on the specious plea of 
their offense proceeding from too free indulgence in drink.”56 The soldiers were 
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released to the more trying circumstance of battle as “proof of their loyalty and 
courage, which they were assured would be severely tested.”57 The line between legal 
and criminal drunkenness was situational, and courage under fire could erase the 
problems associated with the free use of alcohol. Still, the line between the proper and 
improper use of alcohol had much to do with the individual’s rank because an officer 
who consumed similar amounts of alcohol delivered to soldiers was prone to poor 
decision making. Dimming one’s wits was useful before plunging a bayonet into an 
opponent but was a detriment to skillful command under fire.  
 Since American alliances with Native Americans rarely occurred during the 
hostilities, it may follow that the British muted criticism of their Native American 
allies. However, the British description of the alcohol consumption of their allies was 
significantly harsh. Lieutenant Colonel J. Harvey, Major General Drummond’s 
adjutant, gave specific instructions not allowing captured alcohol to fall into the 
hands of Native Americans. Harvey ordered Major General Phineas Riall to “use your 
best exertions, and require all under your command to do the same, in restraining the 
savage propensities of the Indian warriors, and to give protection to the persons and 
property of such Inhabitants as may remain in their Houses.”58 The British, like most 
Europeans in North America, believed that Native Americans could not contain their 
savageness, and alcohol made it impossible for less human allies to restrain their 
passions.59 Jon Harvey stated that  “All liquors should be destroyed, to prevent its 
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falling into the hands of the Indians or Troops.”60 The denial of captured liquor to 
troops was used to prevent drunken unprofessionalism amongst white soldiers, but in 
the case of Native Americans, it was employed to restrain “savage propensities.”  
 Whites attributed brutality in the conflict to inebriated Native Americans. 
Major General Gordon Drummond reported that “the Indians who advanced with M 
General Riall’s force on the Morning of the 18th (December 1813) had committed 
great excesses (in consequence of intoxication) and had burnt the greatest part of the 
Houses in Lewiston.”61 Officers often dismissed the brutality of conflict characterized 
by growing examples of reciprocal violence because of intoxication. When Shawnee 
warriors executed wounded U.S. prisoners of war at Raisin River, Captain William 
Hamilton Merritt attributed the tragic event to intoxicated Native Americans. Merritt 
stated that “Some of the wounded were left in the house near the action. The Indians 
are getting drunk and brutally massacred them in cold blood; although the officers of 
the department exert themselves in an extraordinary manner to prevent it.”62 British 
officers had difficulty “controlling” their allies, yet they found it impossible to 
restrain the brutality of inebriated tribal allies. American prisoner William Atherton 
observed, “It has been said, and perhaps with due regard to truth, that many of the 
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Indians engaged in this dreadful havoc, were under the influence of rum.”63 American 
accounts of the War of 1812 illustrate that the Northwestern Army burned and 
pillaged multiple tribal villages immediately after the outset of hostilities.64 Rather 
than recognizing the reciprocity of tribal attacks, like at Raisin River, U.S. and British 
accounts portrayed Native American alcohol use as animal and savage, even though 
most soldiers were provided liquor before battles and might well have been equally 
intoxicated.  
 The Raisin River massacre, in the Michigan Territory, tempered the views of 
Americans, especially American prisoners of war. When left in the custody of Native 
Americans, American prisoners had the highest anxiety level when their captors were 
consuming alcohol. William Atherton’s account of captivity observed the Raisin 
River Massacre from a wounded prisoner’s perspective. He noted, “They were 
supplied with it by the British, and when under its influence were more savage than 
savages.”65 Atherton leveled blame on the British officers using the same logic of the 
British that Native Americans could never contain their savage nature while 
intoxicated. When captured, Atherton was highly disappointed that he was not held 
by the British as a prisoner. At Fort Malden, Atherton observed that “I saw that the 
Indians were drunk. Here my fears were again alarmed—being in the midst of a 
savage camp.”66 After witnessing the Raisin River massacre firsthand, Atherton 
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arrived in a camp with intoxicated Native Americans heightened his fears, and he 
further expressed his beliefs on the temperament of inebriated Native Americans. The 
“lusts” of Native Americans were not containable when under the influence of 
alcohol; Atherton saw “the blood scores fresh upon them—and under the influence of 
strong drink! While the Indians kept sober I had some hope of protection.”67 From the 
perspective of the British and American accounts, alcohol use led to courage in battle 
or dysfunctional frivolity in white soldiers, but alcohol made Native American 
passions unrestrainable and led to brutal savagery. However, from the American 
perspective, British Army officers exploited Native American savageness by 
intentionally providing allies with excessive amounts of spirits. There were proper 
and improper uses of alcohol by both armies, and Native American use of alcohol 
served to strengthen ideas about the right and wrong way to consume it.68  
 David Livingston Smith’s recent survey of dehumanization emphasized the 
role of language used to describe opponents as animals.69 Contemporary descriptions 
of Native American alcohol use often used racially charged animal comparisons. 
After a drinking “spree,” Atherton’s life was in danger from the supposed uncheck 
bloodlust of his captors.70 As Atherton described his fear, “I now felt myself in 
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danger, for one of them attempted to take my life; I escaped because he was drunk 
and could not get me. That night the squaws hid me out in the woods behind a log in 
the snow.”71 Every moment of intoxication was unbearable for Atherton because he 
believed Native Americans would revert to their animal nature, but he also thought it 
made it easier to outsmart them. Atherton described his narrow survival: “The Indians 
were lying about round the fires like hounds after a hard chase; the whiskey was 
dying in them, and they were sleepy and sick.”72 With the help of women he was able 
to ward off the brutal advances of his captors consistently. The British also believed 
that Native Americans brutalized American prisoners. As previously mentioned, 
Byfield Shadrach significantly restored the morale of an American prisoner by 
providing rum and fresh shoes, but Shadrach was also implored to prevent Native 
American brutality. After providing rum for the unnamed American prisoner, 
Shadrach observed the emotional response: “He said he did not expect to be so 
treated.”73 Americans described British officers who incited the brutality of savages, 
yet when British men in the ranks captured U.S. soldiers there was more cordiality. 
U.S. soldiers felt safe with British soldiers as captors; however, when held by Native 
Americans, they felt imperiled, and the U.S. often linked attacks on prisoners to the 
orders of British officers.   
 Some accounts described extraordinary efforts to prevent wounded American 
soldiers from capture by intoxicated Native Americans. Major Isaac Roach struggled 
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to keep his friend Captain McChesney from bleeding to death while hiding him from 
Kahnawake warriors. Roach stated that “My time was occupied in attending to my 
friend McChesney whose wound was very painful, as the ball passed through the 
wrist joint and cut off the blood vessel, when he was shot being near me.”74 Roach’s 
tourniquet was unable to stop the bleeding, but his most difficult challenge was 
keeping his dying friend away from drunken Native Americans. Roach “barricaded 
the door and armed with McChesney's sword I watched him all night, at one time I 
expected the Indians to break into our room, as they were in the house.”75 His 
elevated fears of losing McChesney occurred because they “were surrounded by 
savages intoxicated by the liquor found in our wagons,” therefore, Roach believed 
that the Native Americans could not restrain their animal tendencies.76 Under fire, 
Roach employed his musicians to carry “the wounded to the rear, to prevent their 
falling into the hands of the enemy.”77 During the Battle of Beaver dams much effort 
was made to prevent their execution by Native Americans because they were 
intoxicated, but despite surrendering to the British, the British transferred Roach’s 
troops to Native American captors. Despite Roach’s efforts, he stated that “Nearly all 
of our wounded were killed that night.”78 McChesney would fight with Roach in the 
future. It was thus likely that Native Americans would execute soldiers who could not 
keep pace on the march. The American fear of Native American atrocity was 
 
74 Isaac Roach, “Journal of Major Isaac Roach 1812-1824,” Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1813, Vol.  
II, 23. 
75 Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1813, 61-64. 
76 Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1813, 61-64. 
77 Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1813, 61-64. 
78 Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 1813, 61-64. 
 
143 
 
heightened significantly when Native Americans used intoxication in much the same 
way white soldiers managed combat and sustained motivation.  
 While American prisoners had the most to fear, some of the worst descriptions 
of Native American “savage” behavior came from their allies. In a letter from 
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Dewar to Colonel Henry Proctor, Dewar described the 
mistreatment of “A poor Canadian of the name Denault (sic)” whose horse was 
senselessly killed by Native American allies.79 When Denault “found the horse 
yesterday in the Town mounted by two Indians, he seized it, and they struck him, but 
procuring assistance, and the Indians finding themselves compell’d(sic) submit, they 
ran their swords thro’ the Animals body.”80 The senseless brutality to a civilian and a 
defenseless animal had occurred “perhaps forty or fifty” times.81  Dewar’s description 
of Native American “brutality” confirmed British expectations because they were 
intoxicated. Dewar stated that “what aggravates the evil is that liquor is again sold 
here to Soldiers, from whom the Indians procure it.”82 British officers serving with 
Native Americans worked to limit alcohol use by their allies. The Indian department 
records repeated requests for Native Americans to use alcohol appropriately, outside 
of proximity with their opponents. William Claus described a give and take between 
the Seven Nations and the Indian department. Like white soldiers, “Desiré (of the La 
Cloche) complains that the change of climate made some sickness and that makes 
 
79 Letter from LTC Edward Dewar to Colonel Henry Proctor from Amherstberg in E. A. Cruikshank, 
ed., Documents Relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit, 1812 (Publications of 
the Canadian Archives. Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1913), 174. Hereafter Cruikshank, 
Surrender of Detroit. 
80 Cruikshank, Surrender of Detroit, 66-68. 
81 Cruikshank, Surrender of Detroit, 66-68. 
82 Cruikshank, Surrender of Detroit, 66-68. 
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them think of going back, not the enemy.”83 The ill Native Americans requested the 
same medicine that white soldiers used, yet for whites, Native Americans could not 
contain their lusts near their enemies. Claus responded, “Brothers! I thank you and 
will tell your father. You still hold him by the hand. The liquor you ask for you shall 
get, but I hope you will take’t very cautiously so near the enemy.”84 Drinking to 
excess was something that Europeans did before battles, and would do so until the 
Somme in the First World War, yet the Native American allies were believed not to 
be able to control themselves when under the influence of strong drink. 85 
 William Claus would further illustrate the contradictions between white and 
Native American drinking. When describing the Chippewa as “Western Indians,” he 
reflected on  their motivations: “A few nights ago they spoke of going, but it appears 
they did it only as an excuse for asking for some liquor.”86 White men drank liquor to 
help endure combat, the harsh environment, and military camp life. However, whites 
described Native American alcohol use as an expression of animal lust, thereby 
reifying existing ideas about difference. Native Americans performed the unheralded 
light infantry tasks that helped preserve the British North American provinces. 
However, whenever Native Americans used alcohol in much in the same manner than 
 
83 Claus, William, “Speech of Colonel William Claus to the Indians Cross Roads 21 July 1813,” In 
Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier 1813, Part II, 260. It is important to doubt the accuracy of white reports 
of Native American atrocity. The best example was in the account of Lewis Bond. He described a 
Native American member of the Michigan militia who asked a woman to make him a soup using a 
human foot. That extreme story is most certainly fabricated and should elicit caution on white 
perspectives concerning Native American alcohol use. See Lewis Bond, “Lewis Bond Journal, 1812-
1813,” 43. 
84 Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier, 260. 
85 John Keegan described the use of Alcohol to keep the ranks in order at the contemporary battle of 
Waterloo. John Keegan, The Face of Battle, 184. 
86 Letter from Colonel William Claus to Lieutenant Colonel John Harvey from Cross Roads, August 
15th, 1813, In Cruikshank, Niagara Frontier 1813, Part III, 23. 
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British and Americans units, they were considered animals with unrestrainable lusts. 
The realities of warfare in the early nineteenth century mean that alcohol was 
necessary for both combat and sustained motivation, yet Native American alcohol use 
magnified perceived differences between races. 
It is most surprising that a thorough review of the War of 1812 alcohol records 
reveals that alcohol often improved combat effectiveness, probably as a result of a 
placebo effect. Perhaps soldiers performed better because they believed alcohol 
helped them, and something like ice cream could have done the same thing to help 
soldiers manage stress. However, veterans who endure repeated terrible experiences 
do not seek counseling and group therapy for ice cream addiction, but they struggle 
significantly with alcoholism. Principally because trauma survivors typically can fall 
asleep more easily after becoming intoxicated, only the dehydrating effects of alcohol 
lead to poor overall sleep. Poor sleep, however, is sleep. Alcohol significantly affects 
the places in the brain influenced by trauma in the short term, while causing systemic 
and irreversible long-term problems. Judging any soldier’s combat experience on the 
North American frontier from a long-term perspective is problematic, and placing 
contemporary definitions of drunkenness on them is similarly flawed. John Keegan 
describes more problems with alcohol use at the Somme in 1917 than at the battle of 
Waterloo in 1815.87 In a preindustrial society soldiers did not operate complex 
machinery. Sobriety was not required to operate early nineteenth-century weapons, 
but many soldiers were so malnourished, and any calories were valuable, regardless 
of long-term problems. If alcoholism prevented medical treatment with purgatives 
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and opiates, then it was ultimately better. The use of alcohol was not the best option, 
it was not even a good option, but it was an acceptable one. Survival in wilderness 
warfare during the War of 1812 was not about reaching an ideal solution; it was about 
the least bad options. Soldiers and officers recognized the least bad outcomes by 
getting the most out of generous rations of alcohol.  
 In his famed work, “The Trouble with Wilderness,” William Cronon 
cataloged the problems of preserving sacred nature versus more ordinary 
landscapes.88 Likewise, scholars like Roderick Nash have elevated ideas about nature 
posited by intellectual elites, disconnected from day-to-day practical experience in the 
wilderness.89 Soldiers of the War of 1812 experienced the frontier and wilderness 
environment in a way that challenges such sacrosanct and restorative ideas about 
nature. The use of whiskey and rum to fortify the bodies of soldiers for fatiguing 
wilderness marches, the occupation of isolated outposts, and for morale in frontier 
battles represent critical insights into how early nineteenth-century people were 
interacting with a wilderness that was far more dangerous than invigorating. The 
soldier experience with nature in the War of 1812 required the consistent use of 
alcohol to prevent desertion and preserve morale. Likewise, intellectual studies of 
war-related trauma indicate that the most significant predictor of PTSD (behind being 
physically injured), is the perception of being in a dangerous place. As such, the 
ubiquitous descriptions of fatigue caused by the environment in the War of 1812, as 
well as the temporary efficacy of alcohol, offer a powerful example in a longer story 
 
88 William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” 
Environmental History 1, no. 1 (1996): 7-28. 
89 Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). 
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about war and psychology. The field of trauma is dominated by work exploring the 
emotional burden of killing, while soldiers report the challenges of fighting in harsh 
environments as far more mentally taxing. Examining how the frontier environment 
affected the health of soldiers opens questions about the emergence of a natural 
philosophy that worshiped the unspoiled wild. Pragmatic participants in the northern 
campaign of the War of 1812 required alcohol to endure the ravages of nature. The 
liquor ration also illustrates how soldiers and officers made the most of their limited 
resources. Ideas about patriotism were significant but were secondary to material 
factors such as generous rations of whiskey and rum during the crises of frontier 
combat and prolonged exposure to a harsh wilderness environment. 
 Furthermore, alcohol use solidified the sense of racial difference, while 
sometimes uniting soldiers in a way that transcended the conflict. One of the worst 
things a contemporary white man could do was allow Native Americans access to 
large quantities of alcohol. Additionally, soldiers on both sides often bonded with one 
another by sharing alcohol. For white soldiers, the enemy often suffered the same 
hardships as themselves, and alcohol was a method of mutual commiseration. This 
shared humanity, however, was not extended to Native American combatants. 
Moreover, when Native Americans used alcohol in the same manner as 
whites, they were described as animals. During the War of 1812, whites most often 
attributed atrocities to free use of alcohol by Native Americans. The day-to-day liquor 
ration has made little impact on the historiography of the War of 1812, but this 
chapter illustrates just how central it was to the soldier’s daily experience, as well as 
heightening the sense of racial difference. It is easy to assume that the liquor ration 
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was antithetical to good order and discipline, but it dramatically illustrates just how 
painful the daily experience of combat was for the common soldier during the War of 
1812. It is easier to condescend rather than understand why soldiers consumed half a 
pint of whiskey once a day, but the liquor ration offers vital insights into how soldiers 
overcame the daily drudgery of frontier service and combat. Likewise, the use of 
alcohol as a desperate but often necessary means to preserve morale integrates with 
the next chapter’s focus on the role of nutrition and food insecurity. Like the use of 
alcohol to maintain morale, it also important to note that hunger and food insecurity 
are far more damaging psychologically, as well as to health in general, than combat.  
Understanding the War of 1812 from company level documents further illustrates the 
challenges of soldier motivation.  
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CHAPTER 4 
WARFARE AT THE COMPANY LEVEL: 
JOSEPH TREAT AND HIS UNIT’S WAR AGAINST NATURE 
 
 
  
 While the previous two chapters have focused on topics such as hunger and 
alcohol, this chapter explores the War of 1812 from U.S. company-level records. 
Company-level leadership has not yet had a major influence on the War of 1812’s 
historiography. In an era when soldiers’ accounts were written by a small number of 
men whose education and ability to publish manuscripts set them apart from the 
typical rank and file, company-level sources consisted primarily of order books that 
recorded rations, present for duty rosters, clothing records, and muster rolls. Most 
soldiers could not remain on the company rolls past their first maneuver. Company 
records provide better insight into the nature of a war in which, no matter how 
experienced a regiment became on paper, illness and day-to-day losses meant that the 
rolls were persistently filled with new recruits. The American army of that period has 
typically been considered inept and unprofessional.1 Moreover, operational history 
tends to ignore environmental factors. However, analyzing the war from the company 
level reveals how difficult it was for commanders to retain seasoned veterans because 
of the unique ecological challenges of the Upper Canadian frontier.  
Reconstruction of the history of any single company in the War of 1812 is 
extremely challenging, because company-level records are sparse, pragmatic 
 
1 A study that includes an insightful analysis of American leadership is Wesley Turner, British 
Generals in the War of 1812: High Command in the Canadas (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1999). 
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documents. There are few narrative descriptions, yet the day-to-day details of men in 
or out of the ranks, food supplies, and muster records provide the best sense of the 
significant non-battle influences on the larger conflict. Company records are the best 
records of what soldiers did because they provide data on how they died, how many 
were fit-for-duty, what they ate, their professions before the war, and what type of 
fighting was typical for them. What soldiers did strengthens our understanding of 
what officers reported in dispatches. And more importantly, they emphasize the 
difficulty of merely surviving camp life and campaigning. Like soldiers in the 
twentieth century, who often stressed how the daily dullness of military service 
outweighs moments of terror in battles, the company level records during the War of 
1812 extend our understanding of the daily grind of soldiering.  
  A close study of Joseph Treat’s leadership as a company commander in the 
21st Infantry Regiment provides an in-depth look at one unit in the War of 1812. 
Given his court-martial, memoir, and detailed company order book, Joseph Treat was 
one of the most carefully studied junior officers from the conflict. His two order 
books are arguably the most detailed company-level documents relating to the War of 
1812. After being honorably acquitted of General Jacob Brown’s accusations about 
his alleged negligence at the Battle of Chippewa, Treat remained in Brown’s Army. 
However, Treat was denied participation in some of the U.S. Army’s most significant 
victories at the Battle of Bridgewater/Lundy’s Lane and the siege of Fort Erie. Treat’s 
denial of command during his regiment’s finest battles led him to publish The 
Vindication of Captain Joseph Treat against the Atrocious Calumny Comprehended 
in Major General Brown’s Official Report of the Battle of Chippeway. The rich 
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sources covering Treat’s company reveal the complexity of a conflict that was fought 
using innovative and challenging light infantry tactics, and they show that the 
Northern Army’s service on a distant frontier meant that illness was a more 
formidable challenge than battles with the enemy. In short, a close analysis of Captain 
Treat’s company illustrates that the War of 1812 was a messy, complicated, and 
controversial conflict in which New Englanders played a significant role despite the 
political opposition of their Federalist states. Tragically, while New England states 
periodically served as the primary suppliers of the British army through smuggling, 
their regular soldiers suffered from malnutrition and fell ill.2 This betrayal meant that 
New Englanders were more likely to describe the harsher side of war, even as they 
sought the romantic battlefield glory commonly desired by joining an army in 
wartime. 
 As a field of academic history, the War of 1812 has largely escaped the 
advances of the “New Military History,” and it is generally lacking in social history. 
Alan Taylor’s two recent books have won both great acclaim and the author’s second 
Pulitzer Prize, and have helped to create a social history of the conflict. Taylor’s 
approach lacks an attention to the nuances of military institutional culture.3 Military 
histories of the War of 1812 have focused almost solely on tactics, and on battle and 
 
2 Again, the work of Joshua Smith describes the relationship between smuggling development of 
permeable border between the United States and British North America. Alan Taylor has also 
described the War of 1812 as a civil war, because of cross border relationships. However, Taylor sees 
the smuggling as self-defeating during the War of 1812. The change that this dissertation illustrates, 
with the support of Taylor’s research on Virginia in the War of 1812, published after The Civil War of 
1812, is the recognition that most of the soldiers who fought in the northern campaign came from the 
states engaged in the smuggling. See Allan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British 
Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), and Allan Taylor, The 
Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772-1832 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2013). 
3 Taylor, The Civil War of 1812; The Internal Enemy. 
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campaign analyses, with a smaller emphasis on matters of logistics and day-to-day 
operations. A company-level study of the conflict provides much-needed insight into 
the center of balance of the conflict and challenges both fields of inquiry. The War of 
1812 was a frontier conflict; battlefield victories were rarely decisive. The social-
historical field has elevated soldier suffering and officer incompetence without 
grappling with human agency, perseverance, and camaraderie gained through 
suffering. Soldiers and officers were happy to suffer if it led to battlefield laurels. The 
soldiers in Joseph Treat’s Company maintained a reasonable degree of health because 
their commander adapted to the climate. After Treat’s removal, however, the 
company’s losses increased significantly. An approach that investigates the health of 
soldiers and the operational management of health should help unite these two 
seemingly irreconcilable approaches to the conflict.  
 Historians have described soldiers’ experiences in the war, yet the role of 
junior officers lacks a thorough analysis. Three accounts of highly successful junior 
officers reveal that Joseph Treat was a promising and able young officer, whose 
previous promotion to Captain was the best proof of his courage and capacity. This 
lack of scholarly emphasis on company-level leadership is disheartening because of 
officers like Josiah Snelling, who started the war as a Captain but finished as a 
Colonel, and Thomas Sidney Jesup, who began the conflict as a Lieutenant and 
finished as a Lieutenant Colonel in Command of Regiment.4 Additionally, Captain 
Zachary Taylor distinguished himself as a Captain while in command of Fort 
 
4 Thomas Sidney Jesup, Thomas Sidney Jesup Papers, Library of Congress. Josiah Snelling “The 
Journal of Josiah Snelling,” Minnesota Historical Society, 1938. 
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Harrison, and began a career that led eventually to the White House.5 Snelling and 
Jesup became regimental commanders for  similar reasons; Snelling emerged as the 
strongest captain in the Fourth Infantry Regiment during both Tippecanoe and the 
Battle of Brownstown. Leading the vanguard of the attack at Brownstown, or the 
village of Maguaga, Snelling was central to the only victory during William Hull's 
disastrous campaign that culminated in his surrender at Detroit.6 After being captured 
as a Lieutenant, Jesup gained the rank of Brigade Major. He was released from 
captivity without being exchanged and therefore could not serve as a combatant. As 
such he emerged as the chief logistician of William Henry Harrison’s campaign in the 
Old Northwest. After taking command of his regiment at the Battle of 
Bridgewater/Lundy’s Lane, the Army promoted Jesup to Lieutenant Colonel.7 Taylor, 
while not commanding a regiment during the war, led a small, isolated force of 
mostly ill soldiers against a large contingent of Shawnee tribesman. Although he was 
so sick that he could not even remain awake for the entire siege of fewer than thirty-
six hours, Taylor somehow managed to hold his fortification against several attacks.8 
These three accounts of junior officers are the most extreme examples of Captains 
 
5 Jack Bauer, Dorothy Bauer-Cornish, and Brainerd Dyer, Zachary Taylor: Soldier, Planter, Statesman 
of the Old Southwest (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1993). Letter From Captain Zachary Taylor to 
Governor William Henry Harrison, Fort Harrison 10 September 1812, in John Brannan (ed.) Official 
Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States, during the late War with Great Britain 
in the years 1812, 13, 14 & 15: with some additional letters and documents elucidating that period, 
(New York: Way & Gideon, 1823), 61-63. Hereafter, Official Letters. 
6 Letter from Major General William Hull, to Secretary of War William Eustis From Detroit 13 August 
1812, in Brannan (ed.) Official Letters, 37. 
7 Jesup, “Memoir of the Campaign on the Niagara Spring 1814, “Thomas Sidney Jesup Papers, 11 of 
memoir and 193 in papers. 
8 Letter from Taylor to Harrison, Fort Harrison 10 September 1812, in Brannan (ed.) Official Letters of 
the Military, 61. 
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gaining high status in the war. For most, being mentioned in dispatches was the 
highest measure of performance.  
 During the War of 1812, the U.S. Army granted two principal awards that 
officers could receive. The first was a Congressional Gold Medal, an award primarily 
reserved for the commanders of battlefield victories, but which at times was given to 
subordinate officers whose bravery led to a victory. The second award was the Brevet 
promotion for temporary rank during the conflict, which, during the War of 1812 
when the Army was struggling to fill its ranks, often led to permanent promotions. 
Because there were only two formal means of promoting or awarding officers, junior 
officers typically could expect at best to be mentioned positively in the dispatches 
describing a battle. The most certain way to make it into dispatches was to die or 
become severely wounded, yet officers were also singled out for competence, 
bravery, or serving under fire while unfit for duty.9  
 Another less well-known path to gain a reputation in dispatches was in the 
manner that officers cared for soldiers. Typically, this resulted from empathy, but to 
some degree, these were novel public health policies. Although of a higher ranking 
than Snelling’s Regimental Commander, James Miller singled himself out by the care 
of his soldier’s blisters during the march from New England to Ohio.10 While there is 
little evidence of Snelling positively influencing soldier health during the war, his 
journal of command at Fort Snelling illustrated how the growth of healthy crops 
 
9 Officers in branches like Artillery and Engineering were typically the ones singled out for praise of 
their competency while Infantry and Cavalry officers received praise for moral firmness. 
10 Adam Walker, A Journal of Two Campaigns of the Fourth Regiment of U. S. Infantry in the 
Michigan and Indiana Territories Under the Command of Col. John P. Boyd and Lt. Col. James 
Miller, During the Years 1811 & 12 (Keene, N.H.: Printed at the Sentinel press by the author, 1816), 7. 
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outweighed the benefits of drills and maneuvers.11 Similarly, Jesup distinguished 
himself at Fort Harrison by paying for clothing for recaptured prisoners from his own 
income.12 The junior officers in Treat’s regiment were particularly effective at 
adapting to the environmental challenges and reducing casualties. Treat and his 
officer contemporaries, such as James Miller, Josiah Snelling, and Thomas Sidney 
Jesup, excelled at managing soldier health.   
 Campaigning in Canada was not possible for much of the winter, so the 
fighting season occurred when logistics became more difficult, and illness was more 
problematic. Wagons were impossible on muddy roads, so supplies were transported 
via the soldier’s load, the use of packhorses, and by subsisting off the countryside.13 
While most of the historiographical research on malaria has been focused  on 
southern climates, in the north winter forced armies to fight during the most virulent 
seasons.14 The regulars, who were the most disciplined soldiers on campaign, suffered 
higher rates of communicable camp-based sicknesses because regular regiments 
recruited soldiers from more diverse locations than militia units drawn from specific 
communities.15 As a result, regular soldiers suffered illness and were often unfit for 
 
11 Snelling, “The Journal of Josiah Snelling.” 
12 Letter from Jesup to Harrison Fort Harrison 20 May 1813, Thomas Sidney Jesup Papers, 152. 
13 See Neil Forkey, Shaping the Upper Canadian Frontier: Environment, Society, and Culture in the 
Trent Valley (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003). 
14 J. R. McNeill, Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean 1620-1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Sylvia Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance 
in a Revolutionary Era (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 1991); Kenneth Morgan, Slavery 
and the British Empire: From Africa to America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Andrew 
M. Bell, Mosquito Soldiers: Malaria, Yellow Fever, and the Course of the American Civil War (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010). 
15 The best example of this occurs in Joseph Treat’s Order Book in the October-November time frame, 
there is an addition of soldiers without record on any new recruits. The militia would have been 
hardened by fighting at Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and Fort Erie and would make for the best new 
additions. Lemuel Bradford records that there was an influx of twenty-seven recruits but gained sixty-
two new soldiers on 9 October 1814. In the Fall under siege operations the 21st strengthened itself from 
local militia. See The Company Order Books of Lemuel Bradford and Joseph Treat, Records of Units, 
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duty within weeks of joining their regiment. No early modern publisher would 
produce a memoir of a soldier who took ill after his first forced march, or during his 
first weeks in a military camp, which accounts for the scarcity for accounts and 
makes company-level muster records so crucial for an accurate understanding what 
the war was like for soldiers and junior officers.  
 The 21st Infantry Regiment fought in every battle in the Buffalo-based 
Niagara campaign of the War of 1812. Joseph Treat started as a lieutenant in his 
regiment and moved up to the rank of Captain before the 1814 campaign. Treat was 
promoted and singled out for praise by his commanding officer for his service at the 
Battle of Chrysler’s Farm.16 While Treat was not an officer of the acclaim of Thomas 
Jesup or Josiah Snelling, promotion in the US Army was typically an award for 
bravery. An exploration of Treat’s court-martial reveals that his soldiers and non-
commissioned officers supported their leader. Even with the wellspring of 
information available concerning Joseph Treat, he does not appear in written records 
before he assumed command of his company. His leadership only technically covered 
the Battle of Chippewa because he was formally in command; he was held as a 
prisoner of Jacob Brown after the battle. Treat’s order book described the day-to-day 
experiences of the company in great detail. Unfortunately for Treat, his years of quiet 
unrecorded professionalism have next to no explanation, yet his worst day as a 
commander has been meticulously preserved. His order book and self-defensive 
 
Infantry, 1789-1815 21st Infantry Regiment, National Archives and Records Administration, 
Washington D.C. 
 16 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel T. Upham to Joseph Treat from Portsmouth New Hampshire, 25 
August 1815, in Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, Late of the Twenty-First Regiment United 
States Infantry, Against the Atrocious Calumny Comprehended in Major General Brown's Official 
Report of the Battle of Chippeway (Philadelphia: Printed by Author, 1815), 60. 
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manuscript do, however, provide extraordinary evidence into day-to-day operations 
and the struggle against the environment to keep soldiers healthy and in the ranks. 
They also illuminate the role that small-scale skirmishes played on the outcome of the 
War of 1812. 
 
New Englanders Suffering in Republican Conflict 
 
 First, it is essential to illustrate that New Englanders served in the regular 
units of the U.S. Army more than southerners. The U.S. National Archives holds an 
extensive collection of War of 1812 era muster records, and these sources reveal the 
dominance of New England-based soldiers in the Army’s rolls.17 The prevalence of 
New England accounts could be attributed to higher rates of literacy. Short serving 
junior officers may have been more literate in New England, and the work of J. C. A. 
Stagg has proven that the elites were not the principal group making up the officer 
corps.18 For example, the order book of Virginian Captain Byrd C. Williams has the 
least information found in company records. He merely had a clothing record that 
recorded deaths and discharges in margins.19 The shared record book for Captains 
John McRae and John Standard’s company also has very few reports, and the 
Virginian accounts of junior officers are the sparsest records.20  
 
17 Records of Units, Infantry, 1789-1815, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington 
D.C. 
18 J. C. A. Stagg, “United States Army Officers in the War of 1812: A Statistical and Behavioral 
Portrait.” The Journal of Military History 76, no. 4 (2012): 1001–34. 
19 Byrd C. Williams, Company order book for the Company of Captain Byrd C. Williams, Record 
Group 98, Records of the United States Army Commands, 1784-1821, Records of Units, Infantry, 
1789-1815 20th Infantry Regiment, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C., 
Entry 232. 
20 John McRae and John Standard, The Company order book for the Company of Captains John 
McRae and John Standard, Record Group 98, Records of the United States Army Commands, 1784-
 
158 
 
 The scant records of Virginian junior officers stand in contrast to more 
extensive records kept by New England-based officers. Alan Taylor’s recent Pulitzer 
Prize-winning book, The Internal Enemy, catalogues how British naval raids 
employed freed slaves to threaten Virginian plantations.21 These naval raids 
supported slave uprisings that threatened southern states, requiring a large contingent 
of southern regiments remitted to garrison duties. Southern-dominated Democratic-
Republicans championed a war and believed the invasion of Canada would be a 
“Mere matter of marching,” yet southern states could only field a few troops for 
service outside of the region.22 
 New England opposition to the war did not preclude them from feats of 
heroism. A private dialogue about the performance of officers from Hillsborough, 
New Hampshire, is particularly revealing of the contribution of New England-based 
regular Army regiments. The following account, from a letter sent from Benjamin 
Price to Major John McNeil, illustrates the contradictions between campaigns 
principally fought by New Englanders and opposed politically by New Englanders. 
McNeil stated that “You were fortunate in having the command of the 11th Regt.—
Captn. Crooked has dutifully upheld himself & also the brave Col. (James) Miller—
 
1821, Records of Units, Infantry, 1789-1815 20th Infantry Regiment, National Archives and Records 
Administration, Washington D.C., Entry 231. 
21 Taylor, The Internal Enemy. This also is a good example of the central paradox of American history 
argued by Edmund Morgan in American Slavery, American Freedom. Southern Republicans called for 
a war with Great Britain but were too busy subjugated chattel property. See Edmund Morgan, 
American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1975). 
22 Henry Stephens Randall. The Life of Thomas Jefferson. Vol. 3, (New York: Derby & Jackson, 1858), 
368. Gordon S Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (Cambridge: 
Oxford University Press, 2009).  
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you are all from the county of Hillsborough.”23 During Treat’s detainment, New 
Englanders like John McNeil, James Miller, and Henry Leavenworth distinguished 
themselves at the Battle of Bridgewater/Lundy’s Lane. Treat suffered and was injured 
in service but was denied the honor of leading troops in his regiment’s most 
consequential victory, missing out on the laurels that would have justified his daily 
frustrating experiences as a New England army officer in the War of 1812. 
 Order books are often incomplete working documents prone to omissions, but 
the records of Treat’s fellow company commanders help paint a clearer picture of 
what his Maine-based company endured. The order books of the 21st Infantry 
Regiment are extremely telling documents. Like most U.S. military order books, they 
did not start actively measuring present for duty data through morning reports until 
1814, but these practical documents reveal a great deal about the nature of the 
conflict. The number of illnesses is significantly higher than those of soldiers 
wounded in combat. Captains Lemuel Bradford, Morrill Marston, and Charles Proctor 
all had companies in the same regiment as Treat, and their records provide extensive 
data describing both the present for duty totals as well as the soldiers who were sick 
and absent. In their documents the sickness occurred after an action or battle, and 
after a period of low rations. In an aggregated list of one hundred and three deaths, 
seventy-four soldiers died of illnesses: nineteen “of fever,” sixteen “unknown,” two 
of “Consumption,” one of dysentery, and thirty-six unspecified (one of whom died in 
captivity), as well Private Stocy Thompson, who died of “insanity” on 5 October 
 
23 Letter from Benjamin Price to Major John McNeil from Hillsborough New Hampshire 11 August 
1814, Bentham-McNeil Family Papers, Library of Congress, 22. 
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1813.24 It is important to note briefly that Thompson’s death occurred in conjunction 
with most of the fever deaths, and the fatiguing illnesses were sometimes hard to 
separate from psychoses. The 21st Infantry fought at Queenston Heights, Chrysler’s 
Farm, Chippewa, Bridgewater, and the Siege at Fort Erie, yet lost twenty-nine 
soldiers to wounds.25 Twenty-nine in the bloodiest battle of the war was less than half 
of the number of soldiers lost to illness. As a regiment fielded from Queenston 
Heights to Fort Erie, the 21st Regiment’s battlefield deaths could have easily 
overtaken illness, making it especially tragic that men who had survived so much 
fighting died due to disease. For the duration of the conflict, the aggregate company 
records illustrate how the 21st Regiment lost the sum of a company’s strength to 
deaths and had roughly seventy-two percent of those deaths attributed to sickness. 
The aggregate regimental losses of seventy-four soldiers to illness matched the 
number of privates present for duty, which numbered in the mid-thirties for each 
company. Bradford’s company had the highest numbers of soldiers in the regiment, 
with sixty-one privates present for duty at their first engagement at Queenston; this 
was more significant than the sixty-two present for duty in the same company after 
 
24 Lemuel Bradford, Company Order Book for the Company of Lemuel Bradford 1812-1815, Record 
Group 98, Records of the United States Army Commands, 1784-1821, Records of Units, Infantry, 
1789-1815 21st Infantry Regiment, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C., 
Entry 233, Vol 1, 113-14; Morrill Marston, Company Order Book for the Company of Morrill Marston 
1813-1814, Record Group 98, Records of the United States Army Commands, 1784-1821, Records of 
Units, Infantry, 1789-1815 21st Infantry Regiment, National Archives and Records Administration, 
Washington D.C., Entry 237,59-60; Charles Proctor, Company Order Book for the Company of 
Charles Proctor 1813-1815, Record Group 98, Records of the United States Army Commands, 1784-
1821, Records of Units, Infantry, 1789-1815 21st Infantry Regiment, National Archives and Records 
Administration, Washington D.C., Entry 238, 58-60. 
25 Bradford, Company Order Book for the Company of Lemuel Bradford 1812-1815, Vol 1, 113-14. 
Marston, Company Order Book for the Company of Morrill Marston 1813-1814, Record Group 98, 
Records of the United States Army Commands, 1784-1821, 59-60, Proctor, Company Order Book for 
the Company of Charles Proctor 1813-1815.  
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the war ended in January 1815.26 The environment claimed far more lives than the 
British coalition of regulars, Canadian militias, and Native American warriors.  
 Sickness also influenced the present for duty numbers by placing men in 
hospitals. Charles Proctor, another commander from Captain Treat’s Regiment, had 
forty-one soldiers in hospitals during 1814, most of them in the fall when his present 
for duty numbers were in the twenties.27 Seventeen hospitalizations occurred after a 
period of low rations. Soldiers joined for battlefield heroics but instead suffered death 
and disability due to low rations and high rates of sickness.28 Lemuel Bradford 
recorded forty-eight soldiers in hospital, and though many of them occurred in 
October of 1814 when there were many documented cases of illness, there are no 
descriptions of why the soldiers were in the hospital.29 However, this corresponded 
with high rains that hindered logistics and led to low rations. Mosquito-carried 
illnesses debilitated soldiers, but soldiers were incapacitated after weather hindered 
logistics. Of the forty-one dead listed in Proctor’s book, only two were killed in 
action. The remaining thirty-nine deaths due to illness were far more extensive than 
his present for duty soldiers. Appropriately, Proctor’s book includes one of the most 
significant quotations regarding the nature of war experienced by men in the 21st 
Regiment. More than a year before Jacob Brown’s Command Major orders, he stated: 
“Our ranks must not be thinned in camp or Quarters the Gallant Soldiers must not 
 
26 Lemuel Bradford, Company Order Book for the Company of Lemuel Bradford 1812-1815, Vol 1, 
126-27. 
27 Proctor, Company Order Book for the Company of Charles Proctor 1813-1815, 90 (note that there 
are two pages numbered 90). 
28 Proctor, Company Order Book for the Company of Charles Proctor 1813-1815, 73-74, 90. 
29 Bradford, Company Order Book for the Company of Lemuel Bradford 1812-1815, Vol 1, 117-18. 
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perish ingloriously in filth & wretchedness.”30 No matter how the 21st Regiment 
demonstrated repeated gallantry on the battlefield, they suffered more from the harsh 
environment and lack of supplies. 
 Many soldiers incapacitated by illness were present with their companies, but 
unfit for duty. Of the previously listed causes of deaths, some have individual 
descriptions next to the soldiers’ muster data, stating that they died “on the march.” 
Charles Proctor recorded Privates John Lewis and Oliver Fletcher as having died “On 
the March” in an unknown location to describe two of his otherwise unspecified 
deaths.31 While some died, many soldiers were left at garrisons on the line of march. 
Lemuel Bradford listed Daniel Lane and Sylvester Ahord as both being left at 
Greenbush as one example of soldiers who could not march and were left at the safest 
possible location.32 The War of 1812 would bring the 21st Regiment many battlefield 
heroics, but that provided little solace to men left on the road to die or to be captured 
by the enemy. Joseph Treat’s company recorded twenty-five soldiers sick and present 
in July of 1814, nineteen of which occurred during the Battle of Bridgewater.33 Only 
forty-five were listed as present for duty before the battle, which was close to half of 
the company’s force.34 For example, Bradford had seventeen soldiers sick for much 
of September 1814 at Fort Erie, leaving him twenty-five to twenty-six privates 
 
30 Jacob Brown, General Orders, 23 January 1813, Company Order Book for the Company of Charles 
Proctor 1813-1815.There are no page numbers in the section of Proctor's order book that recorded 
general orders. 
31 Proctor, Company Order Book for the Company of Charles Proctor 1813-1815, 59-60. 
32 Bradford, Company Order Book for the Company of Lemuel Bradford 1812-1815, Vol II, 3,5. 
33  Joseph Treat, “Absences Explained” July 1814, Company Order Book for the Company of Captain 
Joseph Treat 1814-1815, Records of the United States Army Commands, 1784-1821, Records of Units, 
Infantry, 1789-1815 21st Infantry Regiment, National Archives and Records Administration, 
Washington D.C., Entry 239. 
34 Treat, “Monthly Report July 1814”, and “Muster Roll for July and August 1814,” Company Order 
Book for the Company of Captain Joseph Treat 1814-1815. 
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present for duty.35 Although the U.S. forces prevailed through highly successful 
attacks against the British powder magazine, Major Thomas Sidney Jesup – himself 
wounded with his arm in a sling – commanded the defense of the fort with the 
invalids and a small group of uninjured soldiers. The victory was achieved, under 
significant duress caused by high rates of sickness.36 The sick served actively in 
defense of fortifications. 
 The records of the 21st Infantry indicate that the regiment with the most 
battlefield experience lost most of its soldiers to poor health and low supplies.37 High 
turnover rates were the nature of the war fought by New Englanders and by the 
Mainers in Joseph Treat’s company. The data from the other companies are useful 
because they provide a significant period before Treat’s assumption of command in 
1814. Captain Treat was in the regiment before his order books because the 
regimental commander testified to his service under fire at Chrysler’s Farm.38 His 
previous commander, Lieutenant-Colonel T. Upham, testified to his service “as an 
attentive and vigilant officer” after witnessing Treat’s “gallant conduct at Chrysler’s 
Field.”39 Based on the dates of his order book and Upham’s character testimony, it is 
evident Treat had advanced in the ranks based on his service in the campaigns of 
1813. Moreover, his order book provides ample evidence that he was well-liked by 
his company. 
 
35  Bradford, Company Order Book for the Company of Lemuel Bradford 1812-1815, Vol I, 126-7. 
36 Jesup, “Memoir of the Campaign on the Niagara Spring 1814,” 15. 
37 The 21st Regiment was matched only by the 4th Infantry (which shifted to the 5th Infantry after losing 
its colors after the surrender of Detroit), and it is unfortunate that the 5th regiment has fewer records 
than the 21st Regiment.  
38 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Upham to Joseph Treat from Portsmouth New Hampshire, 25 
August 1815, in Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 60. 
39 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Upham to Joseph Treat from Portsmouth New Hampshire, 25 
August 1815, in Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 60. 
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An Exceptional Document  
 
Treat’s order book is among the most detailed among the War of 1812 
documents in the National Archives. His attentiveness to details relating to how many 
of his soldiers were present and how many absent because of sickness occur are 
unmatched in other documents.40 Most records also have one master muster roll for 
the entire company for the duration of the command, but Treat updated his book 
periodically with new waves of enlistments, transfers, and losses.41 It is fortunate for 
Maine history that the company in the regular army composed most significantly of 
men from Maine had the most meticulous officer, and it is even more fortunate for 
historians that Treat was subject to such a significant controversy.42 These nuanced 
differences may seem like small matters, but it meant that the information available 
from Treat’s company provided greater details about the lives of soldiers.   
 Company order books tend to be incredibly monotonous and practical sources. 
They primarily chronicle enlistment records, daily and monthly reports on soldiers 
present for duty, clothing records, and returns on provisions. They also include lists of 
deaths, soldiers absent at hospitals, and troops on furlough. It is challenging to 
determine the signal through the noise of all the data present in such working 
 
40 Treat, Company Order Book for the Company of Captain Joseph Treat 1814-1815, Vol I and II. 
41 Treat, Company Order Book for the Company of Captain Joseph Treat 1814-1815, Vol I and II. 
42 His meticulous and matter of fact document during a time of controversy and change during the War 
of 1812 bears resemblance to the journal of Martha Ballard. Maine is fortunate to have both documents 
to enrich our sense of life in the early American Republic. See Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, A Midwife's 
Tale: The Life of Martha Ballard, Based on Her Diary 1785-1812 (New York: Vintage Books, 1991). 
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documents. However, one section reveals a difference in Treat’s leadership 
philosophy. Three furloughs were unique when compared to the wider U.S. Army.  
 Of the three leaves that stand out, two involved Mainers. These records 
consist of two soldiers recovering from injuries and another permanently disabled and 
at home while drawing his pay for the duration of his enlistment due to a major 
wound. Corporal Othaniel Cross lost an arm and he receive his pay while Furloughed 
ay home in Portsmouth from 14 July 1814 to 13 June 1817. Cross’s pension records 
placed him in Massachusetts from 1843 to 1863.43 It was rare for enlisted soldiers to 
survive amputations, but officers typically experienced better outcomes. Othaniel 
received immediate support from his unit that continued to the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Normally soldiers in his position would be discharged with a 
recommended pension, but in Treat’s company Cross received his pay for the 
duration of his enlistment due to his sacrifice at York. Major General Jacob Brown 
approved the furlough. Treat also furloughed two other soldiers to Bangor. Joseph 
Kasey and Stephen Parmiten were both “unfit for duty” and allowed leave in Bangor 
and rejoined their company in June 1814.44 Both soldiers were unfit without reference 
to a wound, which universally meant illness, and both soldiers returned to duty after 
convalescing at home. Officers were typically allowed the privilege of convalescing 
at home, but U.S. court-martial records overflow with cases of soldiers charged with 
desertions because they sought care from their families after commanders denied 
 
43 Treat, Company Order Book for the Company of Captain Joseph Treat 1814-1815, Vol I, 61-2, 
Othaniel Cross, Ledgers of Payments, 1818-1872, to U.S. Pensioners Under Acts of 1818 Through 
1858 From Records of the Office of the Third Auditor of the Treasury, 1818-1872 (National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T718, 23 rolls); Records of the Accounting Officers of the Department of the 
Treasury, Record Group 217; National Archives, Washington, D.C. accessed from Ancestry.com. U.S. 
Pensioners, 1818-1872 [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc., 2007. 
44 Treat, Company Order Book for the Company of Captain Joseph Treat 1814-1815, Vol I, 61-62. 
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them furloughs.45 Close attention to data in two meticulous books reveals how 
exceptional Treat was compared with other American company commanders. The 
policy was astute, because units fighting in Upper Canada rarely had adequate 
medical stores and provisions. Transporting soldiers home to convalesce with their 
families and trusted caregivers thus freed up resources that were always in short 
supply. 
 Treat understood that soldiers healed better at home, and his soldiers stayed fit 
while he was in command. Having served while ill and lame after falling off a horse 
was a critical feature of Joseph Treat’s defense at his court-martial, as well as a 
source of his bitterness at not having shared in the glories of his regiment and 
company. He shared the day-to-day drudgery, inadequate rations, and illness, but was 
denied the laurels of battles at Bridgewater and Fort Erie. Even after being relieved at 
Chippewa, he carried a musket as a private until his Regimental commander gave him 
a platoon to command. Suffering on campaign created the most significant loss and 
had the most profound effect on the soldiers, but battlefield glory was what they 
sought to remember and record. Treat’s line of reasoning was that he had suffered the 
drudgery. He had marched into Upper Canada despite a doctor ruling that he was 
unfit for the march, and he deserved to command his company in battle. Battles were 
a terrible reward for serving in an environment that was even more horrible and 
 
45 Court Martial of Jonas Watherbee, William Sage, Markus Remmee, Nathan Stone, Case File A-17, 
and Court Martial of Jacob Coons, and James Hyatt, case File R-80, Court Martial Proceedings, 
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C. Two court proceeding representative 
examples were in Boston and Brooklyn Heights. One example of furloughs for “Benefit of Health” 
involved Lieutenant Claiborne B. Battes and Captain Eli B. Clemson (Oct 1810-May 19, 1811). See 
Eli B. Clemson, and John Symmes, Company order book For the Company of Capts. John Symmes 
and Eli B. Clemson 1812-1814, Records of the United States Army Commands, 1784-1821, Records 
of the United States Army Commands, 1784-1821, 1814-1815, Records of units, Infantry, 1789-1815 
1st Infantry Regiment, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C. 
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challenging than the enemy. Other accounts on both sides of the conflict illustrate 
how serving wounded or ill was a great honor.46 Officers, who more often 
convalesced at home with family on furloughs, were considered a class by themselves 
when serving ill, injured, or lame. 
 By all accounts, Captain Treat was lame and sick due to a fall from a horse, 
yet he chose to lead his company in its movement into Upper Canada. At Treat’s 
court-martial, Dr. Everett, the surgeon of the 21st Infantry, testified that in June Treat 
was “thrown from his horse.” According to Everett, Captain Treat was “bruised in 
several places, especially on his leg: I attended him, and recollect that he was very 
lame, and had a tumor on his leg, which unfitted him for duty.”47 Still, Treat chose to 
lead his men “against the advice of Dr. Allen and myself.”48 Treat’s tumor, which 
was most likely an infection, illustrated how injuries often turned into illnesses that 
incapacitated soldiers for extended periods.  
 What was unique about Treat’s lameness was how it affected Major General 
Jacob Brown’s criticism of him. An undetected force of light infantry attacked Treat’s 
command of the pickets around Brown's army.49 In the process of linking up pickets 
with the larger camp, Treat’s hodgepodge of troops came under fire.50 In a mixed unit 
 
46 Solomon Van Rensselaer, A Narrative of the Affair of Queenstown: In the War of 1812. (New York: 
Leavitt, Lord & Co: 183, 23, and 9 in Appendix. Letter from General Alexander Smythe to a 
committee of patriotic citizens of New York from a Camp Near Buffalo 3 December 1812, in John 
Brannam (ed.), Official Letters of Military, 104. These sources and events will be described more 
thoroughly later in the chapter.  
47 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett’s Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 45. 
48 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett’s Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 45. 
49 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett’s Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 19-20, 25, 30, 35, 38, 41. 
50 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett’s Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 19-20, 25, 30, 35, 38, 41. 
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made up principally of new recruits, many of his troops fled in fear. Treat tried to 
rally his soldiers who had returned to camp, recover the casualties, and pursue the 
enemy.51 However, Brown relieved Treat instantly for cowardice, but all the officers 
present testified to Treat coming into camp to allow an artillery battery attack the 
enemy.52 Captain Treat was calm and collected but lame and unimpressive looking. 
Brown relieved him for his actions while ill during a small-scale light infantry 
skirmish, thereby denying him the battlefield honors he sought despite his wounds 
and illness. 
 
Defense of Honor and Denied Glory 
 
 The testimony also clearly indicates that although Treat was decisive and calm 
under fire, due to his lameness he did not always look the part of an officer. Officers 
and non-commissioned officers supported Treat as being “cool and collected under 
fire,” with Corporals Gale and Barton, as well as Sergeant Holt, Captain Gilbert, and 
Major Biddle all testifying to his disciplined demeanor.53 No one offered testimony 
against him. The ugly skirmish that yielded no victor deprived him of his honor of 
leading men in the battles that would follow. Brown’s sacking of a cool-headed leader 
was an exceptional event on both sides of the conflict. 
 
51 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett’s Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 19-20, 25-27, 29-31, 35-6, 38, 41. 
52 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett’s Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 39 and 41. Letter from Major General Brown to Secretary of 
War John Armstrong from Chippewa Plains, July 7th 1814, In Brannan (ed.) Official Letters of the 
Military, 363. 
53 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett’s Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 21, 32, 37, 40, 42. 
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In most cases, officers who served under fire were singled out for praise in 
dispatches rather than censured and arrested. An excellent example of how the British 
valued officers serving while unfit comes in the description of Captain Jenkins, the 
commander of a company in the Glengarry light infantry. Captain Jenkins “Fixed 
Bayonets & pushed forward, but had not proceeded many paces when his left arm 
(which he had since lost) was smashed to pieces with a grape shot.”54 Afterwards his 
right arm was “severely lacerated by canister, but he still ran on cheering his men to 
attack till his arms dangling useless before him.”55 In the same letter, Lieutenant 
Colonel MacDonell provided comparable praise for Ensign Lowrie, who “had left his 
sick bed to join his company.”56  In a November 1812 naval battle, a Captain Jacob 
James commended a Lieutenant Claxton who was too ill to command his division, but 
who “remained upon the deck and showed by his composed manner” with resolution 
despite being ill. Claxton’s illness eventually cost him his life, but not his honor.57 
Officers were symbols more than fighters, and Captain Treat performed exactly as he 
should have to inspire his soldiers. Treat’s performance in a bad situation explains 
why he “volunteered and went with his company and carried his musket,” serving as 
a private in the following battle to maintain further the honorable conduct of leaving 
 
54 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel George MacDonnell to Harvey Prescott At Kingston February 25 th, 
1813, In Charles Henry Wood (ed.), Select British Documents of the War of 1812, Volume II (Toronto: 
Lake Champlain Society 1922), 22. 
55 Letter from MacDonnell to Prescott At Kingston February 25th, 1813 In Wood (ed.), Select British 
Documents of the War of 1812, 22. 
56 Letter from MacDonnell to Harvey Prescott At Kingston February 25th, 1813 In Wood (ed.), Select 
British Documents of the War of 1812, 23. 
57 Captain Jacob Jones to Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton from New York 24 November 1812, in 
Brannan (ed.) Official Letters of the Military, 93. 
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his sick bed to command his company.58 His service while ill also explains why his 
non-commissioned officers supported him during his court-martial.  
 The testimony of non-commissioned officers could never overturn the charges 
of a Major General in the regular army, so their testimony was less useful for Treat’s 
defense than that of officers. But their testimonies do offer insights into how soldiers 
perceived their commanders. From his regiment, Corporals Gale, Fellows, and 
Barton, as well as Sergeant Holt, all testified to the capability and character of their 
commander.59  The court-martial ended after the testimony of two officers, so their 
testimony solved little; nonetheless, it provides a rare glimpse into the point of view 
of Maine soldiers. Corporal Gale’s testimony was that the attack on the “piquets” 
(sic) was very disoriented, and they were not sure who was firing at them in “very tall 
grass.”60 Treat had to muster all his energy to rally the men and maneuver his platoon 
back to camp to prevent fratricide. Gale also observed that “a significant part of the 
guard were new recruits,” who cowered and fled to the nearest American position 
despite Treat’s orders.61 Constantly fighting with raw recruits was the nature of the 
conflict on a distant frontier, where the most experienced infantry regiment in the 
Niagara Campaign was crippled by illness and essentially became a force of 
unseasoned and inexperienced recruits. Still, Gales observed how Major General 
Brown expected Treat to maneuver his troops as on parade and “march his guard to 
 
58 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett's Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 44-45. 
59 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett's Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 21, 32, 37, 40, 42. 
60 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett's Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 20. 
61 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett's Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 20. 
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where he had been fired upon,” as if his movement to prevent fratricide in an irregular 
skirmish was cowardice in the face of the enemy rather than a textbook battlefield 
maneuver. By being present despite being lamed by an injury and sickness, Treat 
provided inspiration to his green troops. But that did not match Brown’s perception of 
the effective appearance of leadership.62  
 Perhaps the best example of Treat’s stellar leadership came after his arrest and 
removal. His experiences demonstrated that combat and campaign experience was 
problematic because sickness tended to deny experienced regiments the service of 
their veteran soldiers. In Joseph Treat’s company, illness caused more casualties than 
the Battle of Bridgewater. At a time when the company’s ranks swelled with twenty-
seven newly recruited privates, thirty-one soldiers would be fit for the maneuvers in 
Upper Canada.63 On the monthly report, forty soldiers were listed as sick or absent, 
twenty-nine of which were related to the Battle of Bridgewater.64 On 11 July the 
company, swelled by recruits, had seventy-nine privates present for duty; after the 
battle it had only forty-eight.65 By August, Captain Treat’s company was platoon-
 
62 The best example of Major General Brown’s classic military bias involves his favoring the 
leadership of Winfield Scott over James Miller. James Miller won more gold Medals than any other 
U.S. Army officer, yet Brown’s praise of him was always brief and muted, the key example being 
when it took nearly a month for Brown to recognize that Miller led the attack that freed the Northern 
Army from a siege at Fort Erie. Miller had unquestioned valor, but his reputation had been made in the 
Detroit and Ohio frontiers, and he was far less “spit and polished” than Scott. He looked less 
presentable and was often unfit due to illness, but there was no better office in a bayonet charge. See 
Letter from Major General Jacob Brown to James Monroe from Fort Erie 1 December 1814, Jacob 
Brown Papers, Library of Congress, 214. 
63 Treat, “Morning Reports July 1814,” “Company Order Book for the Company of Captain Joseph 
Treat 1814-1815, Vol II. 
64 Treat, “Monthly Return July 1814,” “Company Order Book for the Company of Captain Joseph 
Treat 1814-1815, Vol II.  
65 Treat, “Morning Reports July 1814,” “Company Order Book for the Company of Captain Joseph 
Treat 1814-1815, Vol II. 
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sized (less then forty), despite having ninety-eight soldiers on the roster.66 The 
company only lost four killed in action and eight to wounds received at the battle, yet 
the force lost half of its effectiveness due to illnesses.67 The 21st Infantry Regiment 
fought in nearly every battle of the war, but the men that could hold rifles were 
almost always recruits. By the time Brown relieved the company of a seasoned and 
respect officer, it had been badly crippled by sickness.  
 Treat, on the other hand, felt like his denial of leadership at Bridgewater was 
the forfeiture of the honor he gained through suffering the greater hardships of 
campaigning on a distant frontier. Jacob Brown’s detainment of Treat removed him 
from his regiment after two years of failed campaigns, and therefore deprived “him of 
all the scenes of glory which awaited his comrades in arms.”68 Treat had suffered the 
worst that illness, denial of supplies, and a harsh climate could throw at him, and he 
believed he deserved to have the opportunity to fight at Bridgewater and the siege of 
Fort Erie. As Treat stated, “I repeat sir, if after these multiplied privations, indignities, 
and wrongs.” He was most upset that he could not return to command his company; 
he firmly believed that he had earned a chance to lead in battle. 69 The day-to-day 
sufferings on the campaign entitled him to his regiment’s greatest honors, and the 
only privations he described were his denial of the same. 
 The irregular nature of the small skirmish preceding the battle of Chippewa 
also made Treat’s removal from command so upsetting. Skirmishing claimed as many 
 
66 Treat, “Morning Reports August 1814,” “Company Order Book for the Company of Captain Joseph 
Treat 1814-1815, Vol II. 
67 Treat, “Muster Roll for July and August 1814,” “Company Order Book for the Company of Captain 
Joseph Treat 1814-1815, Vol II. Eight soldiers were listed as killed in action, with only four linked to 
the Bridgewater campaign. 
68 Letter from Treat to President James Madison (undated) in Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 6. 
69 Letter from Treat to Madison, in Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 6. 
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lives from the company in July and August of 1814 as did the Battle of Bridgewater, 
and smaller actions represented a significant portion of those killed and wounded.70 
However, skirmishing was seldom described in detail in the reports of officers, and 
the points of view of soldiers were rarely recorded as it was at Treat’s court-martial. 
The non-commissioned officers that testified on Treat’s behalf described an 
unwinnable clash that created fratricide, and how Treat’s quick retreat prevented 
further unnecessary loss of life. Because of Brown’s firing of Treat, other officers 
also described the light infantry battle that occurred before the Battle of Chippewa. 
Thomas Sidney Jesup described how Major General Phineas Riall used light infantry 
and the support of Native Americans. On the Fourth of July, Jesup described how 
“Riall’s light troops were discovered in our neighborhood.”71 Riall would use his 
light force to support “a body of militia and indians (sic) in the woods.”72 The light 
infantry ambush occurred from concealed positions that made their approach nearly 
impossible to detect. This ugly and impossible skirmish negated Treat’s laudable 
service in previous battles and prevented his participation in his company and 
regiment’s greatest successes.  
 Corporals Gale, Fellows, and Barton, and Sergeant Holt all testified to the 
capability and character of their commander, but they also thoroughly described a 
pre-battle skirmish.73 Small-scale clashes were plentiful in the War of 1812. Corporal 
 
70 Treat, “Muster Roll for July and August 1814” “Company Order Book for the Company of Captain 
Joseph Treat 1814-1815, Vol II.  
71 Jesup, Memoir of the Campaign on the Niagara Spring 1814, page 186 in overall papers, and page 3 
of the memoir. 
72 Jesup, Memoir of the Campaign on the Niagara Spring 1814, page 187 in overall papers, and page 4 
of the memoir. 
73 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett’s Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 21, 32, 37, 40, 42. 
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Gale explained how Treat took control of a highly disorganized “picquet” (sic) in the 
dark of night with little help from the staff officer who ordered him there.74 Gale 
stated that “Treat asked the officer of the watch, Major Orne who gave him charge of 
the piquet to go with him and show him where to station it. He told Capt. Treat it was 
no use to go; he could find it as well as himself.”75 On the march to Chippewa Treat 
became more ill, his injuries more bothersome. He desperately needed a restful night, 
but the officer of the watch ignored his unfitness. Corporal Gale made it clear that 
“When capt. Treat was on the picquet, he complained and seemed very lame.”76 
Nonetheless, Treat struggled to accomplish his assignment, despite inadequate 
guidance and his infirmity. Gale described the general confusion: “It being dark, it 
was some time before captain Treat could find the sentinels of the picquet (sic). He 
placed his sentinels, but they would not reach to the other picquet (sic) which he had 
not found.”77 Treat stumbled in the darkness because the former officer in command 
of the watch performed an inadequate relief. Thus, it is no surprise that when Captain 
Treat’s force was fired on in the morning, it was impossible to determine whether 
friend or foe attacked him. A prompt court of inquiry would have acquitted him with 
enough alacrity for Treat to have served the remainder of the campaign, but he was 
denied that honor without cause. 
 
74 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett’ Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 19. 
75 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett’s Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 19. 
76 Proceedings of a General Court Martial Held at Sackett’s Harbor in held in the state of New York, in 
in Treat, The Vindication of Joseph Treat, 20-1. Corporal Fellows identified the officer of the watch as 
Major Orne from Brown’s staff on page 25. 
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 Corporal Gale further articulated that the skirmish was a great surprise that 
shocked the untrained recruits. When asked about the number of casualties, Gale 
stated that there were “three; one of which was accidentally by a bayonet in his leg.”78 
Gale was not the only soldier to testify to the utter confusion of the battle. He 
described the chaos as follows: “I thought as well as others, that it was the piquet 
firing on us.”79 All of the soldiers testified to tall grass concealing the enemy and 
being close to the larger fortification, and a link-up with friendly forces is one of the 
most difficult of maneuvers to achieve under fire.80 Being so close to the American 
position and a U.S. battery, it was clear to most of the soldiers that there was a 
significant risk of the fort mistaking them for the enemy. Many of the newer recruits 
fled directly to an artillery battery that was located close to the planned assembly 
point for the patrol, and according to Corporal Fellows, “upon that, captain Treat 
spoke out pretty loudly, to halt and form, several times.”81 In the chaos of concealed 
fire – during which it was impossible to determine whether it came from friend or foe 
– and being so close to a base, the unit broke in different directions in confusion. The 
wounded soldiers were left behind. However, this circumstantially chaotic skirmish 
occurred within in the direct view of Major General Jacob Brown, who discovered at 
the same time Captain Treat did that he had men left behind. Despite the regiment’s 
extensive combat experience, high rates of illness had left the company with 
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untrained soldiers who reacted poorly to the more difficult patrol tasks of asymmetric 
warfare. 
 Most of the war that Treat and his Maine Company experienced did not mirror 
the glories of a pitched battlefield. They died mostly of illness or ambushes, and in 
skirmishes that would never materialize into battle streamers on their regimental 
colors. Even battles like Bridgewater put more men on the sick list than were 
wounded or killed by wounds. Treat, having suffered illness and injury that made him 
officially unfit for duty, then survived an ugly, chaotic, and fratricidal skirmish. 
Everyone who testified at the court-marshal noted that Treat had remained cool and in 
command.82 The losses and sufferings of the War of 1812 were driven principally by 
material forces, including the environment, inadequate supplies, sickness, and 
irregular tactics, but the men’s combat motivations were still primarily those of 
ideology and a search for honor and glory. Treat and his company had suffered from 
the ugly realities of war, and therefore they deserved the battlefield glories that the 
regiment received in his absence. Treat’s service in the battle after his relief is 
emblematic of a leader who inspired his soldiers, but it also indicated a man who 
believed he deserved combat in pitched battles after suffering the privations of years 
of campaigning on a distant frontier. His regiment believed in him because, in Treat’s 
own words, he “Volunteered my services with a Musket; and on the movement of the 
regiment of the flank of the enemy, such was the confidence was placed in me by 
Major Vose, who was then the commanding officer of the regiment, that he required 
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me to lead a platoon.”83 The soldiers in his regiment understood what they suffered 
and how battlefield service was a major motivation, and would not let one contentious 
skirmish deny Treat service under fire. That changed when Major General Brown 
detained him. Treat’s soldiers persevered significantly better when he was in 
command because he was an officer who did all he could to influence their health in a 
positive fashion.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Most of the studies of illness and warfare in North American have focused on 
the southern regions and climates where the time periods for the transmission of 
malaria and yellow fever were longer, or on more well-documented cases of 
smallpox.84 This study of one company comprised of Maine-based soldiers illustrates 
how illness was a fundamental force in the campaigns in Canada during the War of 
1812. When soldiers from what would become Maine volunteered to serve in a 
northern climate, they were exposing themselves to a much worse environment for 
illness. The harsh winters in the north meant that the campaigns would occur in the 
spring, and in the marshy glacial till of Upper Canada and Niagara.85 Since the roads 
were muddy for most of the campaign, supplies by land were always unreliable – 
even when contracted quartermasters provided the services. Widespread sickness, 
mixed detachments that co-occupied garrisons, and the long winter meant that 
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soldiers of different towns and cities shared communicable diseases in cramped 
tents.86 The border region between the United States and what became Canada was an 
ideal environment for the spread of various illnesses that crippled soldiers and made it 
nearly impossible for regiments to retain experienced soldiers. 
 Still, officers prized and sought the glories only found on the battlefield. If 
anything, the privations, sickness, and exposure to a harsh climate solidified their 
motivation for battlefield exploits. The day-to-day experiences did not match their 
ideas of battlefield exaltation. A lack of support betrayed the soldiers of the Northern 
Army. When high casualties were reported, the description of the tragedy typically 
included language relating to how soldiers were lost to less noble means. They were 
denied battlefield glory by infirmity, or they survived great battles only to die of 
sickness. Combat motivation was rooted in an ideological drive towards honor, yet 
the biggest influences on each company’s active soldiers were material factors such 
as the environment, illness, and availability of supplies. The Northern Army felt 
betrayed because New England smugglers supplied their enemies while they 
starved.87 This generation of veterans became embittered because the harsh realities 
of the campaign prevented them from securing the glories of a complete triumph. 
 The men in Joseph Treat’s Maine Company were from the best possible place 
to secure soldiers for a campaign in the frontier between Upper Canada and the 
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United States. However, his company was an ever-changing entity with most of its 
veterans convalescing in the hospital and recruits filling the ranks. Treat’s company 
fought in the bloodiest battles of the war, yet its losses to illness far outweighed 
battlefield casualties. Losses to skirmishes that would never draw the collective 
acclaim soldiers sought were as common as deaths on the battlefield. War was not 
what they believed it would be, but instead of the harsh realities changing their 
perspective on war, they clung to a desire to fight great battles. Soldiers of that 
generation were not resentful that war did not meet their expectations; instead their 
bitterness arose from the fact that they were not supported in such a manner for them 
to be able to fight more battles. The early nineteenth century was the era of Napoleon, 
constant illness, and few supplies, and ignoble death did little to supplant to the 
glories of battlefield courage. A close look at one Maine-based company illustrates 
that war, as it was experienced, was close to the harsh fatiguing unreality of the 
twentieth century, but this did very little to change the minds of its fighters. The 
ideological bias by historical actors was significant. However, this should not 
influence the work of scholars, nor turn their attention away from the significance of 
material factors on the outcome of the war. The fact that New Englanders fought in 
the Northern Army is a vital factor that needs to enrich and perhaps complicate the 
historiography of the War of 1812, and a study at the company level reveals the 
harsher realities of day-to-day experience despite the penchant of most accounts to 
elevate more formal battles. It also illustrates that although the environment claimed 
more lives than battle wounds, the policies of officers and the resilience of motivated 
soldiers could significantly influence the fit for duty rosters that were central to unit 
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effectiveness at the company level. Like the experiences of Joseph Treat’s company 
in the 21st Infantry Regiment, an exploration of the Canadian-recruited 104th 
Regiment of Foot in the next chapter will offer important insights into the British 
Army’s success and failings during the War of 1812. 
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CHAPTER 5 
WASTED OPPORTUNITIES AND THE 104TH REGIMENT OF FOOT 
“Most of them have been brought up in the woods from infancy”1 
 
 The 104th Regiment of Foot, one of the most studied units of the War of 1812, 
was the only British regiment raised in North America. Like Joseph Treat’s company, 
much of the potential of the 104th was wasted by the institutional culture of its leaders. It 
benefits from the only national historiography that pays serious attention to the war. For 
the United States the war, save for one campaign, was embarrassing; for Great Britain, on 
the other hand, it was a sideshow in a broader conflict against Napoleon. The 41st 
Regiment of Foot was a regiment with far more significant service in combat, and yet its 
less ambitious war record illustrated critical problems with the British military. For much 
of the conflict, the 104th Regiment of Foot secured coastal garrisons, only to have its 
ranks replaced by invalids as the war progressed. Its arduous march into active 
campaigning is legendary, but it mirrored the experience of other regiments that moved 
into North America after fighting in Spain and the Mediterranean. The 41st Regiment of 
Foot, the most seasoned British infantry unit in the entire conflict, was forced to fight 
most of its key actions without adequate support. The largest units of British forces came 
in 1814 after daunting service in Spain and were employed at the same time as the 104th 
Regiment of Foot. In 1814 they served as separate detachments with various experience 
 
1 Letter from Major General Martin Hunter to T F Addison from Saint John New Brunswick 20 November 
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in light infantry duty until used as standard infantry at the siege of Fort Erie.  Due to their 
garrison role for two years, most of the service of the 104th was less auspicious. 
The 104th Regiment of Foot was formed from the New Brunswick Fencibles in 
1811. Fencible units were like militia, however they were employable in broader 
conflicts. While militia served in their province, Fencible units could be deployed more 
broadly. The formation of the regiment in 1811 occurred before hostilities with America. 
However, at the outset there was a rush to purchase newly available commissions. When 
drilled, the soldiers in the regiment performed excellently. Yet the officers that purchased 
commissions were typically unfit for any meaningful duty in the frontiers where the War 
of 1812 was fought. Minus some minor detachments sent to the fighting, the 104th 
remained garrisoning in the Maritime Provinces until 1814. In that year the bulk of the 
British Army came to North America following their victories against Napoleon in Spain 
and Portugal, and the 104th’s final employment comprised a small contingent of a larger 
group of reinforcement of the British Army in Upper Canada. The regiment performed 
well in light infantry petite guerre, flank company tactics, only after the U.S. Northern 
Army reforms led to consistent American victories in major battles. The 104th Regiment 
of Foot was relegated to a supporting role for most of the conflict, and only used in the 
latter stages of war when their impact and skill in North American warfare mattered the 
least. 
The hardy British North American fighters were like their American enemies, 
skilled at light infantry maneuvers and poor at parade-style grenadier tactics. Being 
seasoned to the climate of North American was as essential as combat. Veterans are often 
described as combat experienced and or seasoned, but in North America the difference 
 
183 
 
between those two attributes illustrate the wasted potential of the 104th Regiment of Foot. 
A veteran was experienced in the combat of campaigns and battles, while a seasoned 
soldier was fit for the environment. One might assume that the combat veterans were also 
seasoned, but not necessarily for the unique North American environment. The units 
coming from Europe had more experience in combat but were unprepared for the climate. 
The 104th was better adapted to the environment, and being a seasoned unit was more 
central to success in the War of 1812. The impressive endurance of the 104th Regiment of 
Foot in the closing campaigns of the War of 1812 illustrated how their service in 
grarrison for most of the conflict was a waste of resources. The best regiments to help 
understand the 104th Regiment were not other Brtish Regiments of Foot, but rather the 
foreign regiments composed of Swiss and Spanish soldiers. The majority of the records 
of the 104th illustrate the humble role it played for most of the war.  
 The 104th Regiment of Foot’s most extensive series of records predate their 
service in active combat. However, they provide insights into the composition of its 
forces. At its formation 104th Regiment of Foot was well soldiered but less than 
adequately commanded by long-serving officers who were unfit for an active campaign. 
A report on the Captains of the regiments recorded 1,000 soldiers, with officers who 
never even made it to their first parade. According to the regimental order book, some 
Captains were not fit mentally. One example follows: “Captain Christian is certainly 
deranged in his mind, and lame of one leg, he has not done any Duty since his 
appointment as Captain in 1803 except Recruiting and is not even fit for that Duty – 
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being incapable of keeping Accounts of his (word garbled).”2 Service did not break all of 
the officers mentally. Christian’s fellow officers, Captains George von Gereau and 
Captain Halles, were either sixty or nearly sixty years of age and had typical infirmities 
from long service.3 The leaders were overall old and worn out from long service, and 
Maritime Canada was the farthest region from the fight. Perhaps the only young captain 
never even made it to the Regiment: “Captain Dennis never joined, reported by the Agent 
of the Regiment in a very bad state of health, and not likely to join for a very long time.”4 
The soldiers of the Regiment, on the other hand, were probably the most capable British 
Force on the Continent for North American light infantry tactics. The Regiment was 
“drilled in the light infantry movements” and were “nearly perfect.”5 A war fought on the 
frontier of Upper Canada was particularly suited for the hardy backwoodsmen from the 
Maritime provinces. According to Major General Martin Hunter, “The men of the 104th 
in general are very good Marksmen, and most of them have been brought up in the woods 
from their infancy.”6 While the fight between the United States and the Shawnee 
Confederation was developing into the first campaign of the War of 1812, unfit officers 
led the best soldiers in the British regiment and they were relegated to garrison duty in 
the Maritime Provinces.   
 The Regiment’s records from before the more substantial British shift from war 
with Napoleon to war with America, are sparse and utilitarian. However, they are 
differentiated from other regimental histories because of their employment of 
 
2 Letter from Major General Martin Hunter to T F Addison from Saint John New Brunswick 20 November 
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3 Letter from Hunter to Addison, 26. 
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unconventional petite guerre tactics. Under constant strain and with heavy losses, most 
regiments fighting in the War of 1812 were promoting by ability and merit, albeit due to 
necessity because officers without purchased commissions struggled to stay in regiments 
after the war.7 The 104th Regiment of Foot’s order book in the spring of 1813 included 
minimal reference to conflict, but it spent a great deal of time describing the specifics of 
the rates that lieutenants Petit and Rose paid for their commissions. Because this related 
to a transfer from the 103rd to 104th regiment, the conflict or misunderstanding was 
thoroughly recorded. These two officers overpaid for their Lieutenant commissions into 
the 104th, and paymaster of the 103rd advocated and secured their remuneration.8 Other 
regiments were actively fighting and were losing officers at a rate that was unsustainable, 
yet squabbling officers that purchased commissions commanded the regiment with the 
 
7 Other regimental orders were promoting officers based on their performance in the War of 1812. The best 
example comes from the 103rd Regiment of Foot. After Captain Bowie was medically unfit for duty there is 
significant correspondence relating to selecting a replacement based on merit. Captain Logan Francis was 
initially promoted, but for an unspecified reason they sought another replacement. The 103th Regiment of 
Foot described the promotion of a Captain Gardiner based on his performance under fire as late as 1815. 
Lieutenant Charleston would have been the ideal promotion to Captain in the 103rd, but he was killed in 
action. See Letter from Lieutenant Colonel William Smelt to Adjutant Generals office 14 January 1814, 
and Letter from Smelt to Adjutant General from Quebec 1 April 1815, Regimental Order Book for 103 rd 
Regiment of Foot, PANB, 9, 19-20. For the Second Battalion of the Kings Regiment, meritoriously 
recommended commissions predated the start of the War of 1812, In February 1811, Captain William 
Compton resigned from his commission. He stated that “I have not demanded, or accepted, neither will I 
demand or accept, directly or indirectly at any time or in any manner whatever, any gratuity for the said 
commission.” Additionally, Major P. J. Robertson, the officer who took temporary command of Compton’s 
company, begged leave “to recommend Ensign Ross as an officer in every respect qualified to succeed to 
the vacancy.” See Letter from William Compton to George Prevost, Halifax 1 February 1811, Regimental 
Order Book for the Kings 8th Regiments, PANB, 7. Letter from P. J. Robertson to George Prevost, Halifax 
1 February 1811, Regimental Order Book for the Kings 8th Regiment, PANB, 8. During the height of the 
1812 fighting of the War of 1812, the 41st Regiment of Foot lost several of their junior lieutenants, so much 
so that they recommended promotion from the ranks. Their Sergeant’s Major Dennis Fitzgerald had served 
well enough to be granted a commission for service in North America. The 41st Foot struggled significantly 
with the loss of leaders and abandoned the traditional purchase system for demonstrated combat 
effectiveness. See Letter from George Porter to Military Secretary Noah Freer, Detroit 26 November 1812, 
Regimental Order Book for the 41st Regiment of Foot, PANB, 91; and Letter from George Prevost to 
George Procter, Horse Guards 16 March 1813, Regimental Order Book for the 41st Regiment of Foot, 
PANB, 94. 
8 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel William Scott to Robert Francis (103rd Regiment of Foot Paymaster), 20 
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best fighters for North American backwoods conflict. Because the 104th was commanded 
by unfit officers, it could only send small detachments to the active fighting in Upper 
Canada.  
 Although the bulk of the regiment was serving in coastal garrisons in 1812, two 
flank companies fought in the active summer season of 1813. Major Moodin served as 
the commander of the detachment for the first actions, in and around Fort George. The 
104th Regiment of Foot was formed from the New Brunswick Fencibles, which was a unit 
composed of volunteers capable of serving at the command of the British regular Army. 
In the early stages of the War of 1812, the 41st Regiment of Foot mostly fought alone, 
and it is ironic that as a Fencible or militia unit the soldiers of 104th could have supported 
the fighting. However, as a newly formed British regiment the bulk of the 104th remained 
in garrisons in the Maritime Provinces. The Fencibles followed a command structure that 
was much like American volunteer units. The United States Department of War, not state 
governors, commanded the volunteers. Similarly, the Fencibles were essentially militia 
units controlled by the British Army rather than provincial leaders. 
Major Moodin’s letters in the regimental order book contain no descriptions of 
named battles. He described his losses of soldiers to desertion and included memorials on 
behalf of wounded officers. His account testifies to their service in combat, that consisted 
of daily activities rather than a series of set-piece battles. Authors like John Grodzinski 
and Austin Squires have not focused on the formative years of the 104th Regiment of Foot 
that preceded their combat duty. However, the fact that the British regiment with the best 
soldiers for the North American environment was officered almost solely by invalids and 
given the lightest duty illustrates the problems the British faced in a broader conflict with 
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Napoleon. The 104th Regiment of Foot was not removed from its garrison duties until it 
was relieved by the 10th Royal Veterans Battalion, a unit that was officered principally by 
the leaders that previously led the 104th Regiment of Foot.  
 In its formative stage, the 104th was mostly led by aging men, many with over 
thirty years of service. The 41st Regiment of Foot served as the primary regiment in the 
conflict with soldiers recruited from Great Britain, and many soldiers with service in the 
West Indies carried the diseases that came with such service. The 41st slogged through 
every significant battle in 1812-13 and was reformed into a composite battalion through 
high rates of attrition, while some of the best backwoods fighters garrisoned the 
Maritimes.9 The 104th was relived of its garrison duties after there were enough soldiers 
to create veterans battalions composed solely of invalids. John Grodzinski has recently 
argued that historians have focused too much on the 104th Regiment of Foot’s arduous 
winter march to Upper Canada and have therefore ignored the regiment’s combat 
acumen. Grodzinski praised the 104th role in flanking maneuvers during the 1814 
campaign, based on an exemplary combat record. However, the fact that the regiment 
most skilled at light infantry at the outset of the war was left to garrison duty while 
another regiment suffered extreme losses illustrates a wasted opportunity and poor 
tactical leadership. The British Army wasted the talents of the 104th because of 
institutional insistence on purchased rather than earned commissioning; however, this 
would change as the conflict escalated. The 41st Regiment of Foot’s initial victories at 
 
9 Letter from Henry Procter to George Prevost from York, 20 October 1812 in, Regimental Order Book for 
41st Regiment of Foot, PANB, 86-90. In this letter the 41st Foot describes the multiple posts such as Fort 
Erie, and George as well as the unlisted troops at Detroit. The 41st Foot was significantly overused, while a 
Regiment that was capable at light infantry warfare guarded garrisons hundreds of miles from the active 
front. 
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Detroit and Queenston Heights was followed by more flawed performances in support of 
Shawnee and Potawatomi allies who excelled at light infantry tactics.10 The 104th was the 
most suitable for such duty, and the soldiers of the 41st suffered significantly without 
local fighters who spent their whole lives in the North American backwoods.  
 The officers who immediately commanded the 104th in 1811 would lead the same 
coastal outposts in the 10th Royal Veterans Battalion in 1814. The formation of a new 
regiment would not court the best officers, because it was unlikely that the 104th 
Regiment of Foot would remain in existence at the end of the Napoleonic War, and a 
group of invalid officers prevented the participation of soldiers who were most prepared 
for a North American style warfare. A letter on 14 June 1814 described how Captain 
George von Gereau, who served as garrison commander at Halifax, had “done duty for 
more than nine years with that regiment,” and his long service and ailments placed him in 
the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion.11 Captain George von Gereau’s memorial cataloged his 
ailments of long service; they also illustrated how the Regiment was manned initially by 
infirm officers who often continued to serve as leaders of the Maritime garrisons, only to 
later command fellow invalids. The 104th was therefore only able to send a full 
complement of soldiers until there were enough losses to illness, age, and injury to man 
the coastal garrisons.12 Veterans Battalions were a great idea, but they were used to delay 
the employment of an extremely capable light infantry force – the 104th Regiment of 
 
10 Sandy A. Antal, Wampum Denied: Procter's War of 1812. Carleton Library Series, 2nd ed. (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011). 
11 Captain George von Gereau to T F Addison from New North Barracks, Halifax 13 January 1814, 
Regimental Order Book 104th Regiment of Foot, Book II, PANB, 2. 
12 The garrisons themselves are vague in the records, there were clearly troops at centers like Fredericton, 
Halifax, and Charlottetown, but there is only one reference specifically describing the transition between 
Veterans and 104th Foot soldiers at Charlottetown.  
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Foot. Gereau, a German officer with service in Fencible regiments after he survived a 
wound in the American Revolution, appeared ideal for a new regiment. Gereau was 
highly experienced, even if he was not a prototypical British gentleman. However, after 
years of severe service he was only capable of garrison duties. The use of unfit officers to 
lead safe garrisons was wise, but it also kept the 104th out of the first years fighting. 
Long-serving officer like Gereau were excellent Veteran officers but kept the 104th 
Regiment of Foot in garrison when they could have done the most good in an active 
combat zone.  
 In the summer of 1813, the regiment sent individualized flank companies to the 
Niagara region. The detachment of flank companies served in the light infantry tasks, 
such as scouting, skirmishing in front of line units, and picket duties. In the indirect, 
isolated, and independent roles of flank companies, the early combat record noted the 
desertion of “fifteen men from the104th Regt.”13 Flank duty was a particularly arduous 
duty, so it is no surprise that the previously untested detachments sent to the Niagara 
region did not initially fare well. The summer of 1813 was a particularly harsh period 
regarding rates of sickness. The regiment had recently lost eighteen soldiers and only 
forty-seven percent of soldiers were present for duty. By August only nineteen percent of 
men were present for duty.14 The regimental record indicates a small number of casualties 
and losses as a result of continuous operations rather than grand actions. A letter from 
Kingston on 24 November 1813 described the need to promotes James McLaughlin to 
 
13 Letter from Major W Moodin to Lieutenant General George Prevost, from 12 Mile Creek 7 July 1813, 
104th Order Book, 56. 
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Ensign because Lieutenant Grave was killed in action at York.15 Like the majority of U.S. 
regiments drawn from New England, the Regiment sustained most of its losses because 
the fighting occurred during the inclement seasons in marshy Upper Canada, as well as 
slow attrition through small-scale skirmishes. McLaughlin’s elevation came because he 
was the son of Captain McLaughlin and the regiment was manned primarily by family 
groups, often with boys serving in the ranks with their fathers. 
 The 104th’s transitions from militia, to Fencibles, to British Regiment of Foot 
uncovered some unique characteristics – one of which was the extensive service of 
children. In February 1814, a return listed forty-four children serving in the Regiment in 
an active campaign at the fort at Three Rivers, and ten at Kingston.16 The ages ranged 
from ten to sixteen, but ten-year-olds were the largest contingent.17 At the age of ten, 
Antoine David already had six years and three months of service; he was three feet seven 
inches at his enlistment. Twenty-two ten-year-olds were listed in the regiment.18 Many 
were serving with family members, and the records listed one as a noncombatant clerk.19 
Geoffrey Worth fought in the 104th with two brothers; one died of wounds and the other 
served at the Kingston detachment. John Worth was fifteen years old and Geoffrey was 
twelve, and an unnamed brother that was killed in action illustrates that children regularly 
served in combat.20 The list itself indicates that there was a realization that the 104th 
Regiment of Foot had many soldiers that did not meet the British age requirement of 
 
15 Letter from Major Moodin to Lieutenant General George Prevost, from Kingston 24 November 1813, 
104th Order Book, 67. 
16 “A Return of the Ages, Size, & Length of Service of the Boys & Lads of the 104 th Regiment Stationed at 
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fifteen years of age.21 However, because serving in the Regiment was a local and family 
affair, British generals were “Satisfied that the 104th Regiment [was] authorized to enlist 
Boys at 10 years of age.”22 Fifty-four children serving in the Regiment was a larger 
contingent than most companies had in fit-for-duty soldiers; these child soldiers were 
ultimately accepted by British Commanders as a necessary. The fact that the 104th 
Regiment of Foot actively recruited ten-year-olds, only to serve in garrison duties for 
much of the conflict, illustrated a paradox. The British recognized the necessity of 
employing ten-year-olds in a locally formed regiment and made exceptions, yet they left 
the same regiment in garrison duties for most of the war.  
 Bringing all the males over the age of ten to combat in Upper Canada created 
significant family problems in New Brunswick. The regiment is famous for their rapid 
and grueling march from New Brunswick to Niagara, which was a supreme test of 
physical endurance. However, the rapid exit from the province created substantial 
difficulties for family members who were left behind. Major General Hunter wrote the 
Military secretary advocating for the families.  According to Hunter, “I felt so much for 
the distress of the women, and the families of the other soldiers’ wives belonging to the 
104th Regiment, who were left behind when the Corps marched to Canada that I deemed 
it my duty to represent their miserable situation.”23 In March 1814, with a massive 
 
21 Letter from Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston Secretary of War, to Major General Hunter 
from War office London 12 December 1814, in 104th Order Book, 78. 
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reinforcement of British Regiments following the successful Peninsular campaign in 
Spain, simply feeding the families the available rations was a monumental challenge. 
Therefore, the Major General requested “permission to go and join their husbands in 
Canada…in that case, I beg to know if I may order them rations and passage.”24 Soldiers 
in the 104th Regiment fought beside children and left families destitute because of their 
rapid movement to Upper Canada. The high rates of desertion are easier to understand in 
relation to wives who could not provide for children. Frustration among the troops, 
caused by being employed late in the conflict without warning, was widespread. The 
deployment of the 104th with the largest contingent of British forces in 1814 meant that 
providing rations to families was not a priority. 
Child Soldiers and families left destitute were probably exceptional cases specific 
to the 104th Regiment of Foot in British North America. However, the necessity of 
fighting with twenty-two ten-year-olds was emblematic of the desperate nature of the 
fighting in North America. The marshy glacial till of Upper Canada took a severe toll on 
the health of soldiers. On 14 May Lieutenant Shaffalisky was medically discharged as 
“unfit for military duty…it is understood that he is not to be replaced.”25 The 104th also 
lost the active service of Lieutenant C. D. Rankin to parental duties, following the death 
of his wife. Rankin simultaneously required a promotion to cover the loss of income 
generated by his wife.26 Deceased loved ones at home could often take British officers 
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out of the theatre, and even out of North America. As with American units in 1812 and 
the Revolution, the adequate clothing of soldiers was a challenge. MacKinnon stated that 
“the men had one year’s clothing due, but that he heard they would be very badly off 
before the next year comes…the detachment had hardly a coat to wear.”27 Poor clothing 
exposed soldiers to cold and made them more susceptible to insect-borne fevers, but also 
added to the mental burden of being exposed to the harsh environment. MacKinnon 
sought “out the method in which I was to proceed to furnish the men with a covering as 
the weather was extremely severe.”28 Exposure to extreme weather without proper 
clothing would destroy the regiment’s ability to fight. According to MacKinnon, “I shall 
be happy if you have the goodness to direct the steps I am to follow to prevent the detacht 
being totally unfit for service.”29 Like the opposing American units, the 104th suffered 
from a poor supply of uniforms. Unfortunately, British leaders squandered one of its best 
regiments for two years, and when the 104th was finally deployed in force, poor supplies 
caused a dramatic loss of soldiers due to preventable illnesses.  
 As the conflict escalated, the 104th Regiment of Foot served in conventional 
military operations. In a rare incident in British accounts, the acting regimental Major R. 
Leonard singled out a non-commissioned officer for praise in leadership despite his 
injuries. In a letter that recommended Sergeant Richard Smith for an officer’s 
commission, Leonard stated that Smith was wounded five times yet did not succumb to 
his wounds in the face of the enemy. Leonard noted: “I have only to add that he received 
five wounds, three of which, he got in coming off, after the attack that completely failed, 
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so determined was he not to fall into the hands of the enemy.”30 Smith escaped captivity 
with three wounds. Major General Drummond testified to Smith’s intrepid service and 
verbally communicated the need to reward valor with promotion to officer rank. When 
used as line infantry soldiers the 104th Regiment of Foot performed well, but Fort Erie 
was the last battle of the war in the Northern theatre. The Regiment’s record in combat 
was impressive, but unlike New England regiments in the U.S. Army, the Maritime-based 
104th was underemployed. To be uniquely capable of operating in the North American 
frontier, yet sidelined for much of the conflict, was demoralizing for the regiment. Their 
meritorious combat record late in the war speaks to their resolve.  
Smith’s injuries would make it impossible for him to serve actively in the 104th, 
yet he did meet the requirements in the Veterans Battalion, due to “loss he has sustained 
by his determination and gallantry.”31 Smith was a perfect soldier for a Veterans 
Battalion because of his exemplary service in the ranks. Additionally, his gallantry 
caused his disabilities. Like other boys in the regiment, he joined the “New Brunswick 
Regt in June 1805 at the age of fourteen.”32 At the start of the war, Smith was a sergeant 
and was the colors sergeant during the 104th service in Upper Canada. His major actions 
occurred at Sackett’s Harbor and Fort Erie, but serving in the “right division” under 
Gordon Drummond meant that he would have been present for multiple smaller repeted 
skirmishes.33 Smith was wounded three times at Fort Erie, and one caused the 
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“amputation of his right arm.”34 The Veterans Battalion eventually replaced the 104th 
Regiment of Foot, and it was composed of invalids. A unit of disabled soldiers took over 
the garrison role in the Maritimes. Smith’s petition for a pension provided some of the 
best evidence for the 104th Foot’s misuse for most of the War of 1812; after five combat 
wounds and an amputation, Smith sought a transfer into a Veterans Battalion and a return 
to garrison duties. Smith could perform the tasks he did in the 104th for two years while 
being significantly disabled. The War 1812 was a conflict when the British Army needed 
to use their gallant amputees, yet military leadership kept a fit and capable light infantry 
garrisoned an area hundreds of miles away from the fight.  
During the height of the fighting season in the summer of 1814, the bulk of the 
104th remained in garrison until relieved by invalids. Edward Baynes ordered the 
regiment’s main body into the fight late in the conflict, along with reinforcements from 
the Spanish Campaign of the Napoleonic Wars. According to Baynes, “two Companies of 
the 10th R.V.B. (Royal Veteran Battalion) for the purpose of relieving the 104th Regt. at 
Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton.”35 For most of the conflict, the second battalion 
of the 8th Regiment of Foot and the 41st Regiment of Foot – supplemented by militia units 
– fought the bulk of the actions. Most of the 1812 reinforcements were veterans of the 
Peninsular Campaign’s asymmetric fighting. However, despite their experience, they did 
not have a stellar record in the northern theatre of the conflict. The 1814 reinforcements 
were so large that they included two Swiss Regiments. The highly expeirenced Swiss 
regiments in the British Army recorded losses at the battles of Plattsburgh, Chippewa, 
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Lundy’s Lane, and the Siege of Fort Erie. The environmental effects of the frontier 
limited to their ability to support larger contingents, but unlike the U.S. Army, the British 
excelled at logistics. However, veterans of warfare in Spain and the Mediterranean 
brought both experience and large numbers of invalids. Adjutants filled their records with 
officers who sailed to North America hoping to be fit for duty, only to be unable to serve 
actively. The British Army employed the 104th in 1814, when the British Army was at its 
largest, after two years of being outnumbered significantly. Arthur Wellesley’s army 
embraced the use of terrain and light infantry tactics, so the British had an example of 
those dynamics that predated the charge of the light brigade.36 But at the time a regiment 
formed on the periphery of the British empire was not taken as seriously as other military 
units, and its capability and fortitude in the North American climate and courage under 
fire was underappreciated by commanders.  
The administrative processing of soldiers who were unfit for duty based on the 
previous service in Europe and the Mediterranean dominated the regimental records of 
units that arrived in British North America in 1814. The 103rd Regiment of Foot listed 
one soldier and one officer unfit based on their previous service. Private Charles Dimond 
suffered a debilitating rupture, which could run the gamut of ailments from an untreated 
and unhealed wound to an infection called cellulitis, which is common today in elite 
military units. Punishing labor, poor cleanliness, and calorie depletion make it a condition 
common among Ranger soldiers, but these conditions were universal in early modern 
conflict. The old soldier was no longer capable of contributing. In his memorial Charles 
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Dimond said, “Your petitioner is on the verge of 50 years of age & from his rupture, 
which daily gets worse often confining him to bed for days together, he considers himself 
a burden on the service.”37 When Dimond moved to a Veterans battalion, his rupture 
improved and only precluded all service to something, “which occasionally prevents his 
doing duty.”38 The full articulation of Dimond’s condition was rare, but ruptures in long-
serving soldiers occurred often, and the war’s low rations and poor sanitary conditions 
meant that soldiers had infections so severe that they caused open festering wounds. An 
aggressive regimen of antibiotics would be used to treat those kinds of wounds today. 
The 103rd Regiment of Foot struggled to retain and replace officers while carrying 
convalescents. Captain Bowie was “ordered lame” and “from the very weak state of his 
intellects, and the incapacity to fulfill ever the duties of his situation as Captn in the Regt 
.”39 Bowie was given orders at half pay in 1815 after the conflict was over and two 
capable officers commanded his company. Major William Smelt noted the following: 
“Captn  Gardiner who from having received five severe wounds on the mourning of the 
15th of Augt  1814.”40 Furthermore, he observed that “Lieutenant Charleston would be 
the best replacement” but “was unfortunately killed on the mourning of 15 Augt  1814.”41 
This brief exploration of the sister 103rd Regiment of Foot illustrates how the 
employment of the 104th Regiment of Foot, regardless of its lack of formal combat 
experience as a British regiment, was badly needed. It might well have outperformed 
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other regiments, yet it was consigned to a marginalized role. The best comparative 
regiments were therefore not the standard British Regiments. Instead, the regiments 
composed of foreigners offer the best comparative lens. 
Two units that fought in the 1814 campaign alongside the 104th Regiment of Foot 
were Swiss regiments that were commissioned as supplements to the British Army. Many 
of the soldiers in the Swiss regiments were recruited in Switzerland, but guerillas serving 
beside Arthur Wellesley’s command in Spain replenished their ranks. The Swiss 
Regiments, like the 104th, consisted of marginalized soldiers that were denied the best 
duties and honors. Its officera were often transferred to Regiments that remained active 
after the war. The Regiments of de Meuron and de Watteville served in garrison roles in 
the Mediterranean and at Gibraltar, much like the 104th Regiment of Foot’s duty in the 
Maritime provinces. Like other 1814 reinforcement regiments, and unlike the 104th, the 
veterans of European conflict brought soldiers unfit for combat. Lieutenant Casper 
Brewer in de Meuron’s Regiment was deemed unfit for service before going to North 
America, but he decided to travel in the hopes of recovering. He was never of any use to 
his regiment, and despite four years of wartime service, Brewer was deemed by 
Lieutenant de Meuron Boyan as “totally useless to it (his regiment), on account of ill 
health, and also in my opinion by want of sufficient zeal and acting for the good of the 
Regiment.”42 Rather than praising his character for shipping out to an active war zone, 
British officers questioned Brewer’s fortitude because he remained unfit for duty.43 
Brewer, like many of the foreign soldiers in the Swiss regiments, later settled in 
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Drummondville, Upper Canada. These German, French, and Spanish soldiers struggled 
as foreigners in Upper Canada. When the British paid the Swiss with “Spanish Pillar 
Dollars that are distinguished from Spanish Dollars by not having pillars stamped on 
them, and consequently are refused the same value,” the foreignness of the Swiss 
Regiments was solidified.44 The British cynically offloaded worthless script left over 
from Spanish Peninsular campaign to pay the multicultural soldiers of the Swiss 
Regiments, as if it was an acceptable currency on the distant Upper Canadian frontier.  
The Regiment de Watteville was a similar force composed of Swiss soldiers, and 
their records are far more extensive than those found in De Meuron’s order books. Major 
General Louis Watteville described how his subordinate struggled to keep men in the 
ranks. Lieutenant Colonel Fisher was distressed by the situation “under which he [found] 
himself placed.”45 Without much action in the conflict in North America, sickness 
crippled this veteran Swiss regiment. His distress was caused by “the reminiscing of sick 
men, as many will become entitled to their discharge for having complete their period of 
service.”46 The tougher service on the remote frontier caused contention, and like the men 
in De Meuron’s force, the British did not treat them as equals. Local non-regular 
Fencibles were offered larger enlistment bonuses for shorter service. The British denied 
Swiss soldiers’ entrance into traditional British regiments because they were 
“Foreigners.”47 Their duties, like those of the 104th, would be light infantry assaults on 
Oswego and defense of small outposts. Moreover, the Regiment de Watteville’s postwar 
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records indicate that officers, infirm from wounds, struggled to receive just 
compensation.  
The Regiment de Watteville functioned like the 104th before 1814. Lieutenant 
Everett commanded a detachment of de Watteville’s force while he retained a 
commission in the 10th Veterans Battalion.48 Like Fisher, he described the problem of 
retention because the soldiers in the regiment went unpaid. The use of an invalid officer 
illustrates how the Regiment was also shifting its invalids into garrisons that faced little 
threat. The 104th guarded the Maritimes until replaced by invalids of the 10th Veterans 
Battalion. The regiment later saw service primarily in flank company duties and other 
light infantry tasks, such as attaching blockhouses and supply depots. Likewise, the 
Regiment de Watteville would suffer most of its losses while attacking Oswego. That raid 
that occurred in support of the siege of Fort Erie, and, like the 104th Regiment, De 
Watteville’s Regiment served as light infantry supplements to the British Army.  
Light infantry tactics were what decided the outcomes of 1814, yet they did not 
bring the same accolades and advancement. Ensign J. Harmon requested promotion 
because he took command of a more significant force as a result of the death of an officer 
in “which your Memorialist was employed.”49 Captain “Ledingingtoningo… received a 
wound from a Musket Ball” and lost his finger.50 Injuries illustrated the irregular nature 
of the fighting on both sides. Captain “meholer Mittelholzer” also “received two Wounds on 
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by a Buck Shot in his left Arm, the other by Musket ball” in his “left side.”51 It is also 
important to note that Mittelholzer’s injury was made worse by the environment. In his 
memorial Mittelholzer states that “he occasionally feels the effects of the latter Wound, 
particularly in Change of Weather.”52  Buckshot was typically used in irregular warfare, 
and Mittelholzer’s injuries illustrate how soldiers in marginal units typically fought in 
petite guerre roles. Still the effects the environment influenced the wounds, and the battle 
for calories was waged against nature and the enemy. The officers of De Watteville’s 
Regiment served an army that could not even understand (and perhaps pronounce) their 
names. Yet De Watteville’s soldiers fought and were wounded, and their memorials of 
disability were hastily compressed in one form that failed to secure adequate pensions. 
The British Army needed the service of regiments that they felt were marginal, but that 
did not mean that those regiments enjoyed the same privileges and accolades.  
John Grodzinski recent regimental history of the 104th Regiment of Foot argued 
that the march on snowshoes had had too much attention in the record, at the expense of 
the Regiment’s combat record.53 He demonstrated that they performed well in non-linear 
light infantry fighting, such as raids on small logistical posts and flank companies. 
However, the long march on snowshoes is the best illustration of the 104th Regiment of 
Foot’s fitness for the light infantry fight. Drummond’s adjutant wrote a letter criticizing 
the use of the bayonet in such a densely wooded and rugged frontier.54 British leaders 
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recognized the unique nature of the region of North America, yet they resigned their only 
North American-raised regiment to a supporting role.   
If success occurred primarily due to the consistent success of crack regulars in 
battle, then it would be appropriate to dismiss the famous march of the 104th. Yet keeping 
soldiers healthy during the 1814 campaign season was the most significant challenge. 
Battlefield victory gained little save for accolades to the victors. The grueling winter 
march placed the 104th in excellent company. Adam Walker from the U.S. 4th Infantry 
Regiment described the journey from New England to northern Ohio as the hardest 
aspect of his regiment’s service, and the unit’s order book is full of the names of soldiers 
who fell out.55 John Rabdy is the best example because he was left on the road, destitute 
without food or money, only to be court-martialed in New York after a harrowing 
journey to earn enough money to eat and travel home.56 Governor Isaac Shelby, still a 
combatant in his sixties, led Kentucky militia troops; he was complimented by Major 
General William Henry Harrison for keeping up with the cavalry.57 The 4th Infantry 
Regiment and Kentucky militia, under Thomas Shelby, were amongst the best light 
infantry backwoods fighters in the world, and the 104th Regiment of Foot’s march on 
snowshoes placed them in the same fraternity.58 Moreover, the 104th Foot shared the 
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characteristics of light frontier fighters as well as the formidable discipline of British 
regulars. The 104th was in many ways superior to comparable U.S. infantry regiments in 
its general fitness and ability to withstand the punishing environment of North America’s 
interior.  
George Ramsay’s account of the march from New Brunswick combines the 
descriptive language of nature with data that notes the daily distance traveled. Ramsay’s 
description illustrates how difficult it was to supply the larger British Army. As the 
previous chapter on “The War for Calories” demonstrated, supplying the British Army in 
the frontier border region was extremely difficult. Ramsay’s account meticulously listed 
each day that supply wagons could not follow the light troops on their march. The 104th 
was rapidly demonstrating that as a light force they could operate without the support of 
supply animals. The 104th Regiment of Foot marched 353 miles to the conflict, and then 
walked 283 miles on its return home in 1815.59 Their movement over harsh terrain in the 
winter would have crippled most regiments. Most losses in the War of 1812 were not 
incurred in battle; they were caused by exposure to a harsh environment. The 104th Foot’s 
ability to function after its exhausting march illustrated its fitness for conflict in the 
Upper Canadian frontier border region, even after years of sitting in garrison.  
Ramsay’s account is more than an eloquent description of human endurance; it is 
one of the best descriptions of the gritty challenges of the conflict. Like other regimental 
records it was a day-to-day description of events, and like most accounts, the more 
significant problems involved the struggle of human bodies versus nature. Again, it is 
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hard to find an account of the War of 1812 that described the horrors of combat in 
anything but matter of fact tones. Yet Ramsay used emotional language to describe his 
unit’s route. For example, he noted “A wretched road at all time” that was narrow and 
“just passable for a horse and in many places that is difficult.”60 Occasionally the 104th 
marched through a settled area “cleared of the timber,” but life in the Maritimes prepared 
the men of the 104th for the harsh, unsettled terrain of the Niagara region. The 
parsimonious landscape is a persistent theme in Canadian geographical history, and the 
most common experience for soldiers on both sides was the daily struggle in an austere 
environment. Sir Arthur Wellington gained notoriety leading British troops in the 
wilderness region of India, but he did so with unlimited sources of labor.61 Backwoods 
Canadians, like their American counterparts, were more capable of fighting in remote 
areas away from supply wagons. The 104th Regiment of Foot’s long winter march gained 
notoriety; it is one of the few episodes in the war’s story where historians celebrate the 
day-to-day struggles of soldiers.  
The 104th’s rate of march was impressive but it was also a vital indication of their 
fitness to operate in an unforgiving land. When on good roads, the 104th marched 
upwards of thirty miles a day. The regiment made their most extended movement from 
Petite River to Cheston, logging forty-one miles. They were able to make formidable 
progress because the “the road for this distance is by far better.”62 In a previous stretch, 
they covered twenty-six miles because of a good route. The route was “good [for] all but 
two miles” until “Mack’s Mill to Petite River” where it was “bad all but two miles.”63 
 
60 “Memoir of George Ramsay,” 2. 
61 Jac Weller, Wellington in India (London: Longman, 1972). 
62 “Memoir of George Ramsay,” 3. 
63 “Memoir of George Ramsay,” 3. 
 
205 
 
The regiment covered major distances in all but the worst conditions, which were most 
legs of the march. From Port Mouton to Liverpool the 104th covered only twelve miles. 
Ramsay stated that “this is an open country and about half the road is very fair / the 
remainder very bad not / very (sic) hilly.”64 The open, unsettled country had poor roads 
that men could only use at a rate that slowed their pace significantly. Moreover, it often 
prohibited the movement of supplies via wagons. Light infantry was a category 
determined by a supply system that used pack horses, rather than wagons, and required 
heavier loads for soldiers. The 104th proved it could march in a land with bad roads harsh 
terrain. The most challenging feature of the war was operating in the wilderness, and the 
winter march of the 104th demonstrated their skill in petite guerre wilderness warfare.  
The most significant historiographical influence of Ramsay’s short descriptive 
account of day-to-day marches from Fredericton to Quebec relates to the Canadian 
environment. The history of the War of 1812, studied more broadly, supports the critical 
theories of Canadian environmental history. Parsimony, staples theory, and the slow 
transition from rural first nature to settled second nature are significant themes in 
Canadian environmental history that Ramsay’s account serves to confirm.65 His 
manuscript’s description of the march route testifies to the viability of theories that are 
predicated on the unsparing Canadian environment. This dissertation connects emphasis 
on daily environmental management in military history to geographical realities. 
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Supplying troops in the wilderness regions of North America was one of the most 
significant challenges from the colonial period until the American Civil War. The 
struggles of commanders and soldiers in 1812 mirrored events described in David 
Preston’s latest book. Preston recontextualized Major General Edward Braddock’s defeat 
at Monongahela as a result of the critical challenges of wilderness isolation.66 Lisa Brady 
illuminated the manner in which Union officers such as  Ulysses S. Grant and William 
Sherman used scorched earth tactics to turn portions of the South into a wilderness.67 
Kathryn Meier explored the idea that militia and volunteer soldiers were more apt to 
survive in the Shenandoah wilderness during the Civil War, primarily because they could 
return home when sick and practice self and family care.68 Likewise, the 104th’s 
performance illustrates the ability of a local unit to operate in the wilderness because of 
its soldiers’ lifetime spent in pre-settlement “first nature.”69 The frontier environment 
presented one of the most significant challenges of the War of 1812. Surviving nature 
was the only way to even set foot onto a battlefield. Remarkably, the environment has yet 
to play a central role in historical interpretations of the war.   
Conclusion 
 As was the case with American units, the 104th Regiment of Foot’s most 
significant challenges came from the environment. For most of the conflict, one of the 
British units most capable of enduring the frontier guarded the unthreatened Maritime 
 
66 David L. Preston, Braddock’s Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
67 Lisa M. Brady, War Upon the Land: Military Strategy and the Transformation of Southern Landscapes 
During the American Civil War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012). 
68 Kathryn Shively Meier, Nature’s Civil War: Common Soldiers and the Environment in 1862 Virginia 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 
69 William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature.” Environmental 
History 1, no. 1 (1996): 7-28. 
 
207 
 
region. The 104th Regiment of Foot’s proven endurance of the harsh North American 
environment set them apart. Its fitness for the environment might have made it one of the 
most storied units in the conflict, yet the 104th played a relatively small role in the 
conflict. When it became militarily active in the final year of the war, it was employed as 
one regiment in a sea of reinforcements that came to North America after the war against 
Napoleon shifted in the British favor. 
 British military commanders often adapted to the harsh environment far more 
astutely then their American counterparts. However, the British Army was still a rigid 
military hierarchy that held a unit of provincials in lower esteem than other regiments. 
Wellington may have been pioneering light infantry tactics and the use of rifles in 
Europe, but a provincial unit expert at light infantry was still not the same as more 
traditional British Regiments. Its provincial status made the soldiers of the 104th 
extremely capable, but it was also the factor that kept them in garrison for much of the 
conflict. Their daunting march to Upper Canada and military performance in 1814 were 
impressive, but they occurred long after the regiment could have made a significant 
impact on the war’s outcome.  
 Moreover, like American frontier units, the 104th Regiment of Foot was composed 
of human beings with weaknesses and frailty. The endurance they showed on the march 
could not fully inoculate the regiment from common ailments; nor could it overcome the 
persistent paucity of supplies in a distant frontier. When they were employed in the 1814 
campaign against the better prepared U.S. Army, the unit lost most of their forces from 
sickness. Their combat record was quite good, and they were the most capable of serving 
in the less heralded light infantry attacks on U.S. lines of supply and communication. The 
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104th kept the only tactically proficient U.S. force on the battlefield away from the supply 
lines. Their service underpinned victories at Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and Fort Erie. Had 
the 104th Regiment of Foot been used earlier in the conflict when the tribal alliances with 
the British were stronger, the war’s outcome might well have been different. 
The 104th’s decline in health was much like the best frontier units on the 
American side. Their success in 1814 overshadowed their human weaknesses, and the 
failure of British commanders to grasp their unique fitness for frontier conflict is perhaps 
one of the most significant blunders in the War of 1812. That is why the Swiss regiments 
offer the best comparison. The Swiss troops – like the 104th – were necessary, but 
commanders relegated them to a secondary role in the shadow of established British 
regiments. Moreover, they were employed late in the conflict and never earned the 
respect they deserved. In many ways, the 104th was more like the U.S. 4th or 21st Infantry 
Regiments. Both have been singled out because they were recruited in nearby New 
England. The 104th and New England-raised regiments excelled at light infantry tactics. 
Although the 21st struggled under poor commanders for two years, it enjoyed major 
military successes in 1814. Similarly, the 4th Infantry Regiment compiled victories in 
every major engagement until William Hull ordered its surrender. Their record further 
illustrates what a tactical waste it was to keep the 104th Regiment of Foot in garrison so 
long. The 104th Regiment of Foot illustrates the profound connections between the War 
of 1812 and North America’s environment. The War of 1812 is best understood by a 
human portrayal of its combatants, because keeping soldiers healthy and in the ranks 
profoundly shaped its outcome.  
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CHAPTER 6 
SICKNESS AND OPERATIONAL MILITARY HISTORY: 
A HUMAN-CENTRIC CONCLUSION 
 
It is widely known, almost to the point of a cliché, that sickness and disease are 
the highest known causes of death in early modern armies. However, there is little 
explicit work on the management of soldier health, especially from an operational 
perspective. The northern theater of the War of 1812 illustrates just how significant 
illness was to the outcome of the conflict. Moreover, the soldiers and officers were not 
passive actors subject to the accident of illness.1 Officers and soldiers did much to 
overcome the environmental disadvantages of the Upper Canadian frontier. The sheer 
belief that they had control over their health meant that soldiers and officers who were 
proactive were more likely to overcome the challenges of illness on a distant frontier. 
Health research should not solely be understood as medical history; it was also a critical 
aspect of operational military history. War of 1812 commanders who adapted to the 
challenges of a harsh frontier environment became the leaders that won the most battles, 
largely because they kept more soldiers on their fit for duty rosters. Military 
 
1 The two key works that offer deterministic explanations for the accidental nature of European colonial 
expansion are Alfred Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), and Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies 
(New York: Norton, 2017). Given the obvious influence of humans on their physical environment, related 
to our understanding of climate change, more recent environmental histories have stressed human impact 
on sickness. Elizabeth Fenn’s work on smallpox describes human use of the disease in the colonial warfare 
and the American Revolution, and John McNeill argues that yellow fever was a cultural artifact of the slave 
trade. See Elizabeth Fenn, Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-82 (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2001), and John McNeill, Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620 - 
1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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professionalism was also not simply a matter of regulars versus volunteers and militia; it 
was about the previous experience in frontier warfare. 
 For the Americans, the best commanders, save for Winfield Scott, all came out of 
state militias. Commanders who learned their trade in the frontier militia excelled at the 
management of health. Militia leaders learned the hygienic and tactical measures 
necessary to maintain the health of their soldiers. Commanders like William Hull, who 
viewed health as unmanageable, failed, whereas commanders who allowed their soldiers 
to continue to fight while ill or injured were successful. There was also a correlation 
between petite guerre irregular tactics and larger volumes of soldiers fit for duty. Light 
infantry tactics relied on logistics drawn from foraging and more dependable and 
versatile pack horses. Conversely, commanders that relied on wagons for logistics could 
not supply their forces, or worst, became tethered to their fortifications and engaged in 
few offensive actions.  
A key disadvantage of American military culture in the War of 1812 was the 
Revolutionary heritage. There was a shared corporate identity in warfare as characterized 
by suffering and privation. The tradition of unsupplied soldiers serving in tattered 
uniforms connected soldiers to their Revolutionary forefathers but did not create an 
identity around competent logistics. The Continental Army succeeded through defensive 
survival against a more powerful opponent, but during the War of 1812 the U.S. Army 
was the aggressor and thus required competent logistics to succeed. The effective light 
infantry tactics of leaders such as William Henry Harrison secured the Old Northwestern 
Territories, but the American Army could not maintain a campaign long enough to seize 
all the provinces of British North America (present-day Canada).  
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The regiments that were best disposed to succeed in the Northern campaign of the 
War of 1812 were drawn from regions where the war was fought. Political divisions in 
America made the war extremely problematic. The Democratic-Republicans who called 
for the War of 1812 were strongest in the southern states but were forced to keep most of 
their regiments in the south to protect against a slave revolt supported by the Royal 
Navy.2 The borderlands New England and the mid-Atlantic states provided the best 
regiments in the War of 1812. Perhaps ironically, these states were heavily influenced by 
Federalists who opposed the war. A case study of the 21st Infantry Regiment reveals 
soldiers who suffered failure after failure early in the conflict only to be denied victory 
during the 1814 campaign. In 1814, after numerous reforms, the U.S. Northern Army 
won all its engagements but was forced to abandon its offensive action because of 
inadequate logistics. For the New England soldiers of the 21st Infantry Regiment, the 
failure of logistics occurred simultaneously with the smuggling of New England supplies 
to the British Army. This represented a particularly galling betrayal of their years of 
suffering privation on a distant frontier. The flaws of a divided slave-based and free 
country led to frustrating failures in the northern campaign, making the suffering of 
privation far more onerous. 
The British use of a locally drawn Regiment of Foot was frustrating for reasons 
far more connected to problematic institutional culture in the British Army. The 104th 
Regiment of Foot was drawn from New Brunswick and excelled at light infantry tactics 
from its inception. However, the unit’s commissions were all based upon purchase, and 
 
2 Alan Taylor recently described the role of British maritime raids that exploited southern slave populations 
in The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772-1832 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2013). 
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most of the officers who commanded in the 104th had to grapple with invalids who could 
not physically handle active campaigning. The Regiment defended unthreatened coastal 
fortifications for most of the War of 1812. The best light infantry fighters in British North 
American languished in garrison duties while a small force of British regulars struggled 
with a larger U.S. force in the Upper Canadian frontier. The 104th Regiment of Foot 
remained in coastal garrison duties until the volume of invalids from the fighting in 
Upper Canada was large enough for invalid Veterans Battalions to relieve them.  
The 104th Regiment of Foot deployed to the fighting during the 1814 campaign 
along with large reinforcements that came to North American following the Duke of 
Wellington’s victory in the Peninsular Campaign. By that time, there were so many 
British Regiments in North America that Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond had to 
pull units out of combat duties because his forces exceeded his ability to supply 
provisions. The unit’s quick winter march to the fighting theatre illustrated the 104th 
Regiment of Foot’s unique fitness for the conflict. Moreover, it attested to their wastage 
for the duration of the conflict. The best regiments for a comparison to the 104th 
Regiment of Foot did not consist of fellow British units; rather, they were the “foreign 
regiments” drawn from Swiss Allies. The 104th Regiment of Foot performed well in 
combat, and it is appropriate that they have been so celebrated in Canadian history. 
However, military leaders squandered them in garrison duties for most of the conflict 
because they were a provincial regiment. This dynamic represents one of the biggest 
mistakes in the War of 1812. The 41st Regiment may have been the most experienced 
regiment on the continent, but the 104th was the most prepared to meet the environmental 
challenges. 
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The resources of commanders and soldiers were often grossly inadequate to take 
control of their health in an austere environment. Morale and health were inextricably 
linked and speak to John Lynn’s three types of soldier motivation: the motivation to 
serve, combat motivation, and sustained motivation.3 Alcohol was a means to secure both 
combat and sustained motivation and, as such, became a method of managing illness on 
both sides of the War of 1812. Before combat, soldiers drank a pint of hard alcohol, and 
often that improved their combat effectiveness. There were also references of liquor used 
to fortify soldiers in the harsh environment, with American soldiers receiving extra 
rations after harrowing stream crossings and British soldiers receiving extra rations in 
isolated outposts. Alcohol use to help soldiers stay healthy and in good spirits was so 
widespread that individuals on both sides shared alcohol. While the shared experience of 
alcohol could unite soldiers on both sides, it further alienated Native Americans. Most 
records about Native American alcohol use pertained to Shawnee confederate and 
Potawatomi tribes and served to exacerbate differences. Alcohol, when used by Native 
Americans in the same manner as white soldiers, was interpreted as something that 
furthered the purported animal nature of Shawnee and Potawatomi fighters. Alcohol was 
an imperfect device that offered soldiers and officers some measure of control of their 
health in a harsh environment. The flawed nature of the solution of alcohol illustrates the 
perniciousness of the War of 1812’s environment and the desperate nature of day-to-day 
survival in the Upper Canadian frontier.  
 
3 John Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 
1791-94 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). 
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In a conflict on an isolated frontier, food and logistics became the most important 
factors for survival. Soldiers today suffer from the same health problems as soldiers in 
the War of 1812, and people die with similar conditions in the undeveloped world. 
Modern medicine helps soldiers survive; however, malnutrition is a leading factor in high 
rates of sickness. Robert Sapolsky’s extensive research on the neurochemistry of stress 
and trauma places more emphasis on food insecurity than specific instances of violence.4 
While scholars of human experiences focus on the emotional impact of violence, 
scientific research concentrates more on the role of stress and general illness. A focus on 
the military campaign of 1814 underscores an essential point: there was an extremely 
high correlation between illness and periods of low rations. American officers chaffed 
under a system of unaccountable civilian contractors. After the reforms of Major General 
Jacob Brown and Brigadier General Winfield Scott, the Americans began to gain 
dominance on the battlefield. However, American commanders gained little lasting effect 
in the outcome of the campaign, save for increased reputation, by winning battles at 
Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and Fort Erie, because they failed to support their forces 
logistically for future operations. British Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond, who 
was born in Quebec, was a veteran of fighting in the Netherlands and Egypt. Because he 
possessed local knowledge, he developed a logistically feasible strategy. Drummond’s 
reforms had already taken place when Arthur Wellesley addressed similar problems with 
the British Army in Portugal by establishing a Commissary-General.5 
 
4 Robert Sapolsky Why Zebras Don't Get Ulcers (New York: Times Books, 2004), and Behave: The 
Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst (New York: Penguin Press, 2017). 
5 Letter from Arthur Wellington to Lieutenant General Harry Burrard from Lavos, 8 August 1808, in 
Arthur Wellesley Wellington, and Charles Esdaile ed., The Duke of Wellington: Military Dispatches (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2014), 101. 
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The British used civilian contractors who faced the same problems as their 
American counterparts. However, they employed an accountable general officer who was 
responsible for the distribution rations. In 1814 Drummond received significant 
reinforcements from the Peninsular Wars in Spain and Portugal. However, he limited the 
size of his force so that the commissariat could keep up with demand. He also embraced 
the citizen-soldier model of part-time soldiers that returned home during the harvest. 
Native American tribes, including the Six Nations, Chippewa, Mississauga, Ottawa, 
Wyandot, and Delaware, were deployed as irregular forces that required far less logistical 
support. Drummond lost many battles but gained the most because he could supply his 
forces, and he used Native American allies and militia to cut the American army’s lines 
of supply. He lost the traditional battles but consistently won the light infantry fight. 
Attention to logistics and the supply of adequate rations were crucial features of a 
successful campaign that brought few classic battle victories.  
The War of 1812 is well understood as a conflict in which the British and 
American forces both considered themselves victorious, even if Native Americans gained 
very little for their fighting.6 Approaching the war from a lower-level operational 
perspective helps to clarify the key characteristics that led to successful military behavior. 
In the early years of their dominance, the British failed to employ the best regiment for 
the frontier conflict: the 104th Regiment of Foot. The U.S. Army experienced a slower 
process wherein successful frontier militia officers gained federal general officer 
commissions. At the company level, New England and mid-Atlantic soldiers filled the 
ranks. These soldiers came from states that opposed the War of 1812 politically. Officers 
 
6 Wesley Turner, The War of 1812: The War That Both Sides Won (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2000). 
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at the lowest level of U.S. command often desired the experience of bloody combat as a 
reward for suffering on a distant frontier. Additionally, low supplies and exposure to a 
harsh frontier environment meant that commanders at the company level (typically 100-
120 soldiers) rarely had half strength of regular soldiers. As a result, they were forced to 
heavily rely on recently added recruits to amplify their numbers on fit-for-duty rosters. 
The best commanders exerted some level of control by prudently rationing alcohol and 
food. After being raised in Quebec, Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond possessed 
local knowledge and military experience. In 1814 he succeeded by emphasizing the role 
of the militia and Native American allies that were skilled light infantry tactics. 
Drummond may have always served in regular British regiments, but like the American 
militia generals he possessed local knowledge. 
 More classic environmental histories such as Black Rice and the Columbian 
Exchange argued for an environmentally deterministic theory of history.7 In the War of 
1812, success for operational leaders was rarely accidental, and commanders who took 
responsibility for the health of their soldiers in a frontier border region outperformed their 
peers. Honor has been criticized significantly by authors such as Alan Taylor and Joanne 
Freeman, but it served as a fundamental factor in the hardiness and resilience of War of 
1812 fighters.8 Moreover, leaders often used extremely problematic measures, such as a 
high rate of alcohol consumption, to manage the health of their soldiers. Even measures 
like moving to stagnant water and filth trenches were accidents of early nineteenth-
 
7 Judith Carney, Black Rice: The African Origins of Rice Cultivation in the Americas (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), and Crosby, The Columbian Exchange. 
8 Joanne Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2001), and Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & 
Indian Allies (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010). 
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century humoral theory. Anyone who believes they have control of their own health is far 
more likely to recover from survivable illness and injury than individuals who 
characterized illness and injury as fixed invalidity or disability. Events like the charge of 
cowardice for William Hull’s surrender of Detroit are best understood in the context of 
the impact of environmental factors that dramatically shaped the human body’s ability to 
overcome invalidity. Officers such as Zachary Taylor, who allowed their soldiers to fight 
rather than succumb to illness, succeeded because environmental hardiness was 
connected to the founding Revolutionary Army’s tradition of being clothed in rags with 
negligible provisions. 
 In his book The War of 1812: in the Age of Napoleon, Jeremy Black argues that 
expeditionary forces were weakened because of the lack of lasting strategic results from 
battlefield victories.9 However, the historiography has yet to shift away from decisive 
battle interpretations of the War of 1812. A focus on the day-to-day management of 
illness reveals that the most consequential factor in the northern theatre was the 
management of the environment. Additionally, commanders who believed they could 
control the health of their soldiers performed better in battle. An approach to the War of 
1812 from a daily management perspective illustrates the most important environmental 
factors that shaped the war; it also improves our understanding of how commanders 
succeeded in battle.  
 At the close of the northern campaign, the British army performances of 
environmental management far exceeded those of the American Northern Army. 
 
9 Jeremy Black, The War of 1812 in the Age of Napoleon (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009). 
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However, the American army learned far more as the 1814 campaign unfolded. The Duke 
of Wellington’s victories in the Peninsular Wars and at Waterloo reinforced the dynamics 
of the British purchase system, and the result was the British army’s extremely poor 
performance in the Crimean War. On the other hand, the American army changed 
dynamically after the War of 1812. Commanders like Winfield Scott, Thomas Sidney 
Jesup, and Zachary Taylor learned the hard lessons of a flawed logistics system in the 
campaign of 1814. They developed a much better approach to logistics and 
environmental management that led to successful campaigns in the Blackhawk War, 
Seminole Wars, and Mexican American War. Moreover, these officers had direct 
relationships with Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman. John Grenier has argued in 
The First Way of War that the military experiences from the colonial period to the War of 
1812 shaped Sherman’s brutal technique of targeting of the will of civilians.10 However, 
“the march to the sea” was also a campaign that focused on destroying the environment 
of the American South. The small peripheral wars between the War of 1812 and the Civil 
War developed on distant frontiers under the command of veterans of the 1814 campaign. 
While the commanders endured a broken logistics system in the War of 1812, they 
changed the institutional officer culture as the nineteenth century unfolded. While there 
are certainly problems with today’s reliance on government contractors for logistics, the 
American army will probably never experience the dramatic supply problems that it did 
in 1814. Learning from military failure can be more valuable than success, and the small 
 
10 John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 
219 
 
core of U.S. army officers who fought well in the War of 1812 created a system of reform 
the remains to the present day.  
  Battle narratives dominate the study of warfare by military historians, while 
environmental studies typically lack military operational depth. By studying the 
operational management of the environment, we gain a much clearer picture of the ways 
that officers and soldiers shaped their own experiences in harsh situations. Studies of 
military operational histories that do not account for the experience of war will often 
view soldiers as objects on maps. Importantly, the soldiers’ experience and adaptation to 
their environment were as central to the outcome of the War of 1812 as the placement of 
regiments in key engagements. Frontier innovations in health management and tactics led 
to the most lasting success in the War of 1812 and illustrate that it is not enough to excel 
on the battlefield; it is also important to do the most to preserve the size and effectiveness 
of armies. Soldiers seek battlefield notoriety, but there are far more cases of dysentery 
and malaria than there is glory in war. As this dissertation has demonstrated, those who 
best managed the suffering, the filth, and the unromantic aspects of war prevailed. 
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